NODE aa1544ecRe: Microsoft CAPI
"James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>Thu, 10 Oct 1996 23:01:58 -0700 (PDT)
Mike McNally writes:
>> And so what happens when the Microsoft key is compromised?
>> It might be hard to break by purely cryptographic means, but
>> surely there are some people at Microsoft who aren't
>> millionaires.
At 03:13 PM 10/9/96 -0500, Andrew Loewenstern wrote:
> I ask: "Who Cares?" It is easy enough to distribute with the
secure-non-GAK
> plug-in a patch for disabling the module authentication. Heck, you could
> even make an ActiveX applet that did it.
Better than disabling, would be to give the user the choice of whose
signature to trust. Perhaps many users would prefer a crypto engine signed
by Zimmerman, rather than Microsoft.
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NODE 0e094d80Re: Microsoft CAPI
Mike McNally <m5@tivoli.com>Fri, 11 Oct 1996 06:41:36 -0700 (PDT)
James A. Donald wrote:
>
> Mike McNally writes:
> >> And so what happens when the Microsoft key is compromised?
>
> At 03:13 PM 10/9/96 -0500, Andrew Loewenstern wrote:
> > I ask: "Who Cares?" ...
> Better than disabling, would be to give the user the choice ...
Agreed, agreed, but my point was to wonder out loud whether such
"breakages" of the CAPI safety net that gets it the nod for export
would cause the State/Commerce/Spook department to rescind that
permission.
Maybe since the whole export control thing is just an enormous
government-inflated cloud of FUD it doesn't really matter.
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Mike M Nally * IBM % Tivoli * Austin TX * How quickly we forget that
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