NODE 951c6487Was Cohen the first?
Michael Wilson <0005514706@mcimail.com>Sat, 6 Apr 1996 07:56:14 +0800
I ran across the following article, and it set me to wondering--did
Dr. Cohen actually publish on 'computer viruses' before anybody else?
He continues to use it as the bedrock of his reputation capital, so if
this pre-dates his 'seminal' article, please let me know.
Included message:
For Liz Bass or Reg Gale
Discovery
9:31 AM Friday, April 5, 1996
By Lou Dolinar
This is still my favorite computer story. I'm not saying it was the first
piece ever written about computer viruses, but I won't say that it isn't. I
still have the original, dated April 16, 1985. In some ways I wish I hadn't
written it, because it was posted and reposted on bulltetin boards all over
the U.S., and seems to have subsequently inspired a whole generation of virus
writers.
Note to kids: back then, most computers didn't have hard disks, and started
up from floppies, hence floppy based viruses were a big deal.
As usual, The Hacker wasn't paying for his midnight phone call; he had
stolen the line from one of the long distance phone services.
What's up? I asked. The 17-year-old snickered. Doom was ahead for all Apple
II owners. "Don't engage in casual disk-copying with strangers," he said.
"You might catch an operating-system virus."
Now the hacker has a pretty hefty national rep in the computer underground,
so when he talks about this crazy stuff, it's worth listening. I've seen
whole collections of pirated games software bearing his nom de hack, and his
black-bag jobs on mainframes would curl your hair.
In case you're not familiar with software piracy, manufacturers build
protection schemes into their programs to prevent people from making illegal
copies and siphoning their profits. Dedicated pirates like my friend spend
hours, sometimes days, cracking these schemes then release them, illegally,
free, to the public over a network of electronic bulletin boards that can be
reached with a phone, a computer and a modem.
The Hacker always imprinted his name, electronically, on the game that he
cracked ("Cracked by The Hacker, July 4, 1978"). And therein lies this tale.
A couple of years back, he recalled, some teenagers in the Milwaukee area
stole his stolen programs and released them under their own names. Why
bother, you ask? Because the hacker whose name the stolen program bears
receives the "credit" for having cracked the piracy protected program and,
thus, is viewed with some degree of appreciation by similarly larcenous
wizards in the computer underground.
The Hacker was outraged and plotted a diabolical revenge: A wizard of code,
he constructed ted what he calls an "operating system virus" for the Apple II
computer. The operating system, you may know, loads into the computer before
the program and controls the functions of the computer.
The Hacker modified the operating system erase whatever disks were in the
computer after they had been used 25 times. Not only that, but the "virus"
would attache itself to any other discs that were loaded during the
particular session of computer use. Thus,k if you played a "virus" carrying
pirated game, and then went on to use your $495 word processor and $795
data-base program, these too would be infected and would cash after their
25th use--and in the meantime, they would be spreading the "virus."
Like any disease, then, Killer-DOS, as The Hacker dubbed it, has a latency
period, which allowed it to spread to other "victims" He inserted it into a
recently cracked games program, put it on an electronic bulletin board
frequented by the Minneapolis crowd, and sat back to watch the fun. A couple
of months later, whole libraries of disks were begin wiped out as the
"disease" spread.
Now Killer-DOS is common knowledge in the underground, it it wasn't the
reason The Hacker called. It seems he had, in a frenzy of anti-social
behavior, created a particularly virulent form of Killer-DOS that didn't
crash until it had been loaded 150 times---with a longer latency period, the
potential number of victims rises geometrically. But conscience prevailed.
The Hacker decided not to release the bug.
Then, however, just like the Andromeda Strain, the bug got loose anyway--the
Killer-DOS disk got mixed in with "healthy" programs, disks that he has been
handing out for the last couple of years and are now all over the country. So
if you find a worm in your Apple, don't say you haven't been warned.
NODE e6ef8acaRe: Was Cohen the first?
iang@cs.berkeley.edu (Ian Goldberg)Mon, 8 Apr 1996 12:51:21 +0800
In article <199604070321.TAA02171@myriad>,
Matthew Ghio <ghio@myriad.alias.net> wrote:
>Despite this, the Apple II never became a popular virus-writing platform.
>There are several possible reasons for this, but one of the main ones is
>that few Apple II users had hard disks. On the IBM PC, it was easy for a
>virus to get on the hard disk, then systematically infect every floppy disk
>put into the system. Apple II users, in contrast, often booted from
>floppies, and often rebooted when switching to a different software package,
>thus purging the virus from memory. (Pressing control-reset on the Apple II
>keyboard would always pull the reset line on the CPU, so it wasn't possible
>to trap the interrupt like it is possible to trap ctrl-alt-del on the PC.)
Not true. Pressing ctrl-reset jumped to the interrupt routine pointed
to by the vector at (I think) 1010/1011, if the contents of that vector
checksummed correctly with the contents of the next byte (1012), and
otherwise reset the computer. It certainly was possible (and useful)
to trap ctrl-reset. Also, even when a reset occurred, not all of the
memory was cleared, so you could in fact keep code in memory across
a reset, if you could arrange to have it run on the other side of the
boot.
As you pointed out, it was very easy to write viruses for the Apple ][.
The "slave" disk layout contained two blank sectors (.5 K) within the
DOS image that get loaded into memory. The designers may as well have
labelled it "put virus here".
- Ian "Been there; done that..."
NODE be1d80c7Re: Was Cohen the first?
Matthew Ghio <ghio@myriad.alias.net>Sun, 7 Apr 1996 16:00:47 +0800
The following concerns the history of computer viruses. While an
important issue in computer security, this has no direct relevance to
cryptography, so skip this message if you're looking for crypto...
---
> What's up? I asked. The 17-year-old snickered. Doom was ahead for all Apple
>II owners. "Don't engage in casual disk-copying with strangers," he said.
> "You might catch an operating-system virus."
One interesting fact is that after the release of DOS 3.3 in 1980, the Apple
II operating system was unchanged for several years, until Apple released a
completly rewritten operating system (ProDOS) in 1984. During this period,
hackers disassembled DOS 3.3 and its internal functions and data structures
became well-known. The Apple II ROM contained a debugger/disassembler,
which allowed the operating system to be disassembled and experimentally
modified while it was resident in memory. In addition, several companies,
including Beagle Brothers and Quality Software, published extensive
information on DOS 3.3, which had been obtained through reverse-engineering.
Apple DOS behaved very predictably: it was always loaded at the same
location in memory, and when it formatted a disk, always wrote the operating
system into the same location on the first three tracks of the floppy disk.
This allowed the development of object code patches to the DOS kernel which
would work reliably because almost everyone was running identical copies of
DOS.
It also made it easy to write viruses. The simplest was to attach a call to
the sector-write subroutine at the end of the catalog command. This only
took about 16 bytes of code. (Wouldn't that have made a neat .sig for you
modern-day perl hackers?) Whenever the user issued the catalog command
(which gave a list of files, like the unix ls command) it would write out
that page of memory onto the dos image on the disk, thus infecting the disk.
This was entirely benign unless you tried to use a disk with a different or
modified operating system, in which case the patch would not apply cleanly,
and would likely make the disk unbootable.
Despite this, the Apple II never became a popular virus-writing platform.
There are several possible reasons for this, but one of the main ones is
that few Apple II users had hard disks. On the IBM PC, it was easy for a
virus to get on the hard disk, then systematically infect every floppy disk
put into the system. Apple II users, in contrast, often booted from
floppies, and often rebooted when switching to a different software package,
thus purging the virus from memory. (Pressing control-reset on the Apple II
keyboard would always pull the reset line on the CPU, so it wasn't possible
to trap the interrupt like it is possible to trap ctrl-alt-del on the PC.)
A couple bits of interesting virus trivia: Joe Dellinger, then an undergrad
at Texas A&M, set out to write the "perfect" virus, that is, one that would
silently replicate without causing harm, just to see how far it would
spread. The virus added a tag to the end of the boot sector which read:
GENxxxxxxxTAMU, where xxxxxxx was the generation counter.
A destructive virus called "CyberAIDS", appeared in 1988. I just looked
this one up in an old magazine article, and, when the virus destroyed a
disk, it printed, among other drivel:
DISTRIBUTED BY
Worshippers of Pat / [WOP]
The Kool/Rad Alliance
The Robert Dole Presidential Campaign
I wonder if Bob Dole appreciated the free advertising. (Also remember
that this was in 1988!)
Modern operating systems make kernel-patching viruses like the simple
ten-byte hacks effectively impossible since the operating system is less
predictable with respect to its memory usage, people upgrade more
frequently, and many experienced users compile their own kernel.
Modern protected-mode operating systems are also making boot-sector viruses
obsolete as well. That leaves executable file viruses.
By the late eighties, hard disks were becoming fairly standard equipment,
and the "CyberAIDS" virus mentioned above attached itself to executable
files. Filesystem security and read/execute-only memory pages on Unix
systems make writing effective viruses of this type quite difficult.
Unfortunately, Microsoft's lax attitude toward security allows viruses to
persist on their operating systems, and have made Bill Gates very popular
with the virus writing groups. In addition, the lack of filesystem security
in Windoze makes the shared libraries, and key system files, prime targets
for malicious code.
Still, as the famous login hack demontrates, it's not impossible to write a
unix virus, if you can get control of the compiler/linker. It's just that
there are other methods of hacking unix systems (ie buffer overruns) which
provide a more immediate return on the investment of time for the hacker.