Re: Children's Privacy Act

From:	IN%"llurch@networking.stanford.edu"  "Rich Graves" 24-MAY-1996 21:35:29.54

>I think forgiveness, within reason, tends to have a positive economic
>effect. I'm not the same person I was seven years ago, or even seven
>months. (Is it 7 years, btw? Or was it 12? It's arbitrary, in any case.) 

>I have no objection to allowing someone to become, and remain, a
>productive member of society years after fucking up badly. Note there are
>no statutes of limitations and no forgive-and-forget mandates for the more
>heinous violent crimes.

	I have no objections to giving people a second chance. I just like to
know _when_ I'm giving someone a second chance. What the laws in question say
is that companies - and individuals, so far as I know - shouldn't be allowed
to have that knowledge.

>Someone once said something about giving up a little freedom in return for
>security.

	Do try to keep in mind the freedom of the data-gatherer. This was also
said in regards to government. I'd agree with keeping governments and similar
coercive forces (e.g., monopolistic and ogliopolistic companies) from having
this information, or from misusing it if they have to have it for some
reason.

>OK, that's a straw man. The last couple examples show why some laws aren't
>necessary. The market simply wouldn't accept a too-totalitarian insurance
>company; people would rather pay as they go, and accept the risk
>themselves. But why is it fair to discriminate against detectable risks,
>when undetectable risks may be more expensive? 

	Discriminate? A rather loaded term. I generally define discrimination,
and have confirmed this definition by a dictionary check, as bias against
someone on a basis other than rational information. If someone refuses to hire
me for a job necessitating calligraphy, they aren't discrimiating against me
or other people with bad handwriting (including those, like me, who have that
due to neurological problems). They're being rational. A health insurance
company that judges who should be insured by that company on the basis of
whether the person is likely to get sick is surely being rational. A credit
company that judges who should get credit from that company on the basis of
whether that person is likely to declare bankrupcy is surely being rational.
	Moreover, even when it isn't rational, it's still that company's
business what it does with its dollars. It's analogous to the problem of
not allowing people to freely contract not to sue, as in remailers. While it
might be considered stupid for someone to do so - particularly in hindsight,
when they're claiming that they should be able to do so - the person should
still be allowed to do so.
	In regards to accepting the risk themselves, look at what happens when
you have insurance companies that are required to accept everyone at an equal
price. The ones who have information - denied to the insurance company - that
they're going to get sick will sign up more than the ones who won't. Take
Huntington's as an example. If genetic screening is prohibited to insurance
companies, someone who has a test and finds out that they've got the allele
for Huntington's, and thus will get sick and die from it, is going to go down
and get themselves insurance. Then the insurance - e.g., everyone else who
buys from that insurance company - will have to pay for them when they need
several years of nursing care before dying. How is this fair to everyone else,
including the insurance company?
	You spoke of fairness. Capitalism isn't fair; neither is life. Someone
who is bigger physically will have to spend more on food to keep alive than
someone who is small. Does that argue for socialization of food, so that
those who are big (partially a genetic trait) won't have to pay any more? Some
people are smarter than others. Does that mean that the ones who are smart
should be handicapped artificially to make everything fair?
	Most arguments on fairness ultimately come down to either appeals to
gut instincts - not a valid argument - or philosophical ones, generally
Rawls' Theory of Justice. That one has a problem. Rawls thought that the
most just social system was that which a group of people would come up with
when they didn't know what position they'd be in. This would lead to equality,
since nobody'd want to be in the low position, right? Wrong. People can
rationally take a chance. If you give someone a choice between gambling for
(on the flip of a 50/50 coin) 150 or 0 dollars, and getting 50 dollars
guaranteed, the rational choice is the gamble. In other words, if it is more
efficient - as I have argued - for things to be unequal, then this idea of
what justice is would argue for inequality being just.
	-Allen

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On Fri, 24 May 1996, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:

:	Most arguments on fairness ultimately come down to either appeals to
:gut instincts - not a valid argument - or philosophical ones, generally
:Rawls' Theory of Justice. That one has a problem. Rawls thought that the
:most just social system was that which a group of people would come up with
:when they didn't know what position they'd be in. This would lead to equality,
:since nobody'd want to be in the low position, right? Wrong. People can
:rationally take a chance. If you give someone a choice between gambling for
:(on the flip of a 50/50 coin) 150 or 0 dollars, and getting 50 dollars
:guaranteed, the rational choice is the gamble. In other words, if it is more
:efficient - as I have argued - for things to be unequal, then this idea of
:what justice is would argue for inequality being just.

I don't think that is exactly what Rawls was postulating (though I would
be the first to agree that Rawls' prose is exceptionally interpretable,
which I belive is a point in Rawls favour as a writer).  Rawlsian "Justice
as fairness" is based on the idea that a just system is one in which
people decide rules before they know what their starting positions are.
In a sense this is only taking the idea of a "disinterested/impartial
lawmaker" and putting it into another context.  What is perhaps more
fundamentally important about Rawls is his profound respect for contract
and expectations engendered by the contract, as evidenced in his argument
for the rules being laid down befor eht egame (in this case life as we
know it) begins.  I think this is why Hayek felt "A theory of Justice" was
not the text others thought it was (I haven't read Nozick's Anarchy, State
and Utopia as of yet, only bits of it).  In any case, I don't
really believe Rawls argued for an egalitarian system.  The two "rules" he
thinks will emerge from the "initial position behind the veil of
ignorance" are (pg. 60)

First; each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are both a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and b)
attached to positions and offices open to all.

He goes on to say "While the distribution of wealth and income need not be
equal, it must be to everyone's advantage, and at the same time, positions
of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all.  .... These
principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle
prior to the second.  This ordering means that a departure from the
institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be
justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic
advantages".   He then adds to the argument the concept of the difference
principle (pareto optimality in the final reckoning) and maximin
(maximizing the expectations/outcome of the person at the lowest rung of
the ladder).  About the difference principle Rawls says " it should be
observed that the difference principle, or the ideas expressed by it, can
easily be accomodated to the general conception of justice.  In fact, the
general conception is simply the difference principle applied to all
primary goods including liberty and opportunity".

I really don't see Rawls arguing strict egalitarianism in "A theory of
Justice".  Further, I believe the most important contribution made by this
book is the principle of the "veil of ignorance / initial position" as a
test for the fariness/justice of a particular system.  Rawls proposal is
simply his idea of what would result from the initial position (as you
poit out) and certainly we can come up with other equally acceptable
proposals.  But it is essential to read Rawls because he is so
interpretable, my own reading may be flawed.  In any case, Rawls is well
aware of the demands efficiency places on an egalitarian system (which it
is unable to meet) and does agree that inequality can be in everyone's
interest (i.e. spill-over's, for eg. because geniuses need incentives as
well as does the company that brings you your breakfast cereal).  As a
final quip, the result (in any particular game) of the question regarding
the gamble you proposed earlier depends almost entirely on the player's
aversion to risk.  Some among us (I'm sure) would be willing to take $50
in hand rather than $2million in the bush ;~)

hostmaster@trill-home.com * Symbiant test coaching * Blue-Ribbon * Lynx 2.5
WHERE CAN THE MATTER BE

	Oh, dear, where can the matter be
	When it's converted to energy?
	There is a slight loss of parity.
	Johnny's so long at the fair.

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On Fri, 24 May 1996, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:

> 	In regards to accepting the risk themselves, look at what happens when
> you have insurance companies that are required to accept everyone at an equal
> price. The ones who have information - denied to the insurance company - that
> they're going to get sick will sign up more than the ones who won't. Take
> Huntington's as an example. If genetic screening is prohibited to insurance
> companies, someone who has a test and finds out that they've got the allele
> for Huntington's, and thus will get sick and die from it, is going to go down
> and get themselves insurance. Then the insurance - e.g., everyone else who
> buys from that insurance company - will have to pay for them when they need
> several years of nursing care before dying. How is this fair to everyone else,
> including the insurance company?

I'm sure you know the law and practice better, but my insurance seems to
have a "preexisting conditions" clause. Knowingly doing the above
constitutes fraud. (Of course lots of people probably get away with it.)

Moreover, when the insurance company pays out, that ultimately comes out
of premiums. I don't have Huntington's, but I don't mind paying an extra
$X into a risk pool for people with Huntington's because it means I don't
have to submit to genetic screening, either. You don't have to have
something to hide to see it as an invasion of privacy. It's a pool of
consumers establishing preferences, not just individual consumers v. 
producers. The meaning of microeconomics changes as it scales.

> 	You spoke of fairness. Capitalism isn't fair; neither is life. Someone
> who is bigger physically will have to spend more on food to keep alive than
> someone who is small. Does that argue for socialization of food, so that

[Yawn]

By "fairness" I meant that equal risks should be treated equally. Cost of
disease A = cost of disease B. The detection of predisposition to disease
A is politically feasible, but the same isn't true for disease B. I'd say
you were discriminating against people predisposed to disease A, because
they're paying into the risk pool for B, but B isn't paying into the risk
pool for A. 

-rich