NODE 1d730ea2Re: Game Theory and its Relevance to Cypherpunks
"James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>Thu, 25 Jul 1996 16:58:43 +0800
At 03:21 AM 7/21/96 -0700, Llywarch Hen wrote:
> What Timothy May espouses is not the appearance of craziness but actual
> insanity itself.
The best way to convince others you are crazy is to actually be crazy.
More practically, if you organize your nuclear forces so that any
serious war is likely to escalate uncontrollably into the battle of
armageddon, regardless of your intentions and desires, which is how
the American government organized its nuclear forces in Europe,
then you can pretty much guarantee you will not have to face a
serious war.
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NODE b9cbbba7Re: Game Theory and its Relevance to Cypherpunks
ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)Fri, 26 Jul 1996 01:43:06 +0800
James A. Donald wrote:
> The best way to convince others you are crazy is to actually be crazy.
>
> More practically, if you organize your nuclear forces so that any
> serious war is likely to escalate uncontrollably into the battle of
> armageddon, regardless of your intentions and desires, which is how
> the American government organized its nuclear forces in Europe,
> then you can pretty much guarantee you will not have to face a
> serious war.
How did they organize them? It is interesting.
- Igor.
NODE 19935283Re: Game Theory and its Relevance to Cypherpunks
"Jon Leonard" <jleonard@divcom.umop-ap.com>Sun, 28 Jul 1996 08:16:17 +0800
James A. Donald wrote:
> At 03:21 AM 7/21/96 -0700, Llywarch Hen wrote:
> > What Timothy May espouses is not the appearance of craziness but actual
> > insanity itself.
>
> The best way to convince others you are crazy is to actually be crazy.
>
> More practically, if you organize your nuclear forces so that any
> serious war is likely to escalate uncontrollably into the battle of
> armageddon, regardless of your intentions and desires, which is how
> the American government organized its nuclear forces in Europe,
> then you can pretty much guarantee you will not have to face a
> serious war.
This was, of course, the logic behind the alliances before World War I.
It was obviously suicidal to start a war with any of the major powers,
but it happened anyway.
Game theory is the proper tool to analyze this sort of scenario, but the
tendency for non-ideal behavior has to be factored in. Brinksmanship
is another aspect of game theory, too...
Jon Leonard