"The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...."

At 2:30 PM 9/5/96, Omegaman wrote:

>What strikes me as odd is that the arguments against anonymous
>communication are nearly identical to those against strong crypto.
>ie. the same four horsemen flare up in these discussions.  Yet we
>have parties who are ostensibly pro-crypto but anti-anonymity.
>
>To put it in a nutshell, in a free society I can have a private
>conversation, but I must essentially announce that I am having one
>and who I am having that conversation with?

As with Adam Back's mini-rant yesterday, this is exactly correct. In a free
society, speech need not be approved, registered, escrowed, labelled, or
identified with the Registered True Name of the speaker.

One can paraphrase Esther Dyson's concerns about anonymity in several
fairly equivalent forms.

Here's the original:

"Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by
repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with
some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what
are generally required for a wiretap."

Here's a slightly paraphrased version for freedom to read anonymously, with
some "reasons" included in brackets:

"Books and magazines can be dangerous [bomb recipes, racial hatred,
instilling bad values, etc.]-- as can restrictions on reading, especially
in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing unfettered
reading -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably
stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(i.e., "book escrow," where one's reading materials are escrowed with
Trusted Authorities, and only accessed by law enforcement under Proper
Conditions. Failure to escrow reading materials would be a Class B felony.
Cf. the FBI's Library Awareness Program of circa 1987-8.)

A version for freedom of movement:

"People moving around can be dangerous [avoiding parental responsibilities,
avoiding taxes, spying, plotting to bomb buildings]-- as can traceability,
especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing
freedom of movement -- with some form of traceability only under terms
considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(a la the "position escrow system" I predicted a couple of years ago would
someday be seriously considered)

A version for freedom of association:

"Freedom of association can be dangerous [plotting of crimes, gathering of
mobs, spread of dangerous ideas, disease]-- as can restrictions on such
gatherings, especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor
allowing freedom of association -- with some form of traceability only
under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a
wiretap."

("Club escrow"? All mailing lists, clubs, associations, and such would have
to escrow an up-to-date list of members, associates, and contacts. Then,
with proper authorization by proper authorities, law enforcement could
inspect these lists to see who had been meeting with whom. Hotels would
have to monitor use of rooms by more than two persons (the two person case
is already covered by the "Sex can be dangerous..." variant of the Dyson
Principle).)

A version for anonymous purchases and sales:

"Anonymity in sales and purchases can be dangerous [bomb materials, stolen
goods, unhealthful foods, etc.] -- as can traceability, especially in/by
repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing anonymous purchases
and sales of goods -- with some form of traceability only under terms
considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(There go the flea markets and garage sales (for buyers), which are largely
anonymous. There goes walking into a store and paying cash for a piece of
pipe (could be made into a bomb). There goes cash, period. See next item.)

A version for cash:

"Cash can be dangerous [illegal purchases, drugs, prostitution, tax
evasion, illegal workers, extortion, etc.] -- as can traceable money,
especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing cash
-- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger
than what are generally required for a wiretap."

(One has to presume that Dyson would probably not support Chaumian
untraceable e-cash, though I doubt she would go for the other examples.)

And so on. One can take Dyson's basic argument for why anonymity may be
dangerous at times and why it may need to be restricted, limited, or
banned, and use these arguments for a variety of other basic freedoms.
Essentially, freedom can be dangerous. The world can be dangerous. In fact,
it is.

(No, Dyson has not called for such restrictons on freedom of movement,
freedom of association, freedom to read anonymously. But her argument that
she would support anonymity if some form of traceability is built in
essentially applies, by the same logic (that it can be dangerous) to a wide
variety of other cases.)

To summarize:

"The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...."


--Tim May

We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May) writes:
> As with Adam Back's mini-rant yesterday, this is exactly correct. In a free
> society, speech need not be approved, registered, escrowed, labelled, or
> identified with the Registered True Name of the speaker.

But the U.S. is not a "free society". Tim yaks at those who criticize
his beloved United States for not being "polite". Tim is wrong.

> "Books and magazines can be dangerous [bomb recipes, racial hatred,
> instilling bad values, etc.]-- as can restrictions on reading, especially
> in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing unfettered
> reading -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably
> stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."
>
> (i.e., "book escrow," where one's reading materials are escrowed with
> Trusted Authorities, and only accessed by law enforcement under Proper
> Conditions. Failure to escrow reading materials would be a Class B felony.
> Cf. the FBI's Library Awareness Program of circa 1987-8.)

I remember beig surprised to discover that the library computer at City
University of New York (state school where I got all my degrees) had an
(easily accessible) record of every book I've ever checked out in some
15 years, And by the way you need to present A LOT of ids to take books
out of New York's public libraries, or to use the public-access
computers in them. And by the way you're asked to sign your name and
affiliation (fortunately, no ID is required) if you want to just enter
NYPL's Slavic division and use their reading room. Apparently this was
instituted during the cold war under the assumption that anyone
interested in Slavic Division's materials needs to be watched.

> "People moving around can be dangerous [avoiding parental responsibilities,
> avoiding taxes, spying, plotting to bomb buildings]-- as can traceability,
> especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing
> freedom of movement -- with some form of traceability only under terms
> considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."
>
> (a la the "position escrow system" I predicted a couple of years ago would
> someday be seriously considered)

Have you tried to get on an airplane lately? I just had to present my
driver licence (work id w/ picture wouldn't cut it!) to get on. I
understand John Gilmore got himself arrested for refusing to identify
himself. As he said, there used to be a 200-year precedent that a
citizen can travel within the country without having to identify
himself. Shit, I used to fly under phoney names - can't do this anymore.

> A version for anonymous purchases and sales:
>
> "Anonymity in sales and purchases can be dangerous [bomb materials, stolen
> goods, unhealthful foods, etc.] -- as can traceability, especially in/by
> repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing anonymous purchases
> and sales of goods -- with some form of traceability only under terms
> considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."
>
> (There go the flea markets and garage sales (for buyers), which are largely
> anonymous. There goes walking into a store and paying cash for a piece of
> pipe (could be made into a bomb). There goes cash, period. See next item.)

A very good friend of mine does EE for a living, and in particular he
sells some EE equipment by mail order. He told me that every time he
sells something like the gizmo to write magnetic strips on credit cards,
he gets a phone call from los federales saying: you sold X who paid with
Y and shipped it to address Z - do you have any additional details? He
says every time they know as much about the sale as he does. :-)

> A version for cash:
>
> "Cash can be dangerous [illegal purchases, drugs, prostitution, tax
> evasion, illegal workers, extortion, etc.] -- as can traceable money,
> especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing cash
> -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger
> than what are generally required for a wiretap."

That's why any time you attempt a cash transaction for over 10K (buying
a car, depositing it in a bank, etc), you will, by law, be reported to
the IRS, who will take a close look. I can't recall the name of the guy
who tried to take over 10K of cash out of the country without declaring
it, was searched, was caught, and is currently in jail.

> And so on. One can take Dyson's basic argument for why anonymity may be
> dangerous at times and why it may need to be restricted, limited, or
> banned, and use these arguments for a variety of other basic freedoms.
> Essentially, freedom can be dangerous. The world can be dangerous. In fact,
> it is.

As I told John Gilmore: I've known Esther Dyson for some time before she
got involved with EFF. I consider her a very nice person, and admire her
activities in Eastern Europe and elsewhere (and am in particular
thankful for her help on my past projects). I suspect that Esther simply
didn't think enough about this question before saying what she was
quoted as saying... I hope Esther will research the issue further, and
knowing her pro-liberty record, I'm sure she will see the value of
absoletely untraceable anonymity.

(Likewise I have great respect for Dr. Dorothy Denning, with whom I has
a very interesting conversation yesterday. She showed me cituations
where GAK (or generally employer access to keys) makes sense - not when
it's used by folks not affiliated with the government or the employer,
of course.)

I got on four seperate airplanes with a work ID in late August.  All
you need to do is ask for the manager, and ask to see where in the
contract it says Goverment issued ID.

Air tickets come with about 300 pages of contract included by
reference.  No where in those contracts is anything about government
ID.  I was told once that it was a secret FAA regulation that I wasn't
allowed to see.  After I saw it the women got really adamant that I
couldn't see it in context, nor find out what regulation it was part
of. (I saw, but did not get to keep, about 12 lines of dot matrix
printed text on computer paper.)  The words to use to get on a plane
seem to be breach of contract, with managers.

Adam

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote:

| > "People moving around can be dangerous [avoiding parental responsibilities,
| > avoiding taxes, spying, plotting to bomb buildings]-- as can traceability,
| > especially in/by repressive regimes.  Therefore I would favor allowing
| > freedom of movement -- with some form of traceability only under terms
| > considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap."

| Have you tried to get on an airplane lately? I just had to present my
| driver licence (work id w/ picture wouldn't cut it!) to get on. I
| understand John Gilmore got himself arrested for refusing to identify
| himself. As he said, there used to be a 200-year precedent that a
| citizen can travel within the country without having to identify
| himself. Shit, I used to fly under phoney names - can't do this anymore.


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume