Kantor on GAK

The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38.


   Clinton's Encryption Plan Fits Law and Market

   To the Editor:

   "A Flawed Encryption Policy" (editorial, Oct. 4)
   mischaracterizes the Clinton Administration's recent
   proposal on data-scrambling software, the proposal's impact
   and the results of a study by the National Research
   Council.

   This Administration has never proposed that United States
   citizens be limited in the type of encryption products they
   choose to use domestically. The current plan relates only
   to exports of encryption products that are, for all
   practical purposes, unbreakable in the commercial
   environment.

   Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key"
   management among personal and business users of encryption
   products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover
   information that is lost or otherwise inaccessible, in much
   the same way that we give a trusted neighbor a spare key to
   our house. President Clinton's plan insures that the United
   States -- and not other countries -- will develop such a
   system, which both protects and is based on the rule of
   law, not the whim of governments or trade barriers
   masquerading as import restrictions.

   You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery
   products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe
   -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the
   import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do
   not take law enforcement into account.

   The number of companies that have expressed a willingness
   to work with the Administration to balance commercial and
   law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our
   proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies
   that stand ready now to market such products will soon
   prove that there Is a market for encryption products that
   provide safeguards for both the owner and for society.

   The National Research Council did not say that we should
   allow the export of all encryption. It supported some
   export controls, while allowing the export of encryption up
   to the strength of 56 bits. Our plan allows the export of
   encryption up to 56 bits, but does so in a way that will
   encourage the production and marketing of products that
   both protect privacy and prevent crime.

   The United States is the world leader in information
   technology. Under the Administration's plan, we will remain
   so through a market-driven key-recovery system that both
   promotes the export of encryption products and protects our
   national security and the public safety.

   Mickey Kantor
   U.S. Secretary of Commerce
   Washington, Oct., 9, 1996

At 8:29 AM -0400 10/11/96, John Young wrote:
>   The New York Times, October 11, 1996, p. A38.

>   Unbreakable encryption generates the need for "key"
>   management among personal and business users of encryption
>   products. Users may need a "spare key" to recover

As businesses and others point out, if there's a need, let private industry
fill the need. Let the users decide on who, if anyone, holds the spare
keys. The USG proposal takes this choice away and allows access to others.

>   You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery
>   products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe
>   -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the
>   import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do
>   not take law enforcement into account.

So, because some countries will not allow import into _their_ countries of
non-GAK software, this means GAK must be mandated on U.S. _exports_? Since
when it is our responsibilty to enforce other nation's import laws?
(Because Iran will not allow the import of blasphemous literature, should
the USG ban all export of such material from the U.S.?)


>   The number of companies that have expressed a willingness
>   to work with the Administration to balance commercial and
>   law enforcement issues belies your pronouncement that our
>   proposal is unworkable. In fact, the number of companies

This conveniently ignores the substantial bludgeon the USG holds over the
heads of all high-tech companies. Their "willingness to work with the
Administration" is comparable to the willingness of a kidnap victim to
"work with" his kidnapper.


>   Mickey Kantor
>   U.S. Secretary of Commerce
>   Washington, Oct., 9, 1996


The real goal is obviously domestic GAK and domestic limits on encryption,
else all this is mostly worthless.

--Tim May



"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM
that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology."
[NYT, 1996-10-02]
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

On Fri, 11 Oct 1996, Timothy C. May wrote:

> At 8:29 AM -0400 10/11/96, John Young wrote:
> >   You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery
> >   products, but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe
> >   -- to require use of key-recovery products and bar the
> >   import of stronger and stronger encryption products that do
> >   not take law enforcement into account.
> 
> So, because some countries will not allow import into _their_ countries of
> non-GAK software, this means GAK must be mandated on U.S. _exports_? Since
> when it is our responsibilty to enforce other nation's import laws?
> (Because Iran will not allow the import of blasphemous literature, should
> the USG ban all export of such material from the U.S.?)

Note that Mickey Kantor is doing _exactly_ what has been predicted on 
this very list: he is using the (very limited) response the US received 
from other countries by strongarming said countries into supporting a 
pro-GAK position to manipulate the American public into accepting GAK by 
pretending the US must respond to the requests of the world market.

--Lucky, who hopes everybody on this list will vote for Harry Browne.