Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!

On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote:

> If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed,
> I agree.  I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more
> ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters
> shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against
> them by governments, given their modus operandi.

I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand 
the nature of it.  I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view 
that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not 
guaranteed at all.  As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing 
will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable.  

Here is the post I wrote earlier:

------- earlier post -------

jim bell recently wrote:

> Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be
> deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it,
> and soliciting donations against them.  

I don't agree here.  It would all be a matter of timing, unless the
number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces
would be able to destroy them.  You have to realize that if the money
is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of
being paid are not too good.  Just play the game "Command and Conquer"
for a while and you'll see.  Money is fuel.  Don't run off of it!

For that reason, I think that any AP server, *at the introduction of
the concept*  would have to be a covert operation.  Servers could come out in
public light when their number be large enough to warrant a
strike on anybody trying to eliminate them.  Same for the
publication of the name of the individuals operating the server.

To me, this seems obvious.  Comments?

To go on along that line, I had the idea that a specific piece of
software, a bit like Private Idaho, that would chain remailers but
that would be specifically designed to handle predictions, would
have be designed.

(Pardon my ignorance of the net here)

The server need not to be a unique address.  Actually, the
prediction and any accompanying documents could be splitted a la
Secure Split, and sent to N differents servers, M (<N) of which
would be required to re-assemble the original prediction.  This
assures that if one gets closed, the other can rebuild the message.

If thoses servers were set up on *large* machines servicing tens of
thousands of messages a day, preferably located at a busy remailer
location, any exchange of information between them to rebuild the
prediction at a central location would not be easy to track by any 
govt.

Comments?

----- end of earlier post -----
Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada
 DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee
    Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal
 JFA Technologies, R&D consultant
    physicists and engineers, LabView programming
PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon
ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

At 4:51 PM -0700 9/26/96, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>Anonymity and nonescrowed crypto are the linchpins of AP and its more
>general case, Maysian crypto anarchy. The withering of the nation-state.
>Whatever you want to call it.
>
>To prevent it, governments will ban both. A criminal law, passed in the
>wake of say a bombing this fall in Washington, DC, banning nonescrowed
>crypto. (Freeh will assert he has evidence the terrorists used PGPhone.)
>And another law banning online anonymity.
>
>What then, Mr. Bell?
>
Though I'm not Bell, I have some interest in this question.

I believe, and have argued this for at least several years, that we are in
a "race to the fork in the road." The fork in the road being essentially
the point of no return, beyond which things are either pulled strongly to
one end or the other.

The two ends being:

* a surveillance state, with restrictions on cryptography, the spending of
money, the holding of various items (besides just traditional things like
guns and drugs), restrictions on the dissemination of information, and of
course controls on lots of other things.

(For those who think this scenario is ipso facto unconstitutional, look at
the many moves already in this direction. Between Supreme Court decisions
allowing searches and seizures without warrants (e.g., on buses, planes,
etc.), restrictions on discussion of crypto in public places (ITARs), there
are a raft of "Presidential Decision Directives" and "National Security
Decision Directives" which grant the Executive wide powers to seize control
of telecommunications systems, computer networks, emergency systems, etc.
While this is fodder for conspiracy theory supporters, it concerns many
civil liberties advocates as well.)

* a libertarian or anarcho-capitalist state, with people using a variety of
secure and private channels to interact, exchange information, buy and sell
goods and services, and communicate transnationally. The "anarchy" being
the same kind of anarchy seen in so many areas of life: reading choices,
eating choices (except for drug laws), this list, and so on.

(For those who think this scenario is hopelessy rosy, pointing out that
people "can't eat cyberspace," this is surely so. But a large fraction of
"interesting" interactions are already done on the Net, or via phones, or
other such mechanisms. And even if many people are not in cyberspace at
all, if enough of us _are_ and are _secure_, I'll settle for that. The rest
can come later.)

The reason I believe there's a point of no return is this: once, for
example, enough strong, encrypted, black channels are available, it will
essentially be too late to crack down and stop them. Add to the mix
steganographic channels, lots of bandwidth over several mechanism, and it's
too late.

(Take the Digital Telephony Act. It mainly covers _telephones_ (though many
of us have speculated that computer networks could be covered, especially
if Internet telephony catches on in a big way). There is no way the tens of
thousands of individual Linux boxes and whatnot can be made to comply with
DT "wiretappability." The horse is out of the barn on this one, to use yet
another related metaphor.)

Declan is right that each major "incident"--Oklahoma City, TWA 800,
etc.--jumps us forward toward a totalitarian surveillance state. However,
each new anonymous remailer, each new Web site, each new T1 or whatever
link, etc., moves us forward in the direction of crypto anarchy.

On the issue of terrorists, child molestors, and other Horsemen using PGP,
PGPhone, etc., how else could it be? After all, use of PGP is being
promoted by folks like us, and many others, and the molestors, Mafiosos,
money launderers, Palestinian Neo-Intifada (the war that just started this
week) sympathizers, nuclear material smugglers, and other assorted
miscreants (or heroes, depending on one's outlook) are surely thinking
about securing their communications.

So what? After all, as we've been pointing out for years, criminals and
conspirators also have locks on their doors, use curtains on their windows,
keep their voices down when speaking amongst themselves in public, rent
hotel rooms to plot crimes, and generally use various methods to better
ensure privacy and secrecy. And yet the Constitution is pretty clear that
we don't insist windows be uncurtained, conversations be "escrowed," and
locks have keys "escrowed." And so on, with various of the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights covering these situations (4th, 1st, etc.).

The inevitable use of strong crypto by some criminal, perhaps even a
heinous one, will be used as an argument to restrict crypto. We have to be
prepared.

Meanwhile, deploy as much crypto stuff as possible.

(When I spoke to Stewart Baker, former chief counsel at the NSA, at the CFP
in early '95, we both knew the race was on. On opposite sides, of course.)

Make no mistake about it,  the faster and more ubiquitously we can deploy
as much strong crypto as possible (e.g., the Gilmore SWAN thing, more
remailers, offshore havens, etc.), the greater the likelihood we'll win.
(And winning will have some rather interesting  consequences for society.)

I think there's currently about an 80% chance we'll win, with maybe a 30%
chance that we've already won, that we've already reached the point of no
return and are on the path to crypto anarchy.

--Tim May

0

We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

Anonymity and nonescrowed crypto are the linchpins of AP and its more 
general case, Maysian crypto anarchy. The withering of the nation-state. 
Whatever you want to call it.

To prevent it, governments will ban both. A criminal law, passed in the
wake of say a bombing this fall in Washington, DC, banning nonescrowed
crypto. (Freeh will assert he has evidence the terrorists used PGPhone.)
And another law banning online anonymity. 

What then, Mr. Bell?

-Declan




On Thu, 26 Sep 1996, Jean-Francois Avon wrote:

> On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote:
> 
> > If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed,
> > I agree.  I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more
> > ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters
> > shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against
> > them by governments, given their modus operandi.
> 
> I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand 
> the nature of it.  I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view 
> that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not 
> guaranteed at all.  As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing 
> will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable.  
> 
> Here is the post I wrote earlier:
> 
> ------- earlier post -------
> 
> jim bell recently wrote:
> 
> > Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be
> > deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it,
> > and soliciting donations against them.  
> 
> I don't agree here.  It would all be a matter of timing, unless the
> number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces
> would be able to destroy them.  You have to realize that if the money
> is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of
> being paid are not too good.  Just play the game "Command and Conquer"
> for a while and you'll see.  Money is fuel.  Don't run off of it!
> 
> For that reason, I think that any AP server, *at the introduction of
> the concept*  would have to be a covert operation.  Servers could come out in
> public light when their number be large enough to warrant a
> strike on anybody trying to eliminate them.  Same for the
> publication of the name of the individuals operating the server.
> 
> To me, this seems obvious.  Comments?
> 
> To go on along that line, I had the idea that a specific piece of
> software, a bit like Private Idaho, that would chain remailers but
> that would be specifically designed to handle predictions, would
> have be designed.
> 
> (Pardon my ignorance of the net here)
> 
> The server need not to be a unique address.  Actually, the
> prediction and any accompanying documents could be splitted a la
> Secure Split, and sent to N differents servers, M (<N) of which
> would be required to re-assemble the original prediction.  This
> assures that if one gets closed, the other can rebuild the message.
> 
> If thoses servers were set up on *large* machines servicing tens of
> thousands of messages a day, preferably located at a busy remailer
> location, any exchange of information between them to rebuild the
> prediction at a central location would not be easy to track by any 
> govt.
> 
> Comments?
> 
> ----- end of earlier post -----
> Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada
>  DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee
>     Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal
>  JFA Technologies, R&D consultant
>     physicists and engineers, LabView programming
> PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon
> ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 
>  
> 


// declan@eff.org // I do not represent the EFF // declan@well.com //

On Thu, 26 Sep 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> Anonymity and nonescrowed crypto are the linchpins of AP and its more 
> general case, Maysian crypto anarchy. The withering of the nation-state. 

If I might dare a crypto-related comment as well; it also requires an
absolutely trusted third-party to manage the funds and issue the ecash 
used to pay the murderer, (sorry, fortunate gambler).  The reason why the 
third party must be trusted by both the payers and the gambler, and thus 
cannot be anonymous (only at 'best' pseduonymous) should be obvious.

At 12:21 AM -0400 9/27/96, Simon Spero wrote:
>On Thu, 26 Sep 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
>> Anonymity and nonescrowed crypto are the linchpins of AP and its more
>> general case, Maysian crypto anarchy. The withering of the nation-state.
>
>If I might dare a crypto-related comment as well; it also requires an
>absolutely trusted third-party to manage the funds and issue the ecash
>used to pay the murderer, (sorry, fortunate gambler).  The reason why the
>third party must be trusted by both the payers and the gambler, and thus
>cannot be anonymous (only at 'best' pseduonymous) should be obvious.

Do you consider an entity such as "Joe's Escrow--You Slay, We Pay" with an
untraceable BlackNet identity to be "anonymous" or "pseudonymous"? I'd say
it can be made "untraceable," but with a persistent name and reputation.

How does an escrow service (and I mean the classical definition of escrow,
not the newspeak definition used by the U.S. government) survive and
prosper?

By being in the business of releasing funds when conditions are met, and
not otherwise. By not absconding with the funds.

Note that in the real world, escrow services do quite well, because the
continuing future revenue stream from their good reputation exceeds what
they could get by "burning" any particular customer. (Sometimes by putting
up a bond, which is a kind of secondary escrow. Also, escrow services can
be "pinged" (tested) by lots of small transactions. (A lot of similarities
between digital escrow services and digital banks.)

(For more on this--a lot more--see the "escrow" entries in my Cyphernomicon.)

--Tim May



We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."