Re: Internet Privacy Guaranteed ad (POTP Jr.)

> From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com  Mon Feb 19 17:50:19 1996
> Date: Mon, 19 Feb 1996 17:17:52 -0600 (CST)
> From: IPG Sales <ipgsales@cyberstation.net>

> We are not currently revealing all the details of our system because of 
> patents in process, and other relat6ed matters. We are offering the 
> software. You should be able to readily decompile it and determine the 
> algorithms used andf how they are used to generate random number sequences 
> for very long files.  For short messages, a true OTP is used directly. 

Marketing Fluff - read "we don't *want* to revel it".  Patent stuff doesn't
take long to get the initial disclosures filed.  Cypherpunks are 
generally engineers and are immune to such crap.  

> If you are aware of encrtypting technology, you recognize that hardware 
> prime number cycle wheels for the basis of some of the most secured 
> hardware systems employed for encryption. We simply expand that technogy 
> using software to set an intial setting, an adder, and a limit for 64 
> such wheels, using large random prime numbers for each of those settings. 
> The total number of possibilities is over 10 to the 1690th power and can 
> be much larger. 

So.  Large "random" prime numbers are generated.  From what?  How?
Obviously these act as keys to your "OTP".  Figure out how to 
match this prime and you can generate the same "OTP".

> Thus we can eliminate the need to have the length of the OTP to be equal 
> to the length of the file - if you do not belive that it works, try it 
> and see - it takes inly a few hours to set such a trial up. We generated 
> over 790 gigabytes of charcaters, on multiple backups, and tested. Our 
> standard deviations, chi squares, Delta ICs for bits, characters, sets, 
> and the entire set were random. The sets are random, and you can take 
> that to the bank. 

So the data coming out appears random.  Big whoopie.  Lots of algorithms
can generate the same thing.

The key is how do you seed that random number generator? 

This isn't even close to being a OTP.  A OTP by definition has a random
set of data that is transmitted to the receipient over a seperate
secure channel from the actual message to be sent.  The actual message
and the OTP are XOR'ed together and sent.  The receipient then XORs
the OTP and the encrypted message to get plaintext.

That is pretty simple - even a marketing drone should be able to figure
that one out.

Now - explain how (in generic terms) your system acts as a OTP.

> Someone, will decompile it and discover that it is truly random, at least 
> from the practical usage basis. But we need that time to file patents, 
> cvopyrights and the like. 

Yes - hopefully someone will take the time and money to decompile it.
.... but if you are so sure of yourself,
why not give away some demo copies.  Why not source of the security
functions?  (Shove that patent crap someplace - you wouldn't be 
selling it if your disclosures weren't already filed)

> The IPG system solves the key management problem and produces a truly 
> unbreakabkle system. We make no apologies for not currently revealing all 
> of the methodologies andf algorithms, but they will be revealed with 
> time, by us or others, and you will discover that it is indeed a simple, 
> easy to use, easy to install, truly unbreakable system.

"unbreakable" - Bullshit - you obviously don't know crap.

Dan
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dan Oelke                                  Alcatel Network Systems
droelke@aud.alcatel.com                             Richardson, TX

On Mon, 19 Feb 1996, Daniel R. Oelke wrote:

> > From owner-cypherpunks@toad.com  Mon Feb 19 17:50:19 1996
> > Date: Mon, 19 Feb 1996 17:17:52 -0600 (CST)
> > From: IPG Sales <ipgsales@cyberstation.net>
> 
> > We are not currently revealing all the details of our system because of 
> > patents in process, and other relat6ed matters. We are offering the 
> > software. You should be able to readily decompile it and determine the 
> > algorithms used andf how they are used to generate random number sequences 
> > for very long files.  For short messages, a true OTP is used directly. 
> 
> Marketing Fluff - read "we don't *want* to revel it".  Patent stuff doesn't
> take long to get the initial disclosures filed.  Cypherpunks are 
> generally engineers and are immune to such crap.  

You must also then know that you do not always get what you want with a 
pent - sometimes you do not get anything, or not enough to cover you. 
Until we know, we are reating much of the material as trade secrets, as 
we are sure you would also do. Once, you discover how simple the system 
is to install, use, update, and add to, you will understand our concern.

> 
> > If you are aware of encrtypting technology, you recognize that hardware 
> > prime number cycle wheels for the basis of some of the most secured 
> > hardware systems employed for encryption. We simply expand that technogy 
> > using software to set an intial setting, an adder, and a limit for 64 
> > such wheels, using large random prime numbers for each of those settings. 
> > The total number of possibilities is over 10 to the 1690th power and can 
> > be much larger. 
> 
> So.  Large "random" prime numbers are generated.  From what?  How?
> Obviously these act as keys to your "OTP".  Figure out how to 
> match this prime and you can generate the same "OTP".
> 
The hardware  OTP is used as a template to 

> > Thus we can eliminate the need to have the length of the OTP to be equal 
> > to the length of the file - if you do not belive that it works, try it 
> > and see - it takes inly a few hours to set such a trial up. We generated 
> > over 790 gigabytes of charcaters, on multiple backups, and tested. Our 
> > standard deviations, chi squares, Delta ICs for bits, characters, sets, 
> > and the entire set were random. The sets are random, and you can take 
> > that to the bank. 
> 
> So the data coming out appears random.  Big whoopie.  Lots of algorithms
> can generate the same thing.

Starting with an OTP as seed? The algorithm may be fixed in a sense, but 
it employs a truse hardware random OTP to select intial settings, adds, 
and limits, so every one is new and unique - a lot of algorithnms can 
generate pseudfo trandom numbers, but onece you knw the algorithm, you 
can generate the random sequence. Our system does not do that - in 
oReder to solve the system, you must know what OTP was used, that is what 
was the true hardware generated OTP. Unless you know what that was, 
knowing the algorithm does nothing for you. If you understand that 
principle you understand the system. 

> 
> The key is how do you seed that random number generator? 
> 
As explained above

> This isn't even close to being a OTP.  A OTP by definition has a random
> set of data that is transmitted to the receipient over a seperate
> secure channel from the actual message to be sent.  The actual message
> and the OTP are XOR'ed together and sent.  The receipient then XORs
> the OTP and the encrypted message to get plaintext.
> 
> That is pretty simple - even a marketing drone should be able to figure
> that one out.
Perhaps so, but our system does employ a true hardware generated OTP, and 
operates similiar to what you describe -  however, the important 
differernce is that we use a smal;l OTP to generate a larger OTP, like 
stringing the cable across the Golden Gate narrows. Just becuase we 
convert over from a full OTP to a prime number wheel system configured 
from the OTP doers not mnean that the result is not an OTP - in theory it 
is simple to break RSA systems, but factoring a 2048 bit number, or 4096 
number, or whatever, makes the problem enormous  - our system for large 
messages/files is similiar in difficult except that it is much nearer 
an 8192 bit number than 2048. The possibilities to be examined ar4e so 
large, that iot is not possible to solve then with a computer, even if 
all the particles in the iuniverse, all 10 to the 80 power of then were 
a Cray T3E, or better.  Furthermore, all you would get would be all the 
possiblilities which would be everything!


 > 
> Now - explain how (in generic terms) your system acts as a OTP.
> 
I believe that you have some basic grasp of OTPs, but obviously you do 
not understand how the Golden Gate Bride Cable was strung: A 
string, a rope, a small steel cable, all of the cables - we employ a 
similar technique to fdeliver the follow on OTPs. 
> > Someone, will decompile it and discover that it is truly random, at least 
> > from the practical usage basis. But we need that time to file patents, 
> > cvopyrights and the like. 
> 
> Yes - hopefully someone will take the time and money to decompile it.
> .... but if you are so sure of yourself,
> why not give away some demo copies.  Why not source of the security
> functions?  (Shove that patent crap someplace - you wouldn't be 
> selling it if your disclosures weren't already filed)
> 
> > The IPG system solves the key management problem and produces a truly 
> > unbreakabkle system. We make no apologies for not currently revealing all 
> > of the methodologies andf algorithms, but they will be revealed with 
> > time, by us or others, and you will discover that it is indeed a simple, 
> > easy to use, easy to install, truly unbreakable system.
> 
> "unbreakable" - Bullshit - you obviously don't know crap.
> 
Time will prove one of us wrong, and that wiill prove to be you - it is 
unbreakable as a thoprough examination of the literature will reveal.
 > Dan
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> Dan Oelke                                  Alcatel Network Systems
> droelke@aud.alcatel.com                             Richardson, TX
> 
>

Monty, my squeaky python, has a pop quiz for you. 

1) What is the definition of a One TIme Pad?
2) What is the standard informtation theoretic proof of the 
   unbreakability of a One Time Pad?

Use an number 2 pencil and write on both sides of the perpetual motion
machine

---
They say in  online country             So which side are you on boys
There is no middle way                  Which side are you on
You'll either be a Usenet man           Which side are you on boys
Or a thug for the CDA                   Which side are you on?
  National Union of Computer Operatives; Hackers, local 37   APL-CPIO

I've been reading the mish-mash of replies from "IPG Sales" and have been
trying to figure out exactly what it is they think they're doing.  Aside
from the crap about not revealing details due to patent-pending issues, but
claiming it's the same as a process that's been in use since 1966 (clue:
prior art == no patent) and an unwillingness to provide any names or
references for all this apart from mentioning Ms. Denning and Leyland's web
page, I think I've got something pieced together.  Perhaps IPG Sales will be
happy to tell me if I've got it right or not:

Step 1. 100 friends and I pay IPG $$$.

Step 2. IPG starts up a hardware-based random number generator, and spits out
	5066-bit chunks of random data to be used as OTPs.  Since each pair of
	friends needs unique data (wouldn't want them easedropping on our
	gossip about them), IPG will generate a large number of said chunks.
	The magic box remembers every chunk it's ever spewed and never, ever
	repeats itself.

Step 3. IPG's Kwality Kontrol Dept. will run a bunch of statistical tests on
	the chunks (did I see the standard entropy calculation in the list?)
	to make sure they look truly random.  Chunks failing the tests get
	tossed.

Step 4. IPG takes the surviving chunks and runs them through a "prime number
	cycle wheel" which is some kind of rotor system, with something like
	64 rotors, or perhaps 64 passes through an n-rotor system.  It produces
	primes, or works with primes, or somehow large random primes (can a
	prime truly be called "random) either come in, go out, or both.  Primes
	are involved here somehow.  In any case, whatever comes out is part of
	10^1690 (or from a previous message, 10^2330) possible results.  Why
	this matters I do not know.

Step 5. The results are somehow variable in length (?) or in some way
	eliminates the need for a OTP to be at least as large as the message
	to be encoded.  This has been claimed several times.  So somehow the
	original OTP chunk produces new pads of potentially infinite length?

Step 6. IPG mails out a lot of floppies to me and my 100 friends containing
	lots of these resultant things (which still sound like OTPs.)  I
	assume US Mail is completely trusted, data is never corrupted, disks
	are never lost or stolen, etc.

Step 7. These results act as OTPs (aka Nvelopes) that are used to encode
	the message.  My buddies use the matching chunks to decode the
	messages (aka Nvelopeners.)  The software system does all the work,
	and I don't have to do anything (much like public-key systems today.)

Err... okay, maybe I don't have this figured out.  Still sounds like OTPs,
and someone selling random data at $15 a pop per month.  Having multiple
floppies mailed to me monthly, with all the inherent difficulties, sounds
like a lot more work than public-key management.  My bozometer is pegged.

Looking forward to having my oversights corrected,
Wink

--
winkjr@teleport.com
"We offer freedom to the masses.  It's a tough fight -- I'll grant you that --
but we're brave.  We're well financed.  We believe that God is on our side."
						-- Netscape CEO James Barksdale

I, too, am interested in seeing the underlying algorithms.  Not
because I don't believe that they work, but because I'm interested in
seeing what you may have found that no one else has.  However from
your recent mailing I think I know what you're doing:

> Starting with an OTP as seed? The algorithm may be fixed in a sense, but 
> it employs a truse hardware random OTP to select intial settings, adds, 
> and limits, so every one is new and unique - a lot of algorithnms can 
> generate pseudfo trandom numbers, but onece you knw the algorithm, you 
> can generate the random sequence. Our system does not do that - in 
> oReder to solve the system, you must know what OTP was used, that is what 
> was the true hardware generated OTP. Unless you know what that was, 
> knowing the algorithm does nothing for you. If you understand that 
> principle you understand the system. 

I think this is the key.  Question: if I knew the starting "OTP" that
seeded your algorithms, would I be able to re-create the whole stream
and decrypt a message?  I suspect the answer is "yes".  However if I
knew the algorithm you were using, could I decrypt the message without
the use of the "OTP" key?  I don't know the answer to this question.
I hope the answer is no.  Assuming it is no, then I ask you: when can
I see the algorithm you are using.  Following is an example of why
knowledge of the algorithm is useful but not harmful:

Example: Let's assume I can securely exchange a "OTP" (key) with
someone.  I now run some algorithm using that "OTP", add in the
plaintext, and out comes a random stream which is the encrypted
message.  Is this similar to what POTP does?  I believe the answer is
"yes".  Let me submit that what I described here I can do with DES
using ofb mode to generate a random number stream with which I encrypt
the message.  The fact that I know I used DES does not help me decrypt
the message.  I still need the "OTP" key in order to figure out which
stream of random bits were used to encrypt the message.

> Perhaps so, but our system does employ a true hardware generated OTP, and 
> operates similiar to what you describe -  however, the important 
> differernce is that we use a smal;l OTP to generate a larger OTP, like 
> stringing the cable across the Golden Gate narrows. Just becuase we 
> convert over from a full OTP to a prime number wheel system configured 
> from the OTP doers not mnean that the result is not an OTP - in theory it 

Actually, this statement is false.  What you have is a pseudo one-time
pad, not a true one-time pad.  It's close, though.  The problem is
that the means that you use to convert the smaller OTP to a larger OTP
may be "flawed", and that is the algorithm that I think most people
here want to see.  I do believe that the 5600-bit OTP key material
that you distribute is random.  You claim it is hardware generated; I
believe that.  However that doesn't help me feel any less wary about
the algorithm you use to convert that 5600-bit OTP to a larger
pseudo-random stream.

At best, you have a cipher with a 5600-bit key.  If this is so, I
congratulate you on it.  However I think that I, and others on this
list, would like to see how it is accomplished.  This is mostly
because I believe people here are wary of such systems; key management
and random number generation is a tricky business, and its very easy
to make a slip and get it wrong.  Just look at Netscape and other
systems which have fallen to simple attacks.

I think that people here would like to prove whether or not your
system is vulnerable to such attacks.  Just remember that if it is not
vulnerable, as you claim, then you have nothing to worry aout and you
will gain the acknowledgement of the cypherpunks behind you.  On the
other hand, wouldn't you rather that you know if your system has a
flaw, rather than having some cracker discover it and try to exploit
it rather than inform you?  That is a choice you will have to make.

I believe the cypherpunks offer still stands:  to test your algorithm.

The choice is yours.

-derek

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

>>>>> "Derek" == Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU> writes:

    Derek> Actually, this statement is false.  What you have is a
    Derek> pseudo one-time pad, not a true one-time pad.  It's close,
    Derek> though.  The problem is that the means that you use to

It's not even close. A PRNG-stream can be brute-forced, even if it
uses an otherwise secure RNG. A OTP cannot.

Andreas



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On Mon, 19 Feb 1996, Derek Atkins wrote:

> I, too, am interested in seeing the underlying algorithms.  Not
> because I don't believe that they work, but because I'm interested in
> seeing what you may have found that no one else has.  However from
> your recent mailing I think I know what you're doing:
> 
> > Starting with an OTP as seed? The algorithm may be fixed in a sense, but 
> > it employs a truse hardware random OTP to select intial settings, adds, 
> > and limits, so every one is new and unique - a lot of algorithnms can 
> > generate pseudfo random numbers, but once you know the algorithm, you 
> > can generate the random sequence. Our system does not do that - in 
> > oReder to solve the system, you must know what OTP was used, that is what 
> > was the true hardware generated OTP. Unless you know what that was, 
> > knowing the algorithm does nothing for you. If you understand that 
> > principle you understand the system. 
> 
> I think this is the key.  Question: if I knew the starting "OTP" that
> seeded your algorithms, would I be able to re-create the whole stream
> and decrypt a message? 

Answer - No, there are other things involved, time to microseconds, as 
well as the actual algorithm, recipient - name and relative number, and 
an additional user OTP. Remember that every OTP is a true OTP, and a new 
one is used for each transmission. The information to recreate the 
starting OTP is transmitted but is encrypted with the real starting OTP set,
so it is not easy to figure out what the starting OTP is.

Isuspect the answer is "yes".  However if I
> knew the algorithm you were using, could I decrypt the message without
> the use of the "OTP" key?

  I don't know the answer to this question.
> I hope the answer is no. 


It is definitely NO: You must have the the individual OTP to XOR out the 
message - It is the key to the encryption, and the obvious decryption.
The algorithm is impotent without the OTP.

 Assuming it is no, then I ask you: when can
> I see the algorithm you are using.  Following is an example of why
> knowledge of the algorithm is useful but not harmful:
> 
> Example: Let's assume I can securely exchange a "OTP" (key) with
> someone.  I now run some algorithm using that "OTP", add in the
> plaintext, and out comes a random stream which is the encrypted
> message.  Is this similar to what POTP does?  I believe the answer is
> "yes".  Let me submit that what I described here I can do with DES
> using ofb mode to generate a random number stream with which I encrypt
> the message.  The fact that I know I used DES does not help me decrypt
> the message.  I still need the "OTP" key in order to figure out which
> stream of random bits were used to encrypt the message.

 That is true, except you have a monstrous problem with key distribution 
 and the generation of the OTP keys. In effect, such a system would be 
 can OTP system, except it would not be as clean and as fast, and as 
 simplye as XORing the plain text with the OTP. 

> 
> > Perhaps so, but our system does employ a true hardware generated OTP, and 
> > operates similiar to what you describe -  however, the important 
> > differernce is that we use a small OTP to generate a larger OTP, like 
> > stringing the cable across the Golden Gate narrows. Just becuase we 
> > convert over from a full OTP to a prime number wheel system configured 
> > from the OTP doers not mnean that the result is not an OTP - in theory it 
> 
> Actually, this statement is false.  What you have is a pseudo one-time
> pad, not a true one-time pad.  It's close, though.


  I cannot argue with that characterization;however, I would point out 
  that a true One Time Pad must qualify as unpredictable, not 
  absolute random. We could generate indeterminate length OTPs but they 
  become unwieldy for huge files because the lengths must correspond - so 
  we have gone to the propogating method! 

  The problem is
> that the means that you use to convert the smaller OTP to a larger OTP
> may be "flawed", and that is the algorithm that I think most people
> here want to see.  I do believe that the 5600-bit OTP key material
> that you distribute is random.  You claim it is hardware generated; I
> believe that.  However that doesn't help me feel any less wary about
> the algorithm you use to convert that 5600-bit OTP to a larger
> pseudo-random stream.
> 
> At best, you have a cipher with a 5600-bit key. 

Yes, but it would be trival and not that big of a space problem to 
expand to a 10,000 bit key, or even a 20,000 bit key. We simply change a 
few parameters, in the C programs.

 If this is so, I
> congratulate you on it.  However I think that I, and others on this
> list, would like to see how it is accomplished.  This is mostly
> because I believe people here are wary of such systems; key management
> and random number generation is a tricky business, and its very easy
> to make a slip and get it wrong.  Just look at Netscape and other
> systems which have fallen to simple attacks.

We will provide you with a free demonstration if you would like. We will 
also provide you with the methodology in written form, but becuase of 
certain methods employed, we will not release the source code - we want 
tio buy some time.

In general, you will find the kernel of the propgations consists of 64 
equation sets of the form:

       Bi=(Bi+Ci MOD Di) Mod 256             Large prime numbers  
       ENCRYPTEXTi=OTP[Bi] XOR PLAINTEXTi    Encryption
       OTP[Bi]=ENCRYPTEXTi                   Makes the OTP Dynamic

Where the intial Bis, Cis and Dis are all randomly selected from a 
tables of 2048 random prime numbers, the 5600 bit OTP is used to make 
the selections from the 6144 prime numbers, Dis are always larger than 
either Cis or Bis. The Cis and Dis are also different prime mods of 256, 
there might be some repeats but not many from a selection of 64 from 
a set of 6144. The effect is that you put a plain text character into the 
system and the envcrypted character is XORed against a random character and 
the resultant becomes a part of the dynamically changing OTP. 

There is a little more to it but that is the essence!
> 
> I think that people here would like to prove whether or not your
> system is vulnerable to such attacks.  Just remember that if it is not
> vulnerable, as you claim, then you have nothing to worry aout and you
> will gain the acknowledgement of the cypherpunks behind you.  On the
> other hand, wouldn't you rather that you know if your system has a
> flaw, rather than having some cracker discover it and try to exploit
> it rather than inform you?  That is a choice you will have to make.
> 
> I believe the cypherpunks offer still stands:  to test your algorithm.


We would be most interested in allowing the cyberpunks to examine the 
program and use it as they like. We will provide source code for the 
propgation kernel, generating the large pseudo OTP from the real OTP - 
Actually there are two real time pads involved - a user oriented one and 
a message oriented one, nut that os only used to secure a user and for 
some smoothing operations. But that is the gist of it. 

> 
> The choice is yours.
> 
> -derek
> 

Try it, you will like it:

Ladies and Gentlemen -

For the last three plus weeks, some of the members of the C'Punks list 
have had the IPG algorithms in their possesion. 

None, to date have suggested that the system is unbreakable - to the 
contrary a few have stated that they believe it is unbreakable, but do 
not want to go on the record yet. 

I invite those that have copies of the system to acknowledge that fact 
and to state their opinions, if any. Some of these people have been 
helpful, and we have adopted some of their suggestions. For example, we 
are now call the encryption method, the ABC encryption method, because 
in the opinion of one person, it is so simple, straightforward and 
appropos as you will see. 

However, we want to expedite things. Accordingly, as of this 
date, we are now prepared to release the complete set of algorithms to any 
member of the C'punks mailing list who can establish that they are:

  1. A citizen of the United States
  2. Or a Citizen of Canada.

We are willing to prove incontrovertibly, to your satisfaction, that the IPG 
ABC Encryption system is at once as secure, in the real sense, as a true OTP,
or a pure 3064 bit prime number pair RSA system, and absolutely the fastest 
system possible, excepting possibly very short messages because of setup 
time. 

That is a lot of Chutzpah, but we are prepared to back it up, as you will 
see. We are prepared now, to send you a set of materials that can 
postively establish both of those assertions for yourself, beyond any doubt 
whatsoever. No ifs, no ands, no buts, no maybes, no anything. Period.

Our agenda is very simple.

   1. To prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that the system is absolutely 
      unbreakable, and the fastest unbreakable system possible.
 
   2. After that is agreed to, to prove beyond any doubt that the 
      system is extremely simple and by far the easiest to use and operate.

   3. That combined with RSA, or without RSA for that matter, the key 
      distribution system is as secure and simple as any method 
      available, including the public-private key method. No human ever 
      gets involved, it is all fully automatic and uncorruptable.

   4. That the key generation will be made to conform to your 
      requirements - either by licensing the process to you, or by 
      having an oversight group such as one of the Big Six, to 
      provide continuous monitoring of the process to insure that no 
      copies are kept and no one has access to the process. We can 
      resolve any question you have in this regard. 

   5. That an interchange system will be implemented that provides 
      the same degree of absolute guarantee of privacy, yet the two  
      parties do not even have each others key. Yes it can be done, 
      guaranteed. A few of you already know how, because they have the 
      written copies of our materials.

Temporarily however, we will only address point one. We will address the 
other four points after point one has been settled

It will not take most of you weeks, or even days to establish that the
IPG system is absolutely unbreakable, and that no system can possibly
be faster. Most of you will be able to do it in a day, or even in a few 
hours, it is that simple. I suspect the reason that the few who have the 
materials are not ready to committ themselves is because they cannot 
believe their eyes and mind - it cannot be possible - something must 
be wrong. It is not though. What they see and what their minds are telling 
them is true. It is absolutely unbreakable and no digital system could 
possibly be faster. In all fairness though, we have only provided them 
with the materials necessary for them to conduct there own tests within 
the last 48 hours, so testing may still be under way. 

It is much faster than RD5, IDEA, DES or anything else available 
in the software version  and with hardware implementation it can
be made orders of magnitude faster, 1000s of times faster than 
those mentioned, or any Feistel type system or or any other system,
of which we are aware. It is ideally suited to hardware implementation,
with multilevels of parallelism,  simple and practicable.  

We will send you a complete set of materials necessary for you to 
evaluate and test the system this date subject to the following. 

 1. You provide us with a telephone number that we can call you tonight 
    to verify that you have an American or Canadian citizen, with a phone 
    in one of those two countries. 
 
2. That you provide us with an American or Canadian snail-mail
   address - we will send six of you, selected at random, registered 
   copies of the materials provided to you, with some more detail, 
   mainly relating to hardware implementation, though that is discussed
   in the Internet version.  

3. That you agree to abide by ITAR, as well as by applicable copyrights 
   and patents. That with respect to ITAR, that you will not provide a 
   copy of the materials to anyone but you may tell them that IPG is 
   making the materials available.   

Be forewarned again, we will not respond to any attacks made based upon any 
opinions, suppositions, hypotheses, guesses, thoughts, or anything else 
other than the facts. Nor will we respond to any of the same sort 
of things related to Key Distribution or the like other than to 
reiterate that we will license the manufacture of keys for the system. 

If you are an engineer, you will be amazed by how simple hardware 
implementation is, serial, simple one dimensional parallelism, and two 
level parrallelism, unbelievably so. We intend to license the manufacture 
of chips.

So there my C'punk list friends. You threw down the gaunlet and challenged 
us. We accepted your challenge. Now, we are throwing down the gauntlet. 
To reiterate, we assert:

     1. That IPG's ABC Encryption system it is absolutely proveably 
        unbreakable, even to the point of quickly being self evidently 
        so to most of you with any signficant mathematical background.
   
     2. That is the fastest possible method of producing an unbreakable 
        PRNG stream to be XORed with plain text - 

     3. That it is unbelieveably simple to implement and use, as simple 
        as one of your associates said, as ABC.

Some of you have spoken your piece without one iota of facts. We want 
all of you on the list to see the facts for yourself, It will make 
believers of you. Especially, we want those that jumped into the 
swimming pool, the fray, without anything other than dogma or opinions
to see what the real facts are and how wrong they were.

I close with three quotes:

 1. The person who never alters their opinion is like standing water, and 
    breeds reptiles of the mind. William Blake. "The Marriage of Heaven 
    and Hell."

 2. It is the uncompromisingness with which dogma is held that the danger 
    lies.  Samuel Butler - "The Way of All Flesh,"  

 3. If we value knowledge, we must be free to follow wherever that 
    search may lead us. The free mind is no barking dog, to be tethered on 
    a ten-foot chain. Adlai Stevenson. 

    Paraenthetically, IPG will not be tethered to a one pico meter chain 
    that a few of you insist on trying to do.

We urge you to take up this challenge. It is going to have far reaching 
implications for your clients and for your companies. It is the wave of 
the future, as you will quickly discover.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In list.cypherpunks, ipgsales@cyberstation.net writes:

> Ladies and Gentlemen -
>
> For the last three plus weeks, some of the members of the C'Punks list 
> have had the IPG algorithms in their possesion. 
>
> None, to date have suggested that the system is unbreakable - to the 
> contrary a few have stated that they believe it is unbreakable, but do 
> not want to go on the record yet. 
>
> I invite those that have copies of the system to acknowledge that fact 
> and to state their opinions, if any.

Since a copy of the IPG system has apparently arrived unsolicited in my
mailbox this morning ("apparently" because I haven't unpacked or
inspected the MIME message; "unsolicited" because I did not request it),
I believe it's disclaimer time.

I have entered into no agreements to inspect, test or validate the IPG
software suite.  In the absence of a valid contract for my services, I
shall not inspect, test or offer opinions regarding the security of this
product.  IPG Sales is specificly enjoined from using my nym in any
reference to validation of their product.  Further, IPG is cautioned
against using "cypherpunks" as a validation reference, as my
subscription to this mailing list could then be construed as
contributing to the claim of validation.  This action is intended to
guard against claims of the form "roy@sendai.cybrspc.mn.org has been
unable to break our system", among others.

Note to IPG: I review all contract offers.  Feel free to contact me for
terms, but be advised that I'm somewhat expensive.

Note to c'punks:  apologies for burning listwidth, but this looks like
the proper Publication of Record for this notice.
- -- 
       Roy M. Silvernail         [ ]  roy@cybrspc.mn.org
    "Governments find it notoriously difficult to work with people
    that they cannot shoot."  -- James A. Donald <jamesd@netcom.com>

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Roy M. Silvernail wrote:

| In list.cypherpunks, ipgsales@cyberstation.net writes:

| Since a copy of the IPG system has apparently arrived unsolicited in my
| mailbox this morning ("apparently" because I haven't unpacked or
| inspected the MIME message; "unsolicited" because I did not request it),
| I believe it's disclaimer time.
| 
| I have entered into no agreements to inspect, test or validate the IPG
| software suite.  In the absence of a valid contract for my services, I
| shall not inspect, test or offer opinions regarding the security of this
| product.  IPG Sales is specificly enjoined from using my nym in any
| reference to validation of their product.  Further, IPG is cautioned
| against using "cypherpunks" as a validation reference, as my
| subscription to this mailing list could then be construed as
| contributing to the claim of validation.  This action is intended to
| guard against claims of the form "roy@sendai.cybrspc.mn.org has been
| unable to break our system", among others.
| 
| Note to IPG: I review all contract offers.  Feel free to contact me for
| terms, but be advised that I'm somewhat expensive.
| 
| Note to c'punks:  apologies for burning listwidth, but this looks like
| the proper Publication of Record for this notice.

	I'd like to add my name to Roy's letter.  I also received an
unsoliceted (1700 line) copy of an algorithim.  I do intend to review
it.  I strongly caution IPG against using my name in their
advertising.  

Adam


- -- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume


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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Adam Shostack wrote:
> | Since a copy of the IPG system has apparently arrived unsolicited in my
> | mailbox this morning...

Me too.

>         I'd like to add my name to Roy's letter.

Oh, uhh, yea; me too.  (I've already sent in a comment concerning the
bizarre process of ANDing 8-bit numbers with 0x3500, but that should
be taken as nothing other than a casual result of my reading the mail;
I've made no commitments or entered into any sort of contractual
agreement.)

> I strongly caution IPG against using my name in their
> advertising.

I am sure that a company with as much Internet savvy as IPG realizes
the degree to which using inappropriate attributions like that could
backfire, given the propensity of some netizens to defend their
reputations through every technological and legal means at their
disposal.

______c_____________________________________________________________________
Mike M Nally * Tiv^H^H^H IBM * Austin TX    * pain is inevitable  
       m5@tivoli.com * m101@io.com          *
      <URL:http://www.io.com/~m101>         * suffering is optional

On Mon, 18 Mar 1996, IPG Sales wrote:

> 
> Ladies and Gentlemen -
> 
> For the last three plus weeks, some of the members of the C'Punks list 
> have had the IPG algorithms in their possesion. 
> 
> None, to date have suggested that the system is unbreakable - to the 
> contrary a few have stated that they believe it is unbreakable, but do 
> not want to go on the record yet. 
> 
[Lots of Stuff Snipped]

If an IPG fell in a forest and nobody heard it, would it make a sound ?

Arley Carter
Tradewinds Technologies, Inc.
email: ac@hawk.twinds.com
www: http://www.twinds.com

"Trust me. This is a secure product. I'm from <insert your favorite 
corporation or government agency>."

IPG Sales writes:
> For the last three plus weeks, some of the members of the C'Punks list 
> have had the IPG algorithms in their possesion. 

You again? Go away. Our snakes are very well oiled already.

.pm

On Mon, 18 Mar 1996, IPG Sales wrote:

> 
> Ladies and Gentlemen -
> 
> For the last three plus weeks, some of the members of the C'Punks list 
> have had the IPG algorithms in their possesion. 

[...]

Spelling and related errors: 14
Double Negatives: 8
Instances of forms of the word;
simple: 10
unbreakable: 7
fast: 7
belief: 5

---
My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn@schloss.li
"In fact, had Bancroft not existed,       potestas scientiae in usu est
Franklin might have had to invent him."    in nihilum nil posse reverti
00B9289C28DC0E55  E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

Derek - We accept the gaunlet that Cyperpunks threw down, We will 
provide the complete set of algoritms and free demo systems - we will not be 
asking you to sign a NDA or anything like that, but we do want it to be a 
two way street - if we put our head in your guillotene, to be chopped 
off by the warlord and his minions, then we expect you to perform 
reciprocal actions.

We will be back in a couple of hours or so, to spell out what we have 
in mind.  I do not believe that you will find the terms 
to be onerous or objectionable. 

Thanks for your civility, unlike some of your comrades in arms, very big 
arms, Greatly appreciated!


There has never been an idea advanced, where the orginator was not 
thought of as a crank - Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., "Over Teacups"

Derek - 

As stated previously, we accept the challenge that you make - 
However, we do believe that it should be a two way street -

If you are able to break the system, and everyone knows what we mean by 
break, then we will publicly admit that we are snake oil salesmen, and 
all the other things that Perry Metzger and others called us. We will go 
out of business, and tuck our tail and run. We will inform all major 
publications, WIRED, PC WEEK, PC  Magazine, PC World, Infoworld and the 
like that our mundane system was cracked by the cypherpunks. 

Furthermore: 
you, they,  will be free, to publish any material, any and all 
materials, will become the property of Cypherpunks if they break 
the system, inculding all of our source code - everything and they may do 
with it as they see fit.

On the other hand:

If the cypherpunks fail to break the system, they 
will  acknowledge that, not that it is unbreakable, but that they 
tried to break the system and were unable to do so, Furthermore, 
they will so notify all the major publications, and news sources that 
they tried break the system and failed - not that it is unbreakable 
but simply that they could not break it. Further, that all materials 
supplied to Cypherpunks will be returned to us, and will not be 
published without our explicit written permission, unless the 
Cypherpunks later break the system. 

Further:

That if you have not broken the system by August 1, 1996 the 
expiration date of the demo system to be provided to you, then we are
free to advertise that Cypherpunks have been trying to break our system and 
have been unable to so to that date, Further the cypherpunks will publicly 
acknowledge same as indicated previously. You can still try to break 
the system and publish the results, and obtain all of our souce code, 
materials and whatsoever when you do. However, you must do so with a 
purchased system and not a free demo system.

You can have infinity to try to break the system, but you cannot have 
that long to publicly admit that you have been unable to break it to 
date. I believe 5+ months is long enough to prove how easy it is to 
break, don't you.

Further:

If Cypherpunks are unable to break the system, then those who 
participated in the attempt will upbrade those cypherpunks, I at this 
stage prefer to call them cyphermouths, who have leaped before they 
looked, from a list supplied by us, based on received e-mail, in effect 
tell them to find out what they are talking about -before they start 
spouting off. 

Accordingly: 

We will not publish the algorithms on an Internet URL, for reasons 
that you, yourself, will soon come to understand. But we will provide it to a 
a very large selected set, you or your designee can do the selection, so 
long as all thosee selection are within the United States, of 
cypherpunks as follows:

 1. We will provide a 12 user integrated demo system, each outfitted with 
    240 Nvelopes, and Nvelopeners, read OTPs. These will not be the 
    5600 bit systems, discusssed in the many e-mail messages that have 
    been flowing back and forth, but will be our new 12288 bit systems, 
    which we have been working on since yesterday, since everyone seemed 
    to focus in on the 5600 bit OTPs - the algorithms themselves do not 
    change, only parametric values, but it will take a couple of days to 
    double check everything. 

    These are in effect single user systems, but for your purposes, 
    you may treat them as a site system. You may distribute them to 
    any twelve sites in the United States - You may not knowingly 
    deliver then into the hands of citizens of a country other than 
    the United States, not even Canadians. Nor may you make copies of 
    them and send them to anyone other than the 12 selected sites. Each 
    of the sites may of course communicate back and forth using the 
    system - be sure and don't include anything private because it is 
    so easy to break.  

    At each site, an unlimited number of people may work on cracking the 
    system, without limitation, but they must agree to the terms 
    set out herein in this offer.  Such participants may travel to a site 
    and work on it, but all work must be done at a site, not off 
    premises, at home or whatever -  the site may be operated 168 hours
    a week if desired, but no offsite work. 

   After the 20 User pair Nvelopes are exhausted, the DEMO system will be 
   set to recycle through the Nvelopes/Nvelopeners automatically,  this 
   means, as you might expect, that there is a finite chance, very 
   remote but possible, that you may get one or more exact OTP repeats  
   which means that you will be able to XOR out the OTP used, not the 
   orginal but the one actually used - that doers not count as breaking 
   the system, because it exists only as a convenience to continue 
   testing the system without interruption. For production systems, this 
   does not happen, cannot happen, unless you bugger your own, or allow 
   someone else to,system.     

   Also both performance and interface critisms are off limits during the 
   five months, unless you break the system of course - by then you may 
   crtique the performance, if you do it under lab conditions - a 
   defragmented disk with at least 10 times data free, ie. compare 
   apples to apples, not apples to oranges. We have been focusing on the 
   OTP aspects of the system, to the detriment of performance and 
   interface. For a first release though, we believe you will find them 
   acceptable - we will have a full windows 95 interface and 
   increased performance, hopefully by the time you break the 
   system, within the next few months. 

2. We will also supply 12 complete sets of the algorithms used, and 
   orally clarify any questions or ambiguities that may arise. However, 
   we will not submit to being unundated by a barrage of repetitious 
   questions - no more than three cypherpunks may be appointed as 
   questioners of IPG sales, and we are to be notified in writing,
   of who those appointees are. Inquiries from others will be directed to 
   one those three.

   The algorithms must be worked on at sight, other than some innoculous 
   trail and error processes and procedures which may be worked on at 
   home - no publication of same until you break the system.


Okay, enough badgering of each other - we deliberately did so yesterday, 
as some of you did, but now is the time for the cypherpunks, and for 
a few of what I will call cyphermouths, to put up or shut up. 
Assuming that you accept, we will supply any designee with the 12 sets, of 
materials, by UPS Next Day Air, and you may distrbute them as desired,  
subject to the above restrictions - we want to fight one problem at a 
time.

I somehow hope that you are able to include my good friend, "joke for 
him I am sure but serious from me", Perry in one of the twelve sites, 
so he can show us how stupid we are. Two of the best computer 
system engineers that I have ever known had the last name Metzger, Bob 
and Charles, who was blind - anyway good luck Perry, you are going to 
need it. We await your reply - assuming you accept, we will deliver the 
materials, one of the first three days of next week.

 
"He who laces himself into the straight jacket of what he knows and 
understands, imprisions his mind" - Willian Friedman memoirs - spoken 
to JVN, and Norbert Weiner, of MIT, at Princeton -

I have just read your conditions for releasing the information tha the 
group felt was necessary to evaluate your product. A couple of comments.
First, the Cypherpunks are not an organized group who can agree to your 
conditions. This is simply a mailing list not a corporate entity to be 
contracted with. To attempt to treat them as such and to use their 
resources for your marketing gain is, in my opinion, less than honest. If 
the code has not been broken in 5 months, nothing will have been proved. 
A better model to follow would be that used (eventually) by Netscape. 
Release the code for comment and make changes based on weaknesses 
discovered by the group.
	My last point has to do with one of your restrictions. Why will 
you not release the information to Canadians? It cannot be ITAR, because 
it does not apply to Canadians. How can you claim that the Cypherpunks 
failed to break your system if you exclude its most brilliant members! <G>.

Regards from Canada, 
Tim Philp

===================================
For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to:
pgp-public-keys@swissnet.ai.mit.edu
In Subject line type:
GET PHILP
===================================

We are reconsidering the Canadian restrictions - and may change them -
it is certainly not the ITAR quexstion, but another matter - we expect 
that Canadians will be included shortly - as to the question of using 
Cypherpunks - we are not saying taht we will not make changes based on 
any weaknesses that you discover, we will - but we do believe that if you 
fail to break the system with a spevfic time frame, that is fair game.

Why do you want to make it a one way street? We believe fair is fair - if 
you want to chop off our neck, then we should be able to tell people that 
you tried and could not at some point in time - 

Appreciatively,
Ralph 

There is no subject so old that something new cannot be said about it - 
Dostovesty - A Diary of a Writer

On Wed, 21 Feb 1996, IPG Sales wrote:

> We are reconsidering the Canadian restrictions - and may change them -
> it is certainly not the ITAR quexstion, but another matter - we expect 
                                          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> that Canadians will be included shortly - as to the question of using 

Just what is this 'other matter'


> Why do you want to make it a one way street? We believe fair is fair - if 
> you want to chop off our neck, then we should be able to tell people that 
> you tried and could not at some point in time - 

	I fail to see how this is a 'one way street'. You are interested
in feedback on your system and want us to examine it and tell you of
weaknesses. We are interested in any new system that claims to be secure
and we can learn from the developments, and yes, mistakes of others.  This
sounds like a perfect quid pro quo to me. 
	You seem to want more. You want to be able to use the 'name' of
the cypherpunks to assist your marketing for whatever benefits that you
see by exploiting our name. I say again, as others have said, we are
simply a mailing list of people brought together by a common interest in
cryptography. There is nothing to stop you from making your claims 
without our 'consent' or the 'Cypherpunks seal of approval'.
	The real problem that you have, is that there are knowledgable
people on this list who have expressed doubts about your system. These
people are well known to the press and in the security community and are
not shy about expressing their opinions (right Perry? <G>). These are the
people who you have to convince if you want to have our approval (whatever
that is).
	Look at the history of algorithms that are generally considered 
secure. The code has been placed on the net for public comment and 
review. I think that all have benefited from this process.
	You have made the same mistake as some others who posted long 
samples of marketing 'noise' to the list using all of the keywords that 
we have come to regard as 'snake oil'. I have no idea if your product is 
indeed secure or snake oil. You have not published enough information for 
any reasonable  person to make a determination. The form of your 
announcement was not appropriate for this forum or your needs.
	I submit that a better approach would have been to post the code
to sci.crypt and send a short note to this list asking for comments. 
People who ask for help, and co-operate with us usually receive help. 
People who publish marketing junk, as you did, get abused.
	Let's concentrate on substance rather than form.

Regards,
Tim Philp

===================================
For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to:
pgp-public-keys@swissnet.ai.mit.edu
In Subject line type:
GET PHILP
===================================

Dear IPG Sales (May I call you "I", or would that be too familiar?)

1) There is no such organization as "Cypherpunks". "Cypherpunks" is a
   mailing list, not an organization. Using the name of the mailing
   list as though it were an organization is anti-social. There is no
   one who has the authority to speak for "Cypherpunks" because there
   is no such beast.
2) I see no reason to "trade" with you folks whatsoever. Any honest
   company would simply publish the technical specifications of their
   work and allow independent evaluation of the quality of your
   algorithms. I don't know about other people, but from my point of
   view, no deals (Other people are free, of course, to come to an
   arrangement with you). Submit your algorithms for peer review
   honestly or find yourself ridiculed anyway. I will not even look at
   a non-public specification. 
3) I warn you -- if you sell a system that you know to be potentially
   defective, and fail to take measures to evaluate its security using
   common industry standards (i.e. open peer review) you can and will
   be liable to any number of legal actions, all of which you will
   richly deserve, and no number of silly disclaimers on your
   packaging will save you. I'll happily give expert testimony for the
   plaintiffs and or prosecution, depending on whether it goes criminal.

> "He who laces himself into the straight jacket of what he knows and 
> understands, imprisions his mind" - Willian Friedman memoirs - spoken 
> to JVN, and Norbert Weiner, of MIT, at Princeton -

They laughed at Fulton, but they also laughed at Bozo the clown. All
indications are that you are in the latter, not the former set.


Perry

On Tue, 20 Feb 1996, IPG Sales wrote:

Fess up guys. You are either:

1.  A team of undergrads or graduate students conducting an "exploit". 
2.  A Detweiller tentacle. Dr. FC ?
3.  The return of Alice D'nonymous ?
4.  The reason the coderpunks lists was started.

You've got to be ROTFL. 
See my sig.

Arley Carter
Tradewinds Technologies, Inc.
email: ac@hawk.twinds.com
www: http://www.twinds.com

"Trust me. This is a secure product. I'm from <insert your favorite 
corporation or government agency>."
 

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We fess up - we are pig farmers from TexasL, we never have been to 
these high fluting things you call schools, so we do not even 
know what you are talking about, much less anything about Cryptography.

On Wed, 21 Feb 1996, Arley Carter wrote:

> On Tue, 20 Feb 1996, IPG Sales wrote:
> 
> Fess up guys. You are either:
> 
> 1.  A team of undergrads or graduate students conducting an "exploit". 
> 2.  A Detweiller tentacle. Dr. FC ?
> 3.  The return of Alice D'nonymous ?
> 4.  The reason the coderpunks lists was started.
> 
> You've got to be ROTFL. 
> See my sig.
> 
> Arley Carter
> Tradewinds Technologies, Inc.
> email: ac@hawk.twinds.com
> www: http://www.twinds.com
> 
> "Trust me. This is a secure product. I'm from <insert your favorite 
> corporation or government agency>."
>  
Appreciately,

Ralph

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Finally, an honest man at IPG. Y'all are a hoot. I'll hire you as bozos 
for my kid's next birthday party. 
ROTFL

Arley Carter
Tradewinds Technologies, Inc.
email: ac@hawk.twinds.com
www: http://www.twinds.com

"Trust me. This is a secure product. I'm from <insert your favorite 
corporation or government agency>."

 

 On Wed, 21 Feb 1996, IPG Sales wrote:

> We fess up - we are pig farmers from TexasL, we never have been to 
> these high fluting things you call schools, so we do not even 
> know what you are talking about, much less anything about Cryptography.
> 
> On Wed, 21 Feb 1996, Arley Carter wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, 20 Feb 1996, IPG Sales wrote:
> > 
> > Fess up guys. You are either:
> > 
> > 1.  A team of undergrads or graduate students conducting an "exploit". 
> > 2.  A Detweiller tentacle. Dr. FC ?
> > 3.  The return of Alice D'nonymous ?
> > 4.  The reason the coderpunks lists was started.
> > 
> > You've got to be ROTFL. 
> > See my sig.
> > 
> > Arley Carter
> > Tradewinds Technologies, Inc.
> > email: ac@hawk.twinds.com
> > www: http://www.twinds.com
> > 
> > "Trust me. This is a secure product. I'm from <insert your favorite 
> > corporation or government agency>."
> >  
> Appreciately,
> 
> Ralph
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> 
>

> Perhaps so, but our system does employ a true hardware generated OTP, and 
> operates similiar to what you describe -  however, the important 
> differernce is that we use a smal;l OTP to generate a larger OTP, like 
> stringing the cable across the Golden Gate narrows. Just becuase we 
> convert over from a full OTP to a prime number wheel system configured 
> from the OTP doers not mnean that the result is not an OTP - in theory it 
> is simple to break RSA systems, but factoring a 2048 bit number, or 4096 
> number, or whatever, makes the problem enormous  - our system for large 
> messages/files is similiar in difficult except that it is much nearer 
> an 8192 bit number than 2048. The possibilities to be examined ar4e so 
> large, that iot is not possible to solve then with a computer, even if 
> all the particles in the iuniverse, all 10 to the 80 power of then were 
> a Cray T3E, or better.  Furthermore, all you would get would be all the 
> possiblilities which would be everything!

I'm way out of my league here, but using a small OTP to create a
larger OTP seems impossible on information theoretic grounds.

Richard Coleman
coleman@math.gatech.edu

"Richard J. Coleman" writes:
> I'm way out of my league here, but using a small OTP to create a
> larger OTP seems impossible on information theoretic grounds.

No, you are correct.

Perry

On Mon, 19 Feb 1996, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

> 
> "Richard J. Coleman" writes:
> > I'm way out of my league here, but using a small OTP to create a
> > larger OTP seems impossible on information theoretic grounds.
> 
> No, you are correct.
> 
> Perry

But it's got rotors! Rotors I tell you!

Hiss, squeak. Hiss, squeak.  Hiss, squeak. 

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