Encryption Chips

>	Faking crypto chips for public algorithims is theoretically
>more difficult, because its simple to create a DES_verify routine to make
>sure your DES chip is working right.

a) chips do not need makeup
b) t'were me, I would just fix the chip so that instead of 2^56 (DES) keys
   or whatever, the PRNG was "fixed" so that the total keyspace was only 2^32
   for instance. Enough to be nearly impossible to check but small enough
   for a brute force engine to zip through in seconds *if you knew the 
   algorithm*.

The nice thing about am implimentation in software is that the code can be 
examined for just this sort of thing *on a randomly selected operating unit*.
- hard to do with a chip.
						Warmly,
							Padgett

a. huh?
b. I was assuming something similar to the Sun /dev/des, which is
basically invoked as 
int cbc_crypt(key, data, datalen, mode, ivec)
              ^^^

If your chip is doing key generation for you, then testing is tougher.

Adam


A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security wrote:

| >	Faking crypto chips for public algorithims is theoretically
| >more difficult, because its simple to create a DES_verify routine to make
| >sure your DES chip is working right.
| 
| a) chips do not need makeup
| b) t'were me, I would just fix the chip so that instead of 2^56 (DES) keys
|    or whatever, the PRNG was "fixed" so that the total keyspace was only 2^32
|    for instance. Enough to be nearly impossible to check but small enough


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
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