NODE 4b3521feRe: Federal Key Registration Agency
jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>Fri, 21 Jun 1996 23:21:16 +0800
At 09:20 PM 6/20/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin wrote:
>I have seen the text of the speech. The wire service accounts wildly,
>wildly exaggerate. This is a non-story...except for AG Reno's assertion
>that it would take the government a year to break one DES message with a
>"supercomputer". She presumably believes this. We know the number for
>known plaintext attacks, but assuming you don't have a known plaintext,
>what's a more reasonable assumption?
If done in parallel, on a dedicated, 200 MHz custom chip, my WAG says that
such a chip could try, and statistically analyze the results of 10 million
DES codes per second. (it would do the decrypts on a number of parallel
DES blocks, and look for typical ASCII code pattern probabilities, again all
in parallel.) A typical cracking system might have 100 boards of 100 such
chips, or perhaps a 100 billion such decrypts per second. Checking the
keyspace would require 2**19 seconds, or about a half million seconds, or 6
days. Average decrypt, of course, in 3 days.
Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com
NODE 4021c233Re: Federal Key Registration Agency
William Knowles <erehwon@c2.org>Sat, 22 Jun 1996 06:03:47 +0800
On Thu, 20 Jun 1996, jim bell wrote:
> At 09:20 PM 6/20/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin wrote:
> >I have seen the text of the speech. The wire service accounts wildly,
> >wildly exaggerate. This is a non-story...except for AG Reno's assertion
> >that it would take the government a year to break one DES message with a
> >"supercomputer". She presumably believes this. We know the number for
> >known plaintext attacks, but assuming you don't have a known plaintext,
> >what's a more reasonable assumption?
>
> If done in parallel, on a dedicated, 200 MHz custom chip, my WAG says that
> such a chip could try, and statistically analyze the results of 10 million
> DES codes per second. (it would do the decrypts on a number of parallel
> DES blocks, and look for typical ASCII code pattern probabilities, again all
> in parallel.) A typical cracking system might have 100 boards of 100 such
> chips, or perhaps a 100 billion such decrypts per second. Checking the
> keyspace would require 2**19 seconds, or about a half million seconds, or 6
> days. Average decrypt, of course, in 3 days.
For a guy that used to be in my killfile, I agree with Jim on this one.
William Knowles
erehwon@c2.org
Finger for public key
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