The Crisis with Remailers

At 9:29 PM 5/15/96, jamesd@echeque.com wrote:

>Some nyms are valuable, most are valueless by design.  All remailers
>should be valueless by design.  The penet.fi remailer design is
>unsatisfactory precisely because it penet.fi is valuable, hence a
>target.  If it gets shut down a lot of people lose their nyms,
>causing much inconvenience.

I agree with this point, and the similar points made by Hal Finney and by
several others.

We have far too few remailers, they are too tempting as targets, the use of
"mail-to-News" gateways is formally separable from the function as a
remailer, and there is generally a stagnation in the deployment of new and
varied kinds of remailers and their modes of operation.

We used to discuss remailer architecture, topology, functionality, and
"ideal behavior" quite a bit a few years ago, but seldom do here on the
Cypherpunks list anymore. Various reasons: same old discussions,
commercialization of Mixmaster-type remailers (so I hear, and Lance
Cottrell can clarify this if this is indeed a factor) may be inhibiting
free discussion of planned features, and perhaps the discussion is going on
elsewhere (on remailerpunks, or the remailer operator's list).

(I'm surprised there have been no "Master's Thesis"-level analyses of
remailers and the modeling of them. I had expected by now at least a couple
of such studies. Even better, some even more advanced studies. The "theory
of remailers" was partly laid out by Chaum in his 1981 "Untraceable E-Mail"
short article--at the CSUA site at Berkeley, last I checked--but much has
happened since then. A practical analysis is needed. Note: the recent paper
on remailers by the SAI researcher and another is _not_ what I meant...that
was just put together from Raph's page, other sources, and a few days worth
of Web searches, as near as I can tell.]

A much richer ecology of remailers is sorely needed. A factor of at least
10 or 20 more (100-300 remailer sites), less reliance on specific sites, an
"everyone a remailer" capability (which has many elegant advantages!), more
traffic, temporarily instantiated sites, digital postage, greater ease of
use (especially with crypto and chaining), and such things as nominal
terminal remailers choosing to add their own hops (so as to lessen their
own target potential). Having some of these improvements will be a big
help.

In the past we have discussed many ideas related to this; I sure don't have
the energy right now to recapitulate the points made over the years. Cf. my
Cyphernomicon for some general features, at least as of mid-94. Also, the
archives, if they ever become available again.

Yes, things are stagnating at this time. Not because we discuss "off-topic"
things (as we sure did in 1992-3, for example!), but for various other
reasons.

I suspect the enemies of remailers will sense victory and will try to force
the remaining remailers to shut down or at the least to severely restrict
operations. From a high of perhaps 25 remailers, we may soon be down to
less than a dozen.

These remaining sites will feel even more pressure. The upcoming War on
Intellectual Property Piracy, with opening shots against China already
fired, will put even more heat on remailers.

(A remailer can't just "block" copyrighted material. It ain't practical.
And digital mixes (remailers) should not, obviously, be looking at content
of packets mailed. (Only the last, plaintext, message can be looked at if
things are done right, but I surmise from comments by remailer operators
that a lot of the traffic is not encrypted at all, and that the operators
do in fact take a few peeks at what's flowing through their systems....more
evidence that we are very far indeed from Chaum's ideal digital mixes.)

Yes, a crisis has been brewing for months.


--Tim May

Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software!
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist         | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

> A much richer ecology of remailers is sorely needed. A factor of at least
> 10 or 20 more (100-300 remailer sites), less reliance on specific sites, an
> "everyone a remailer" capability (which has many elegant advantages!), more
> traffic, temporarily instantiated sites, digital postage, greater ease of
> use (especially with crypto and chaining), and such things as nominal
> terminal remailers choosing to add their own hops (so as to lessen their
> own target potential). Having some of these improvements will be a big
> help.

I think it would help tremendously if elm or pine were hacked to allow for
remailing.  Even better would be some sort of dynamic remailer addressing
- sendmail certainly doesn't allow for this capability. :( I think we need
something similar to dynamic routing for remailers. 
--
Ed Carp, N7EKG    			Ed.Carp@linux.org, ecarp@netcom.com
					214/993-3935 voicemail/digital pager
Finger ecarp@netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key		an88744@anon.penet.fi

"Past the wounds of childhood, past the fallen dreams and the broken families,
through the hurt and the loss and the agony only the night ever hears, is a
waiting soul.  Patient, permanent, abundant, it opens its infinite heart and
asks only one thing of you ... 'Remember who it is you really are.'"

                    -- "Losing Your Mind", Karen Alexander and Rick Boyes

The mark of a good conspiracy theory is its untestability.
		    -- Andrew Spring

"ec" == Ed Carp <erc@dal1820.computek.net> writes:

ec> I think it would help tremendously if elm or pine were hacked to
ec> allow for remailing.  Even better would be some sort of dynamic
ec> remailer addressing - sendmail certainly doesn't allow for this
ec> capability. :( I think we need something similar to dynamic
ec> routing for remailers.

  I do agree extending commonly used mailers would be helpful.

  Emacs + mailcrypt (with or without MH & mh-e) already provide the
means to chain one's message through type 1 or mixmaster type 2
remailers. mailcrypt will even choose arbitrary remailer routing for
you based on information gathered from Raph Levien's remailer
list. Unforunately this is not a turnkey solution and requires more
configuration than most users probably want.

michael

mailcrypt home page: http://cag-www.lcs.mit.edu/mailcrypt/

> From: michael shiplett <walrus@ans.net>
> Date: Fri, 17 May 1996 13:54:51 -0400
> 
>   I do agree extending commonly used mailers would be helpful.
> 
>   Emacs + mailcrypt (with or without MH & mh-e) already provide the
> means to chain one's message through type 1 or mixmaster type 2
> remailers. mailcrypt will even choose arbitrary remailer routing for
> you based on information gathered from Raph Levien's remailer
> list. Unforunately this is not a turnkey solution and requires more
> configuration than most users probably want.
> 
> michael

Mailcrypt support for type 2 remailers doesn't really work very well.
You can't specify more than one recipient.  You can't post to a
newsgroup with the "post: news.group" destination.  And somehow not
all the right headers end up making it into the next message.

A better emacs interface to mixmaster remailers is definitely needed.

so list attention turns once again to a looming remailer "crisis"...


where are there so few remailers? the reasons are pretty obvious.
these problems have been transparently apparent from the very 
beginning.

1. there is no economic incentive.

as soon as there is a good economic incentive to run remailers, you
will see them proliferate. but currently they have no virtually
no value to the creator. it's like building a house for other people
to live in out of humanitarianism. note that with web pages, you
are buying free publicity for your company. but in fact you are
typically buying yourself *negative* publicity by running a remailer.

what is the current incentive to run remailers? answer: adulation
by other cypherpunks. hmmm, not necessarily all that motivating
to very many.

2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse"

I commend the remailer operators for starting a mailing list to
deal with spam. but the solution remains essentially "stop
spam by hand". spammers still have the ability to be a serious
threat to the network. this has been a threat from the beginning
and has never been resolved. note that "spam avoidance" is a
very, very difficult problem that plagues far more than remailers,
such as mailing lists and usenet. but it is particularly acute
with remailers.

3. liability

there is a lot of liability to the operator of a remailer, and
again, this risk is totally unsupportable from their current
returns (nil). Hal Finney recently suggested restricting posts
from remailers to avoid copyright liability. this will limit
the liability and risk but does not totally remove it.

4. no need for a network

in fact there is not really a need for a remailer network on one
level. there is only a need if the service is not available. why
is there only one anon.penet.fi? well, because of the above reasons,
and also by the fact that only one is sufficient to serve all of
cyberspace, virtually. what I mean is that there is easily enough
traffic to justify another anon.penet.fi type remailer, but it's
not totally critical (i.e. to the point that someone puts their
resources where their mouth is) as long as anon.penet.fi is running.

5. etc.

==

if people want to know why remailers haven't proliferated  in
the same way that other cyberspace infrastructure has in the
past, such as news servers and web sites, you have to focus on
the above issues. remailers are NOT like other cyberspace services.
they are a tremendous burden to run, instead of being of high
use to the maintainer (even though they don't generate cash)
in the way a web page or usenet server is.

the main problem, getting cash for the service, is slowly dissolving
to the point that it will not be an obstacle. I predict that 
remailers (and many other unusual services) may begin to proliferate
at that point-- but not as much as other areas of cyberspace such
as the web. remailers are always going to be plagued by the other
problems I mentioned above unless some really brilliant genius
comes along to solve what seems to be the unsolvable.

another tact the cypherpunks might take to get anonymity into 
the cyberspace infrastructure is to target forum architecture.
instead of trying to create remailers that "feed into" other
networks, why not build in remailers into those networks themselves?
I am thinking of the way NNTP could be a massive anonymous 
remailer network, and that in fact it was once but that this
was purposely designed against in the protocol (preventing people
from anonymously submitting articles to NNTP hosts).

I propose that as long as there are serious elements involved
in building up cyberspace that are hostile to anonymity, you
are not going to see it flourish in the way other services have.
it seems to me the major obstacles to widespread anonymity
are perceptual, not technological. if people can find a way
to handle the above issues and still provide anonymity, it will
spread. otherwise, I doubt it will ever become very "mainstream".
perhaps the above problems are intrinsic to anonymity, which would
be a pity in my view.

BTW, TCM laments that he hasn't seen master's thesis on remailers.
I consider Lance Cottrell's mixmaster work to be really on that
level, and highly commendable. LC has really advanced remailer
technology by tremendous leaps and bounds since putting his mind
to it. also Levien's remailer page is another very outstanding
service. it is possible that all the real research into remailers
is being done at the NSA <g>

seriously, though, I think cpunks have an opportunity to do some
introspection here. it seems a pretty good rule in cyberspace that
"cool and useful services flourish and grow". witness Usenet
and the web. why haven't the cpunks been able to tap into that
kind of exponential force with remailers? the problems are not
merely technological. I would say the technological problems
associated with the remailers are the most straightforward to
solve. its the complex social issues that are seemingly insurmountable.

I really believe that if anyone wants to get more anonymity in
cyberspace, they must deal head on with the sociological 
"anonymity taboo" in society. why is there a taboo in society
against anonymity? could it be there are some good reasons for it?
is it possible to create a "socially acceptable" anonymity? of
course this line of thinking is going to be utterly repulsive
to some on this list, but I contend it is essential to remailer
growth strategy.

of course if people don't want remailers to ever go "mainstream"
anyway, well then there is no problem. the remailer network still
has an "underground" feeling to it and perhaps that will always
be part of its draw, and its actual structure.

"Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri@netcom.com> writes:
> 1. there is no economic incentive.

So, add the code to mixmaster (and even the old style remailers) to
collect e-cash as it passes on the anonymous message. Then this will
be a good way to accumulate some e-cash, and a number of people will
try running remailers for this very purpose. Witness the recent
Usenet spam by someone advertizing a for-pay remailer.

> 2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse"

Nor should there be.  What's one person's abuse is another person's
free speech.  Internet traffic should not be censored based on contents.

---

Dr. Dimitri Vulis
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

>> 2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse"
>
> Nor should there be.  What's one person's abuse is another person's
>free speech.  Internet traffic should not be censored based on contents.

pardon me, but a rather shallow response. 

you simply cannot ignore the spam problem by saying, "censorship
is not acceptable". this is not a solution. there is definitely
a spam problem in cyberspace, and it definitely has not been
solved. (by "solve" I mean, a solution that is acceptable to most
while at the same time preserving "freedom of speech")

when you say, "internet traffic should not be censored based on contents"
you have something that sounds like Jefferson wrote, but in fact in
practice sounds like someone who has never designed a serious
technological device that resists negative uses by design and not
by dreamy assumption. what is the actual application of your
insistence? this reminds me of the vagueness of marx saying, 
"if people would only do it my way, we would have a utopian government". 
apparently either people never figured out what he was really 
talking about, or he was wrong.

perhaps after someone continues to send you a recurrent mailbomb of
100 MB per day do your site for 1 year, you will still insist that
"internet traffic should not be censored"...

whoever creates/funds the infrastructure can use it any way they so choose.
a usenet adminstrator has absolutely no obligation to dedicate vast
amount of his costly computer resources in cpu time or space to
material he does not wish to even spit on. the fact that he is forced
to in many situations shows how little choice the software gives its
users.

the spam problem will only be solved once people begin to realize what
kind of a problem it is. the same problem that allows spam to 
explode all over Usenet is the principle that gives you chain letters
and unsolicited junk email to your mailbox. it is the same problem.
a solution might be possible if people put their minds to it instead
of wallowing in irrational emotionalism about censorship.

the spam problem is critical to anonymity. it would seem if you
can't even solve the spam problem with identified communication, you
are surely not going to solve it with anonymous communication.

hence my comments from here from time to time that the technological
problems of anonymity are not the true obstacle to widespread use. 
there are deeper problems that cpunks skirt around but fail to grasp
because of numerous prejudices.

Having exchanged e-mail in the past with Lance Deitweller, I have to conclude
that Vladimir Z. Nuri is NOT Lance, since Lance is actually pretty sharp.

"Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri@netcom.com> writes:
> >> 2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse"
> >
> > Nor should there be.  What's one person's abuse is another person's
> >free speech.  Internet traffic should not be censored based on contents.
>
> pardon me, but a rather shallow response.

One of the reasons why I don't like Sovoks is that when they're at loss for
words, they resort to name-calling. Your rants hardly deserve any response
other than *plonk*, and you have the gall to bitch that it's "shallow"?

> you simply cannot ignore the spam problem

Just watch me ignore it, just as my site ignores all cancels.

>                                             there is definitely
> a spam problem in cyberspace,

Not for me.  Not for most sysadmins or readers who have better things to
do than worry that someone posted something inappropriate to Usenet.

Read Dave Hayes's FAQ.

> perhaps after someone continues to send you a recurrent mailbomb of
> 100 MB per day do your site for 1 year, you will still insist that
> "internet traffic should not be censored"...

I said: "Internet traffic should not be censored BASED ON CONTENTS." If the
above actually casued my site problems based on the volume, it would result
in reprecussions for the perpetrator, irrespective of contents.

All of the so-called "spam" combined is a miniscule percentage of Usenet
traffic, less than almost any single alt.binaries. newsgroup.  It can
be easily ignored using a newsreader that processes NoCeM's.

> the spam problem will only be solved once people begin to realize what
> kind of a problem it is.

I.e., not a problem, except for some anal-retentive control freaks longing
for their beloved Soviet Union, and their ilk on news.admin.net-abuse.*.

I'm a news admin.  You're not and you don't know what you're talking about.

> there are deeper problems that cpunks skirt around but fail to grasp
> because of numerous prejudices.

You have a problem with other people saying something that you can't
control.  With this attitude, I suggest you limit your reading to
soc.culture.russian.moderated.

---

Dr. Dimitri Vulis
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

> 1. there is no economic incentive.
[snip]
> typically buying yourself *negative* publicity by running a remailer.

As you said, ecash postage could turn that around. The negative publicity
part is probably the result of the general public's negative perceptions
about anonymity. 

People seem to forget that anyone can drop a letter into the mailbox with
no return address. Did the Unabomber bring negative publicity to the 
postal service, causing people to demand that return addresses become a 
requirement? :-/

> 2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse"

Unfortunately, abuse is also a factor in people's negative perceptions
about anonymity. 

I wonder, would the average spammer be less likely to spam if he had to
PGP-encrypt messages to the remailer? I know we want to make remailers
easy to use and not limit them to the technologically elite, but requring
encryption would have the added benefit of improving security. I believe
some remailers already require encryption; have any Spam Statistics been
gathered? 

Ecash postage might discourage the average spammer, unless that spammer
has deep pockets. With postage, the only spam I can think of that would
gain money or break even is a commercial advertisment, and there's no
point to using remailers for commercial ads anyways, since people need to
know how to contact the business. 

> 3. liability

Liability depends on the jurisdiction, doesn't it? It would be ideal if
all remailers were in countries where there are no laws that would affect
remailers. Reducing liability also has the added benefit of protecting
anonymity, since if the mailer can't be siezed, that does prevent log
files (if any) from being siezed.

Do any such countries exist???

Also, if a remailer could be set up to _only_ remail to other remailers,
that would greatly reduce liability. Obviously we'd still need _some_
remailers that can deliver to the intended destination... I think a lot 
of people would be more willing to run remailers if it didn't mean that 
mailing list/usenet spam would have their name attached. 

Remailers can already be set up _not_ to send to certain addresses, so I 
think there's no reason that they couldn't be set to deliver _only_ to 
other remailers.

[kersnip]
> are perceptual, not technological. if people can find a way
> to handle the above issues and still provide anonymity, it will
> spread. otherwise, I doubt it will ever become very "mainstream".
> perhaps the above problems are intrinsic to anonymity, which would
> be a pity in my view.
[butchered for brevity] 
> of course if people don't want remailers to ever go "mainstream"
> anyway, well then there is no problem. the remailer network still
> has an "underground" feeling to it and perhaps that will always
> be part of its draw, and its actual structure.

Right now, I think, remailers don't need to be mainstream, they just need
to be there when people need them. And I think they can become mainstream,
if you consider that anon.penet.fi is quite popular. 


Just my two bits.

=====================================================================
| Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/)    |
| Email: steve@edmweb.com   Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ |
| PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 |
|          -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. --          |
===================================================================:)

On Sat, 18 May 1996, Steve Reid wrote:

> I wonder, would the average spammer be less likely to spam if he had to
> PGP-encrypt messages to the remailer? I know we want to make remailers

	Some of the technically less sophisticated would. But these people
hardly ever use remailers anyway. 

> Also, if a remailer could be set up to _only_ remail to other remailers,
> that would greatly reduce liability. Obviously we'd still need _some_
> remailers that can deliver to the intended destination... I think a lot 
> of people would be more willing to run remailers if it didn't mean that 
> mailing list/usenet spam would have their name attached. 

	The way I am thinking of setting one up would work as the front
end would accept the mail, and the back end, a seperate account would
send it. By using multiple back ends, traffic analysis would be made
marginally less easy, and there would be less complaints about the front
end. 


Petro, Christopher C.
petro@suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff>
snow@crash.suba.com

[remailer incentives]
>As you said, ecash postage could turn that around. The negative publicity
>part is probably the result of the general public's negative perceptions
>about anonymity. 

not!!! I should have made this clear, but imho no matter how favorably
the public sees anonymity, I still believe there will be little
incentive to run remailers until there is some kind of ecash
scheme. you are going to have "bad" uses of anonymity going on as
long as you provide the capability. ask the remailer operators to
estimate how much of their mail is simply taunts between college
students or sexual harassment. I doubt you will ever be able to
evade this.

what cpunks might investigate is an idea of having a pseudonym
server that somehow automatically registers complaints and stamps
messages with known reputation levels.

>People seem to forget that anyone can drop a letter into the mailbox with
>no return address. Did the Unabomber bring negative publicity to the 
>postal service, causing people to demand that return addresses become a 
>requirement? :-/

agreed, but the subject at hand was not whether anonymity is good or bad, 
but whether there is some incentive to run remailers.

>Liability depends on the jurisdiction, doesn't it? It would be ideal if
>all remailers were in countries where there are no laws that would affect
>remailers. Reducing liability also has the added benefit of protecting
>anonymity, since if the mailer can't be siezed, that does prevent log
>files (if any) from being siezed.

by liability I am also referring to a situation in which the 
internet provider is pressured to quit the service by *anyone* not
necessarily agents of the government. past examples are strong evidence
that it does not at all require a government to shut down a remailer
via pressure. anon.penet.fi at one point was pressured to shut down
by "a well known net celebrity"

>Remailers can already be set up _not_ to send to certain addresses, so I 
>think there's no reason that they couldn't be set to deliver _only_ to 
>other remailers.

hee, hee. I think you need to think that out a bit more.

>Right now, I think, remailers don't need to be mainstream, they just need
>to be there when people need them. And I think they can become mainstream,
>if you consider that anon.penet.fi is quite popular. 

well, the issue we were addressing is why remailers haven't proliferated
like other services. it is true that the usage of them has probably
gone up exponentially, or at least very significantly. but they don't
seem to have multiplied in number in the same way. growth in # of
remailers has been linear at best.

I would be interested if any longtime
remailer operators posted statistics about the amount of mail going
through their services.

On Sun, 19 May 1996, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote:
> not!!! I should have made this clear, but imho no matter how favorably
> the public sees anonymity, I still believe there will be little
> incentive to run remailers until there is some kind of ecash

	Sometimes "Just Because" is enough. There are people running them
right now with no incentive. As long as there isn't a _huge_ disincentive
to run one, there will be several running, if only because there are
people who _want_ to use one, so they run one. 

> scheme. you are going to have "bad" uses of anonymity going on as
> long as you provide the capability. ask the remailer operators to
> estimate how much of their mail is simply taunts between college
> students or sexual harassment. I doubt you will ever be able to
> evade this.

	If they know the answer to this question, then they are treading a
dangerous ground. 

> by liability I am also referring to a situation in which the 
> internet provider is pressured to quit the service by *anyone* not
> necessarily agents of the government. past examples are strong evidence
> that it does not at all require a government to shut down a remailer
> via pressure. anon.penet.fi at one point was pressured to shut down
> by "a well known net celebrity"

	Did penet.fi fold? Apparently not. 

Petro, Christopher C.
petro@suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff>
snow@crash.suba.com

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

> [remailer incentives]
> >As you said, ecash postage could turn that around. The negative publicity
> >part is probably the result of the general public's negative perceptions
> >about anonymity. 

> not!!! I should have made this clear, but imho no matter how favorably
> the public sees anonymity, I still believe there will be little
> incentive to run remailers until there is some kind of ecash
> scheme.

Re-read that first sentence I wrote: "As you said, ecash postage could
turn that around." You made yourself clear; I wasn't arguing against the
value of ecash postage, I was agreeing with it. 

The negative publicity associated with anonymity (and thus remailers) will
make remailers less valuable to their operators. That is, the operators
will want more ecash to make the venture worth the negative publicity. 

I think there are a lot more people who would be willing to run a remailer
as a hobby, if there weren't that negative publicity issue. I probably
would... But negative publicity is a liability in itself, in a way. 

I agree that ecash postage would probably provide the biggest boost to
remailers, but I don't think we should underestimate the negative effects
of the bad publicity and liability. 

> you are going to have "bad" uses of anonymity going on as
> long as you provide the capability. ask the remailer operators to
> estimate how much of their mail is simply taunts between college
> students or sexual harassment. I doubt you will ever be able to
> evade this.

Yes, there will be (and are) bad uses. And I do agree that most of the
anonymous posts right now are probably not what the cpunks intended to
allow. But I think people would be more willing to accept remailers, warts
and all, if they didn't have preconceptions about anonymity. 

> what cpunks might investigate is an idea of having a pseudonym
> server that somehow automatically registers complaints and stamps
> messages with known reputation levels.

If a message is actually anonymous, then there is no way to attach any
sort of reputation. Pseudonymity is a completely seperate matter. If
spammers don't want to have complaints tagged to them (which they probably
don't), they won't use a pseudonymous remailer, they'll use an anonymous
remailer. Anon.penet.fi may be an exception, but I believe that's only
because it's easy to use.

> >People seem to forget that anyone can drop a letter into the mailbox with
> >no return address. Did the Unabomber bring negative publicity to the 
> >postal service, causing people to demand that return addresses become a 
> >requirement? :-/

> agreed, but the subject at hand was not whether anonymity is good or bad, 
> but whether there is some incentive to run remailers.

Again, public perception about anonymity is an issue, because remailers
(and remailer operators) will have a certain stigma attached.

Liability might also be related to the public perception. If everyone
accepted anonymous remailers the same as they accept that people can mail
letters without a return address, then I think nobody would be able to
take legal action against remailer operators, just as nobody (AFAIK) has
taken legal action against the US Postal Service for their 'involvement'
in the unabomber case. 

> >Liability depends on the jurisdiction, doesn't it? It would be ideal if
> >all remailers were in countries where there are no laws that would affect
> >remailers. Reducing liability also has the added benefit of protecting
> >anonymity, since if the mailer can't be siezed, that does prevent log
> >files (if any) from being siezed.

> by liability I am also referring to a situation in which the 
> internet provider is pressured to quit the service by *anyone* not
> necessarily agents of the government. past examples are strong evidence
> that it does not at all require a government to shut down a remailer
> via pressure. anon.penet.fi at one point was pressured to shut down
> by "a well known net celebrity"

I think the non-governmental interference is a very interesting point, but
I still think jurisdiction is an issue. The Co$ (AFAIK) always had a legal
leg to stand on because of copyright law. If the remailers were in a
country where it would not be affected by copyright laws, the Co$ would
probably have been as ineffective as a person saying "Shut down your
remailer because someone has been using it to advocate nose-picking." 

> >Remailers can already be set up _not_ to send to certain addresses, so I 
> >think there's no reason that they couldn't be set to deliver _only_ to 
> >other remailers.

> hee, hee. I think you need to think that out a bit more.

You snipped the paragraph before that one, and I guess you didn't read
it... There was the sentence, "Obviously we'd still need _some_ remailers
that can deliver to the intended destination".

Remailers that deliver only to other remailers can be used for chaining
purposes and nothing else. Such remailers could be used for any link in
the chain, _except_ the last link, since the last link has to be able to
deliver to the destination email address.

This has the advantage that the operators of those remailers won't have
their names attached to spam (I think I mentioned that) and so they won't
recieve a gazillion complaints about the spam. It would also mean less
liability to those operators, since the first target of pressure groups
would surely be (and mostly is) the remailer who's name is attached to the
offending post. 

Of course, this won't help the remailers that are the last link in the chain,
but it would provide more remailers for chaining purposes.

> well, the issue we were addressing is why remailers haven't proliferated
> like other services. it is true that the usage of them has probably
> gone up exponentially, or at least very significantly. but they don't
> seem to have multiplied in number in the same way. growth in # of
> remailers has been linear at best.

I think remailers are only a niche thing.

When people start using the internet and some sort of untraceable packet
forwarding service in their everyday work, and discover that they can
evade taxes that way, then people will start moving towards it in droves,
simply because it would mean that they could work for less pay (pleasing
their employer) and yet have more take-home cash. I don't think
_remailers_ will ever have this sort of popularity, because they don't
allow TCP-like stream connections needed for web connections, PGPfone,
etc. 

BTW, I'm fairly certain that an anonymous/pseudonymous packet forwarding
service could be created to handle TCP connections... It should already be
possibe... It would require few additions to the TCP stack software to
allow encrypted connections, and some way to have TCP connections inside
TCP connections. And of course, servers would be required.


=====================================================================
| Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/)    |
| Email: steve@edmweb.com   Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ |
| PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 |
|          -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. --          |
===================================================================:)

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>>>>> "Steve" == Steve Reid <root@edmweb.com> writes:

Steve> Ecash postage might discourage the average spammer, unless that
Steve> spammer has deep pockets. With postage, the only spam I can
Steve> think of that would gain money or break even is a commercial
Steve> advertisment, and there's no point to using remailers for
Steve> commercial ads anyways, since people need to know how to
Steve> contact the business.

It isn't spam if they're paying for the traffic.  Commercial
advertisement through electronic mail is only evil because it is
forced on someone against their wishes and on their dime.  The current
situation is much like a telemarketer calling long distance collect
with billing done automatically, and you can't hang up until they're
done with their spiel.

If it were standard practice for email recipients to charge the sender
an ecash fee (waived if they thought the mail worth their time), it
would make things much more interesting.

-- 
steve@miranova.com baur
Unsolicited commercial e-mail will be proofread for $250/hour.
Andrea Seastrand: For your vote on the Telecom bill, I will vote for anyone
except you in November.

>
>It isn't spam if they're paying for the traffic.  Commercial
>advertisement through electronic mail is only evil because it is
>forced on someone against their wishes and on their dime.  The current
>situation is much like a telemarketer calling long distance collect
>with billing done automatically, and you can't hang up until they're
>done with their spiel.
>
>If it were standard practice for email recipients to charge the sender
>an ecash fee (waived if they thought the mail worth their time), it
>would make things much more interesting.

a very interesting proposal (I believe Bill Gates may have even
suggested this in his book), but keep in mind you seem to be mixing
different ideas here.

there is a cost involved in delivering a message associated with
pure communications costs. then there may be a cost imposed on someone
to obtain the attention. the latter is arbitrary. the former is
pretty well established based on internet infrastructure.

what you might keep in mind is the following: in a public forum,
where "spam" was originally invented, who decides how much it
costs to post? now lets say we could quantify the communications
costs. ok fine, this comes out to $.05/msg (a large example number).
that is still economically viable for someone to "spam". to
a mail marketer this would be a really great deal. hence a system
that only charges communications fees is unlikely to prevent
spam, imho. furthermore, in a public forum, you aren't very
easily going to be able to implement "arbitrary" charges like
I wrote about.

so charging for email to one's mailbox is one possible way to
deal with spam, but it's hard to see how one could apply this
to public forums. and in many ways, the spam problem is most
difficult to solve there.

but I like the thinking on methods of trying to solve the spam
problem. I do believe it is solvable. it's just that its such
an insanely difficult problem to solve. it's a good example
of a problem that gets worse when the span of the software
grows larger.

! so list attention turns once again to a looming remailer "crisis"...

PLEASE TURN YOUR ATTENTION TO THE CONTINUING CRYPTO EMERGENCY

! where are there so few remailers? the reasons are pretty obvious.
! these problems have been transparently apparent from the very 
! beginning.
! 
! 1. there is no economic incentive.
! 
! as soon as there is a good economic incentive to run remailers, you
! will see them proliferate. but currently they have no virtually
! no value to the creator. it's like building a house for other people
! to live in out of humanitarianism. note that with web pages, you
! are buying free publicity for your company. but in fact you are
! typically buying yourself *negative* publicity by running a remailer.
! 
! what is the current incentive to run remailers? answer: adulation
! by other cypherpunks. hmmm, not necessarily all that motivating
! to very many.

WORKS FOR MEEEE

! 2. there is no good way to deal with spams or other so-called "abuse"

NETNEWS SPAM IS CAUSED BY MODERATION GET RID OF MODERATION TO END SPAM ONCE AND FOR ALL

! I commend the remailer operators for starting a mailing list to
! deal with spam. but the solution remains essentially "stop
! spam by hand". spammers still have the ability to be a serious
! threat to the network. this has been a threat from the beginning
! and has never been resolved. note that "spam avoidance" is a
! very, very difficult problem that plagues far more than remailers,
! such as mailing lists and usenet. but it is particularly acute
! with remailers.

USENET SPAM SAVES DISK SPACE ADMINS LOVE IT

! 3. liability
! 
! there is a lot of liability to the operator of a remailer, and
! again, this risk is totally unsupportable from their current
! returns (nil). Hal Finney recently suggested restricting posts
! from remailers to avoid copyright liability. this will limit
! the liability and risk but does not totally remove it.

THE BEST STUFF IS CUMMING FROM CRYPTO WANNA BEE ON INSIDE TRACK FOR CLEAR TEXT TEEN NUDES

! 4. no need for a network
! 
! in fact there is not really a need for a remailer network on one
! level. there is only a need if the service is not available. why
! is there only one anon.penet.fi? well, because of the above reasons,
! and also by the fact that only one is sufficient to serve all of
! cyberspace, virtually. what I mean is that there is easily enough
! traffic to justify another anon.penet.fi type remailer, but it's
! not totally critical (i.e. to the point that someone puts their
! resources where their mouth is) as long as anon.penet.fi is running.

THERE IS EXTREME UNDERCAPACITY FOR CRYPTO AND ANONYMINITY

! 5. etc.

ETC

! ==
! 
! if people want to know why remailers haven't proliferated  in
! the same way that other cyberspace infrastructure has in the
! past, such as news servers and web sites, you have to focus on
! the above issues. remailers are NOT like other cyberspace services.
! they are a tremendous burden to run, instead of being of high
! use to the maintainer (even though they don't generate cash)
! in the way a web page or usenet server is.

INCORPORATE AND SELL ADVERTISING SPACE IN THE SIG THE COOLEST PEOPLE GET ANONYMOUS MAIL POSTS THERE IS A VAST UNTAPPED SOURCE OF REVENUE GUNS DRUGS CRYPTO PYRO PORN PERSONALS ETC INFORMATION WANTS TO BE PAID FOR

! the main problem, getting cash for the service, is slowly dissolving
! to the point that it will not be an obstacle. I predict that 
! remailers (and many other unusual services) may begin to proliferate
! at that point-- but not as much as other areas of cyberspace such
! as the web. remailers are always going to be plagued by the other
! problems I mentioned above unless some really brilliant genius
! comes along to solve what seems to be the unsolvable.

INCORPORATE AND SELL ADVERTISING SPACE IN THE SIG THE COOLEST PEOPLE GET ANONYMOUS MAIL POSTS THERE IS A VAST UNTAPPED SOURCE OF REVENUE GUNS DRUGS CRYPTO PYRO PORN PERSONALS ETC INFORMATION WANTS TO BE PAID FOR

! another tact the cypherpunks might take to get anonymity into 
! the cyberspace infrastructure is to target forum architecture.
! instead of trying to create remailers that "feed into" other
! networks, why not build in remailers into those networks themselves?
! I am thinking of the way NNTP could be a massive anonymous 
! remailer network, and that in fact it was once but that this
! was purposely designed against in the protocol (preventing people
! from anonymously submitting articles to NNTP hosts).

BUT IN THE MEAN TIME WE WANT MORE SERVERS

! I propose that as long as there are serious elements involved
! in building up cyberspace that are hostile to anonymity, you
! are not going to see it flourish in the way other services have.
! it seems to me the major obstacles to widespread anonymity
! are perceptual, not technological. if people can find a way

WE WANT OTHERS TO DO THE WORK FOR US

! to handle the above issues and still provide anonymity, it will
! spread. otherwise, I doubt it will ever become very "mainstream".
! perhaps the above problems are intrinsic to anonymity, which would
! be a pity in my view.
! 
! BTW, TCM laments that he hasn't seen master's thesis on remailers.
! I consider Lance Cottrell's mixmaster work to be really on that
! level, and highly commendable. LC has really advanced remailer
! technology by tremendous leaps and bounds since putting his mind
! to it. also Levien's remailer page is another very outstanding
! service. it is possible that all the real research into remailers
! is being done at the NSA <g>
! 
! seriously, though, I think cpunks have an opportunity to do some
! introspection here. it seems a pretty good rule in cyberspace that
! "cool and useful services flourish and grow". witness Usenet
! and the web. why haven't the cpunks been able to tap into that
! kind of exponential force with remailers? the problems are not
! merely technological. I would say the technological problems
! associated with the remailers are the most straightforward to
! solve. its the complex social issues that are seemingly insurmountable.
! 
! I really believe that if anyone wants to get more anonymity in
! cyberspace, they must deal head on with the sociological 
! "anonymity taboo" in society. why is there a taboo in society
! against anonymity? could it be there are some good reasons for it?
! is it possible to create a "socially acceptable" anonymity? of
! course this line of thinking is going to be utterly repulsive
! to some on this list, but I contend it is essential to remailer
! growth strategy.
! 
! of course if people don't want remailers to ever go "mainstream"
! anyway, well then there is no problem. the remailer network still
! has an "underground" feeling to it and perhaps that will always
! be part of its draw, and its actual structure.

ANYONE FUCK WITH MY REMAILER AND I SUMMON TEN SKINHEADS TO BREAK OFF THEIR DICK