// COMPLETE THREAD

[Explanation] Re: "STOP SENDING ME THIS SHIT"

4 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child

NODE 4cf4b787[Explanation] Re: "STOP SENDING ME THIS SHIT"
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Perry E. Metzger writes:
 > "Adam Pingitore" writes:
 > >           I've got news for you all. This 'jerk' was spammed by some
 > >           ass out there. I've canceled by subscription so would you
 > >           all quit whining already. Sorry if I sent you people
 > >           inappropriate mail, but I just wasn't very happy getting
 > >           2000 e-mails a day.
[ Mr. Metzger's amusing flame elided. ]

     I run a small mailing list that has been subject to problems
similar to the recent spate of "unscrives".  Apparently there is a
list of mailing lists circulating the warez boards along with scripts
for spoofing subscription requests.  Over the past few months my list
has periodically received batches of bogus subscriptions for accounts
ranging from Fidonet sysops to Al Gore to random AOL users.  Email
from other mailing list admins indicates that these same accounts,
perhaps two hundred in all, were subscribed to several hundred lists.

     Crypto relevance:  This attack will be eliminated when more mail
agents support public key crypto and the mailing list software can be
modified to check signatures on subscription requests.

pjm

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface

iQEVAwUBMXXU22AA81GB0e9dAQEjowf9EpmBXt3smBCduo3QF6/FLRRsC7NX65Ew
7jDI48XO9BWCOTXwwsFgibGgvefjtRKosB77SgeOy0q8QbukWjO8SXzqmQBSH3hK
MBbP6Z1HVlP29KkyVpuWf9RAdsFMYGRuUjrFBNsc+ohpztW75MXvBkqHX7jGEk9K
fpmTfQv8TRyygjNR8bqiAXGWMP3OWq/gIO27ydCDG8+7czzqcCX6/JiGsYdH8ns5
sBAPe5oJsm15at4i8khNtpNbf/+JTm6cS+TTAhQLaBTxmdxUDAa/zQlxeevSsrfl
sBo9fRF+IgU4v9Zw7BSDcc4E3FKCjpZ39PXLfW+QPH7WBPu9hRjQVw==
=4GcH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
NODE a93c44dbRe: [Explanation] Re: "STOP SENDING ME THIS SHIT"
Patrick May <pjm@spe.com> writes:
>      I run a small mailing list that has been subject to problems
> similar to the recent spate of "unscrives".  Apparently there is a
> list of mailing lists circulating the warez boards along with scripts
> for spoofing subscription requests.  ...
>
>      Crypto relevance:  This attack will be eliminated when more mail
> agents support public key crypto and the mailing list software can be
> modified to check signatures on subscription requests.

Eric Thomas's LISTSERV has had a feature for 4 or 5 years that prevents
spoofed subscription requests. The list owner can configure the mailing
list so that whenever a subscription request is received, LISTSERV
e-mails the apparent sender and asks to e-mail it 'OK nnnn', where 'nnnn'
is a pseudo-random string uniquely identifying this request. If the
confirmation isn't received within 48 hours, LISTSERV ignores the command.

Similar confirmations can be requested for other commands, like unsubcribe.

Works like a charm without any public key crypto or digital signatures.

---

Dr. Dimitri Vulis
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
NODE 355c6539Re: [Explanation] Re: "STOP SENDING ME THIS SHIT"
>      I run a small mailing list that has been subject to problems
> similar to the recent spate of "unscrives".  Apparently there is a
> list of mailing lists circulating the warez boards along with scripts
> for spoofing subscription requests.  Over the past few months my list

	Ah, KaNN3d t00Lz: the incompitent kRak3r'z best friend. :)

>      Crypto relevance:  This attack will be eliminated when more mail
> agents support public key crypto and the mailing list software can be
> modified to check signatures on subscription requests.

	But you're presupposing a public key distribution mechanism
such that the list software can get a key for that user.  And that
that's a valid key for that user, not a key that J Random kRak3r didn't
just send in for his clueless AOL victim before said victim established
a public key.

	At any rate, has something like this been put into the current
PGPdomo?  I don't think that it would be too hard to hack in a query
to a web keyserver to grab a key.  If the initial request's not
signed, maybe include a note about how to go about getting PGP and
putting a key on the keyserver (or a pointer to instructions on the
web).

---
Fletch                                                     __`'/|
fletch@ain.bls.com  "Lisa, in this house we obey the       \ o.O'    ______
404 713-0414(w)      Laws of Thermodynamics!" H. Simpson   =(___)= -| Ack. |
404 315-7264(h) PGP Print: 8D8736A8FC59B2E6 8E675B341E378E43  U      ------
NODE 9ee4e1b0Re: [Explanation] Re: "STOP SENDING ME THIS SHIT"
On Wed, 17 Apr 1996, Patrick May wrote:
>      Crypto relevance:  This attack will be eliminated when more mail
> agents support public key crypto and the mailing list software can be
> modified to check signatures on subscription requests.

	Isn't that what PGPDomo does?

        xan

        jonathon
        grafolog@netcom.com



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