Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?

At 03:46 PM 3/28/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote:
>On Tue, 26 Mar 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote:
>
>> At 09:46 PM 3/25/96 -0500, Michael Froomkin wrote:
>> 
>> >An interesting issue, likely to be addressed in future judicial 
>> >assistence treaties...
>> >
>> 
>> However, future judicial assistance treaties are meaningless if you store
>> your keys anonymously (domestically or internationally) so that even the
>> keeper doesn't know he has them or exactly where they are in his pile of 
keys.
>
>Given the significant contempt charges that can follow a refusal to 
>produce items (anonymous or not) this still depends on the absence of 
>initial detection.

You clearly don't understand.  You're making the ASSumption that the 
organization keeping the keys can produce them in a form that is "useful" to 
the cops.  Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in 
fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, 
must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested.

You also seem to assume that "contempt charges" will be able to operate 
world-wide, which is a highly dubious proposition.  (Read Froomkin's 
paragraph above CAREFULLY.  He said "internationally.")  

And in any case, I consider it highly doubtful that anybody would contract 
with an escrow agent and identify himself by name.  It would be a simple 
matter to operate "escrow agents," just glorified data-holders, who would 
receive data anonymously and send it out just as anonymously, to the person 
who can identify themselves via some sort of encrypted ID system.   Even 
"detecting" such a transfer is useless because the cops won't be able to 
figure out what the data is, since it's encrypted in both directions while 
being transferred, in addition to being encrypted while being held, with a 
code the escrow agent doesn't know.


In short, you need to comprehend what you're responding to before you 
express your opinions.  You're living down to my expectations.


>> In fact, I suppose that government operation of the identification system
>> (drivers' licenses, passports, etc.) in general is also horribly inefficient
>> and should be attacked on efficiency grounds.
>
>You might not like what you get in response.  Streamlined and uniform 
>identity documents generated at birth and renewed with tax filings would 
>be the likeliest efficiency improvement.  An inefficient government 
>identification system is to the advantage of the privacy seeker.

You seem to be ASSuming that an "efficient identification system" is one 
that will ALSO operate to the benefit of the government, as opposed to the 
individual who wants to be identified for only limited purposes.  I don't 
think so.  Chaum's encrypted ID system described in the August 1992 
Scientific American makes it clear that identification can occur without the 
ability to cross-reference databases.  Chaum's system, if implemented with 
current microprocessor technology, would be extremely "efficient," at least 
from the standpoint of the amount of human effort involved.  It would, 
however, be extremely hostile to the government.

Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com

On Thu, 28 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote:

> At 03:46 PM 3/28/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote:
> >On Tue, 26 Mar 1996, Duncan Frissell wrote:
> >
> >> At 09:46 PM 3/25/96 -0500, Michael Froomkin wrote:
> >> 
> >> >An interesting issue, likely to be addressed in future judicial 
> >> >assistence treaties...
> >> 
> >> However, future judicial assistance treaties are meaningless if you store
> >> your keys anonymously (domestically or internationally) so that even the
> >> keeper doesn't know he has them or exactly where they are in his pile of 
> keys.
> >
> >Given the significant contempt charges that can follow a refusal to 
> >produce items (anonymous or not) this still depends on the absence of 
> >initial detection.
> 
> You clearly don't understand.  You're making the ASSumption that the 
> organization keeping the keys can produce them in a form that is "useful" to 
> the cops.  Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in 
> fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, 
> must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested.

You clearly don't understand.  You are an ass making an assumption that a 
court cares or believes that the witness can actually produce the 
requested information or not.  Fines tend to be imposed regardless.
 
> You also seem to assume that "contempt charges" will be able to operate 
> world-wide, which is a highly dubious proposition.  (Read Froomkin's 
> paragraph above CAREFULLY.  He said "internationally.")  

Contempt charges do operate world wide.  The reach of U.S. jurisdiction 
is very extensive and the United States generally doesn't care what the 
foreign jurisdiction thinks of it.

See my large note on asset concealing.

> And in any case, I consider it highly doubtful that anybody would contract 
> with an escrow agent and identify himself by name

The same way no one creates Panamanian companies with their own name.  So 
what?  Third parties are still fined heavily.

 It would be a simple 
> matter to operate "escrow agents," just glorified data-holders, who would 
> receive data anonymously and send it out just as anonymously, to the person 
> who can identify themselves via some sort of encrypted ID system.

And simpler for courts to fine them out of existance (which happened to 
several banks, trust companies and agents in Cayman and Panama).

   Even 
> "detecting" such a transfer is useless because the cops won't be able to 
> figure out what the data is, since it's encrypted in both directions while 
> being transferred, in addition to being encrypted while being held, with a 
> code the escrow agent doesn't know.

They need only suspect or have reason to suspect it might be exculpatory.
Practically speaking this means convincing a judge.  Not hard when the 
words "offshore holding company" are mentioned in a brief or hearing.

> In short, you need to comprehend what you're responding to before you 
> express your opinions.  You're living down to my expectations.

In short, go to law school, then try to talk about legal issues.

> >> In fact, I suppose that government operation of the identification system
> >> (drivers' licenses, passports, etc.) in general is also horribly inefficient
> >> and should be attacked on efficiency grounds.
> >
> >You might not like what you get in response.  Streamlined and uniform 
> >identity documents generated at birth and renewed with tax filings would 
> >be the likeliest efficiency improvement.  An inefficient government 
> >identification system is to the advantage of the privacy seeker.
> 
> You seem to be ASSuming that an "efficient identification system" is one 
> that will ALSO operate to the benefit of the government, as opposed to the 
> individual who wants to be identified for only limited purposes.

Without getting into semantics, and "efficient identification system" 
implies one that identifies people efficently.  Blocking government use, 
or limiting it to certain circumstances is not efficiency.

> I don't think so.

Opinions are like assholes....

> Chaum's encrypted ID system described in the August 1992 
> Scientific American makes it clear that identification can occur without the 
> ability to cross-reference databases.  Chaum's system, if implemented with 
> current microprocessor technology, would be extremely "efficient," at least
                                                                     ^^^^^^^ 
> from the standpoint of the amount of human effort involved.  It would, 
> however, be extremely hostile to the government.

Hedge just a bit more and your argument will be completely underground.

> Jim Bell
> jimbell@pacifier.com

---
My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li
"In fact, had Bancroft not existed,       potestas scientiae in usu est
Franklin might have had to invent him."    in nihilum nil posse reverti
00B9289C28DC0E55  E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

On Thu, 28 Mar 1996, jim bell wrote:

> Escrowing encrypted keys makes them useless to subpoena, and in 
> fact it helps the key owner because the escrow agent can (and, in fact, 
> must!) be obligated to inform the key owner if his key is requested.

I thought I would take the time to let everyone know that this is 
baseless as well.  Most jurisdictions forbid third parties to reveal 
prosecution inquries to the principal for which they are holding 
documents or other information.  A VERY few have laws on the books that 
require this disclosure.  Switzerland is no longer one of them.

Even if a judge was convinced by the defense not to levy heavy fines 
against a third party who pleaded that he or she was simply unable to 
comply, informing the principal would literally assure such fines would 
be imposed regardless.  Criminal charges of obstruction could easily 
attach.  Obstruction in connection with narcotics cases or other major 
felonies are generally extraditable offenses as well.

Once again Mr. Bell pulls legal analysis out of his rectum rather than 
basing it in fact or research.

With Mr. Bell as a defense attorney, who needs prosecutors?

> Jim Bell
> jimbell@pacifier.com

---
My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li
"In fact, had Bancroft not existed,       potestas scientiae in usu est
Franklin might have had to invent him."    in nihilum nil posse reverti
00B9289C28DC0E55  E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information