Schelling Points, Rights, and Game Theory--Part II

As promised in Part I, here is more on the application of Schelling points
to the discussion of "rights" (property rights, rights of parents to tell
their children what to do, etc.).

We saw that Schelling points, as developed by Richard Schelling and others,
are essentially "lower entropy" points. (In fact, I suspect there are
formulations which involve so-called "maxiumum entropy" methods which would
reproduce the theory of Schelling points; Cover and Thomas hint at this in
their "Information Theory" book.)

How does this apply to rights?

Let us take as an example the contentious issue of "parent's rights,"
"children's rights," and societal issues involving schooling, child abuse,
indoctrination into the body politic, citizenship, etc.

* Viewpoint #1: Parents have absolute control of what their minor (under
some age, usually 18 and/or resident in their homes) children read, watch
on t.v., listen to on the radio, etc. They can control the comings and
goings of their minor children, whom they may associate with, etc.

* Viewpoint #2: Children, even minor children, have certain basic rights to
access to information, access to t.v., radio, music, and books. Even access
to crypto!

* Viewpoint #3: The State and/or Community has an interest in the
upbringing of a child and may take steps to direct the education and
exposure to information of children, even in contravention of the wishes of
parents.

There are of course various shadings of these viewpoints. And examples can
be found to defend each of these viewpoints, and also to attack them. (For
example, what of the Christian Scientist who lets his 5-year-old die of an
easily-curable disease because he believes injections are unGodly? What of
the 10-year-old who is taught in public schools how to use condoms (or how
to clean dirty needles), in contravention of the wishes of the parent?)

Cutting to the chase, I submit that nearly all societies have "evolved" an
approach that says:

-- "While I may think you are raising your child in a way different from
how I would raise him, I cannot take over the raising of your child, and I
cannot be in your house/tent/cave/yurt at all times, or even at _any_times,
so I will basically not interfere unless something really egregious
happens."

This is a "Schelling point" in the same way that territorial boundaries
develop and are mutually adhered to, for the most part.

The _costs_ of extending beyond the Schelling point boundaries is deemed to
be too high, and the boundary persists. (Boundaries may jump around, as
conditions change. And wars still exist to try to imbalance or move the
boundaries. Nothing says the Schelling points are fixed in stone, only that
the points are not completely random, and that there is a kind of order out
of the chaos.)

This is summarized in the most important of all Schelling points:

"Live and let live."

In the absence of a direct threat to one's self or family, and in the
absence of other compelling evidence of a need to intervene, much energy
and grief is saved by not trying to intervene in the lives of others.

(I believe many of the themes we talk about, here and in libertarian
circles, come together in this way. The view of John Rawls, that "justice"
is that which an ensemble of people of people would pick, even if they did
not what station in life they would be born into, closely fits with this
Schelling point model.)

ObCrypto Sidebar: The "fair" method for dividing a pie between two people
is well-known: "You cut, I choose." This *game theory* result is central to
many cryptographic protocols (though it may not always be apparent at
first). And the protocol can be extended to 3 parties, and proabably to N.
Research is ongoing on this, including Cypherpunk Robin Hanson's work at
Caltech.

My essay here is not a formal, footnoted proof of my claims, naturally. But
I believe my claims to be basically correct, and to offer insights into the
debate about "rights"...certainly a Schelling point or evolutionary game
theory interpretation of what we call "rights" is superior to an
appeal-to-God or "natural rights" interpretation.

To get back to the issue of children's rights: I will not expend my
energies and risk my life to forcibly gain entry to my neighbor's "castle"
to make sure his 7-year-old son is able to view "Power Rangers" when his
"rights" to do so are denied by his father. Nor will I pay for cops, Child
Protective Services, and a powerful bureaucracy to enforce these "rights."
Nor will I demand that this parent send his child to the church I deem most
appropriate, nor the school I deem most appropriate, etc.

That is, "practical and economic" issues lead me to the conclusion that
parents basically can tell their minor children what to do, and that only
truly egregious cases, such as clear cases of severe beatings, warrant the
interference by the State.

The same applies to cryptography. While there are dangers with any
technology, including cryptographers, most societies have eventually
evolved a system in which one is secure in one's home and papers. Orwell's
vision of video cameras in all homes (actually, only of the elites, as the
"proles" were unmonitored) has not come to pass, and even in nominally
totalitarian states like the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. there was considerable
privacy in the home, at least after the worst of the terrors in the 1930-70
period. (I am not endorsing these states, naturally, just noting that even
these states had to recognize the Schelling points of (mostly) not trying
to send cops into private residences to enforce marginally-important
rules.)

Forceful advocates of children's rights, such as Mike Duvos, will no doubt
find many points to use to argue for intervention on behalf of children.
And in some case, I would even agree. But the basic principle, the "right"
of a man to control his own castle, and the "right" not to have people
nosing around inside his home, and the very real economic point that a
parent pays for services and good consumed in his house, means that the
balance of rights _must_ be in the direction of Viewpoint #1 above.

Parents are free to raise their children as they see fit. They feed and
clothe them, they talk to them about ideas and beliefs, they control the
television set and the radio channel tuned to, and so forth. This is basic
reality. To change this basic reality would require intervention from
outside. And this is too high a price to pay for illusory gains. (I say
"illusory" because I don't think intervention from outside would produce
better-educated children, though it might produce more controllable
citizen-units.)

This essay has concentrated perhaps too much on "parent's vs. children's
rights," but this is what sparked my desire to write an essay on Schelling
points and why certain so-called rights appear to have evolved. I believe
the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches, mixed in with economics,
offer the most solid grounding for the discussion of rights.

Comments, as always, are welcome.

--Tim May


Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software!
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist         | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

Hello, Tim,

I found your essay interesting, but would like to describe a 
hypothetical situation and my ideas of how your notion of Schelling 
points applies to you to see if I am correctly following your ideas:

Suppose that I live in a rural area and 
I know that my neighbour beats his children because I have seen them with 
bruises before and too many times just to be from household accidents. 
Since I am far enough away from him, the beating does not make enough noise
to distrub me from any of my activities. I am also planning on 
moving in three years, so there is little danger that I will be a
victim if the children develop into violent criminals due, in part,
to their abuse. In this case, the "least action" reasoning seems to 
tell me to do nothing. 

On the other hand, the state might do some sort of calculation like
the following: 

(probability the children will become violent criminals) x
(cost of dealing with violent criminals)
-(cost of taking the children from the parent)

to see if intervention is warranted. This is already a simple
application of utilitarianism, however, so that the introduction of the 
notion of Schelling points to explain state intervention seems
unnecessary. 

One the hand, the theory does seem distinguishable from utilitarianism for 
explaining the likely behaviour of the other neighbours of the beater:
Cosinder ones who will be living in the area for quite some time. They
are more likely to later become victims of violent crime (either from the
beater or the children) so would have a greater probability of 
intervening than others. However, it seems that no intervention can be 
justified on notion of Schelling points unless

(probability the children will become a violent criminal) x
(cost of children's crimes to me if they do)
-(cost of person acting now)

is positive. (Of course, people will have diffent estimates of the costs
and probability affecting whether or not they act). A utilitarian, 
however, would have to do the same calculation as the state to determine 
whether or not it was right to act, so would be more likely act,
because the utilitarian needs to consider the cost to everyone, not
just to him or herself. 

Am I following your ideas ok? :) 

-- 
Leonard Janke (janke@unixg.ubc.ca)
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