NODE 57e2b3b6Re: Remailers run by spooks
Just Rich <rich@c2.org>Tue, 5 Mar 1996 07:57:39 +0800
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On Mon, 4 Mar 1996, Anonymous (or so he thinks!) wrote:
> >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous
> >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic.
> >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that
> >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the
> >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they
> >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break
> >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested
> >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024
> >bit keys.
>
> I don't know about everyone else, but I consider this, if true, to be a
> MAJOR worry. It never ceases to amaze me how lightly the government takes
> lying to the people. Unfortunately I don't have the contacts or resources
> to do any further investigation, I hope this thread is resolved one way or
> another soon.
Yeah, didn't you know that Sameer was on the CIA payroll? How do you
think he paid for his new Ferrari?
I have no doubt that the CIA can break 1000-bit keys on a case-by-case
basis, *if they decide to allocate the resources*. I think it's possible
that some remailers are run by spooks. However, I seriously doubt that
anyone is breaking stuff routinely, and I think the web of trust is pretty
good. Of course, the CIA had Ames... the reverse could easily be true.
However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading
disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break
the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any
case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level.
You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can.
It's a war of attrition.
- -rich
- ---
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NODE f3febf91Re: Remailers run by spooks
Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li>Fri, 8 Mar 1996 06:47:12 +0800
On Mon, 4 Mar 1996, Just Rich wrote:
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> I have no doubt that the CIA can break 1000-bit keys on a case-by-case
> basis, *if they decide to allocate the resources*. I think it's possible
> that some remailers are run by spooks. However, I seriously doubt that
> anyone is breaking stuff routinely, and I think the web of trust is pretty
> good.
What does the web of trust currently have to say about the political
reliability of remailers?
> However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading
> disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break
> the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any
> case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level.
> You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can.
> It's a war of attrition.
And thus the winner will be the one who makes it the hardest for the
other to fight, not who inflicts the most casualities.
>
> - -rich
> - ---
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> means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the
> signature and forwarded.]
>
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My prefered and soon to be permanent e-mail address: unicorn@schloss.li
"In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est
Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti
00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information
NODE 06e0fe6fRe: Remailers run by spooks
cmca@alpha.c2.org (Chris McAuliffe)Mon, 4 Mar 1996 15:58:06 +0800
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[To: Just Rich <rich@c2.org>]
[cc: cypherpunks@toad.com]
[Subject: Re: Remailers run by spooks ]
[In-reply-to: Your message of Mon, 04 Mar 96 00:11:09 EST.]
<199603040511.AAA24235@bb.hks.net>
>However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading
>disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break
>the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any
>case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level.
>You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can.
>It's a war of attrition.
I agree with turning up the noise level. For a few weeks now I've been
using the following script:
#!/bin/ksh
while sleep `roll 1 7 1`000
do
roll 1 10000 `roll 1 200 1` | "a chain of remailers back to me"
done
I've deleted the actual command to do the remailing, since it is
homegrown. Back at this end, I recognise the incoming mail and throw it
away. So I never get to see it, but there is a steady stream of
encrypted traffic both in and out.
The "roll" command, by the way, is a perl script I picked up off the
net, and it is very handy to have around:
#!/usr/bin/perl
$low = $ARGV[0];
$high = $ARGV[1];
$count = $ARGV[2];
$high = $high - $low + 1;
# seed the random process, and generate a few to be thrown away.
srand($$+time);
for ($i = rand(1000)/50; $i >= 0; --$i) {
rand(1000);
}
# generate
for ($i = 0; $i < $count; ++$i) {
$v = int(rand($high)) + $low;
print $v, "\n";
}
Chris McAuliffe <cmca@alpha.c2.org> (No, not that one.)
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