NODE dc1cb349Big Brother vs. Cypherpunks
John Young <jya@pipeline.com>Tue, 8 Oct 1996 13:38:01 +0800
Time, October 14, 1996, p. 78.
The Netly News
Joshua Quittner
Big Brother vs. Cypherpunks
For more than three years, the White House and the U.S.
computer industry have sat locked, eyeball to eyeball, in
a seemingly intractable face-off over who will control
the secret codes that protect our most sensitive
communications. The government claimed to be working to
protect us from nuke-carrying terrorists; the computer
industry said it was championing the individual's right
to privacy. Neither was telling the whole truth.
Last week, in a concession to Silicon Valley, the
Administration blinked -- or perhaps it merely winked.
Fittingly, in the arcane world of code making and
breaking, it's difficult to ferret out who's doing what
to whom. And why.
A few things are incontrovertible. Vice President Al Gore
announced the new encryption initiative at midweek, timed
to coincide with support from an alliance of high-tech
businesses that included such hardware heavyweights as
IBM, Sun Microsystems and Hewlett-Packard. However, most
of the big software makers -- and every civil liberties
group -- still opposed it.
At the core of the initiative is a new code-making scheme
known as "key recovery." Here at last, the government and
its supporters claimed, was a way to get around the more
noxious aspects of the reviled Clipper chip, the
Administration's first doomed attempt to balance the
industry's call for stronger encryption with law
enforcement's need to surveil our shadier citizens.
Clipper, as proposed, would use a powerful encryption
formula to encode communications sent over telephones and
computer networks but would require that a "back door"
key be built into each chip that would give police --
where warranted, of course -- a means to eavesdrop.
Nobody -- especially foreign companies -- liked the idea
of the U.S. and its agents holding those keys. The new
key-recovery proposal tries to get around that objection
by chopping the keys into several pieces and storing them
with "trusted agents" of the user's choosing. Some nice
Swiss banks, perhaps.
But the Administration's plan still falls short of what
civil libertarians, and especially a vocal group of
cryptoextremists who call themselves cypherpunks, say
they need: encryption powerful enough to give back to the
citizenry the right to absolute privacy, which we have
lost in the information age. According to the
cypherpunks, the so-called 56-bit code the Administration
has okayed for export can be cracked by the National
Security Agency's supercomputers in a matter of hours.
Are they right? It's hard to know whom to believe in this
cloak-and-dagger debate. Civil libertarians tend to gloss
over the fact that the world is full of bad people with
crimes to hide. The software industry -- which makes 48%
of its profit overseas -- is clearly less concerned with
privacy than with losing foreign sales. And it may be no
accident that the Administration chose to start making
concessions the same week an influential software CEO --
Netscape's Jim Barksdale -- excoriated Clinton's
cryptopolicy and endorsed Bob Dole.
The issue is too complex -- and too important -- for
political gamesmanship. It will never get sorted out
until somebody starts playing it straight.
-----
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Wide Web
[End]
Thanks to JQ.
NODE 6246f953Re: Big Brother vs. Cypherpunks
snow <snow@smoke.suba.com>Tue, 8 Oct 1996 18:00:16 +0800
Mr. Young posted:
> Time, October 14, 1996, p. 78.
> Joshua Quittner
> Big Brother vs. Cypherpunks
> Are they right? It's hard to know whom to believe in this
> cloak-and-dagger debate. Civil libertarians tend to gloss
> over the fact that the world is full of bad people with
> crimes to hide. The software industry -- which makes 48%
No, some of us "Civil libertarians" are well aware that there
are bad people in this world. We just acknowlege that some of these
bad people are IN THE GOVERNMENT, that some of these people are in
other positions of power, and that the rest of the bad people are
relatively unlikely to be negatively effected by these schemes. It is
more likely that the "bad guys" will be positively effected (to OUR
disadvantage) by forcing us to use bad crypto. If the NSA can
break the encryption in near real time, then the "bad people" can
get the tools to do it nearly as fast (sure, it will cost them
2 or 3 hundred thousand dollars, but they just busted a drug ring
in one housing project here in chicago that was making that much
money in a week) Do you know what your privacy is worth? Find out
how much Amex charges for it's database of your purchasing habits.
Then think about how much some "bad guy" could make by cracking
medical or credit information that is being transfered across "The Net".
Petro, Christopher C.
petro@suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff>
snow@smoke.suba.com