Duress

>Ms. Wilson then gave into the pressure applied and gave
>the passwords required by Justice Haggerty.

Those of you who follow FIREWALLS may recall that I premote the use of
"minefields" on networks, machines that should never be accessed and will 
trigger an alarm/response on any access.

Some years ago I wrote a spec for cryptographic securing of notebooks/
E-Mail that included a "duress" capability: a "password" that, when 
entered would appear to be properly accepted but would report an error 
on retrieval. Optional was to be overwriting of any material whose access 
was attempted.

For some time people have been puzzled when I have said that good systems
protection will increase the risks to the *people* involved just as good
locks on cars led to carjacking.

					Warmly,
						Padgett

"A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT@hobbes.orl.mmc.com> writes:
> Those of you who follow FIREWALLS may recall that I premote the use of
> "minefields" on networks, machines that should never be accessed and will
> trigger an alarm/response on any access.
>
> Some years ago I wrote a spec for cryptographic securing of notebooks/
> E-Mail that included a "duress" capability: a "password" that, when
> entered would appear to be properly accepted but would report an error
> on retrieval. Optional was to be overwriting of any material whose access
> was attempted.

As a side remark, every burglar alarm connected to a phone that I've ever seen
has this feature: a code that one can type under duress that will both turn
off the alarm and call for help. I wonder how many users will remember this
code when under duress.

---

Dr. Dimitri Vulis
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps