No Subject

I came across some interesting passages in the RAND Corp. study, An
Exploration of Cyberspace Security R&D Investment Strategies for DARPA:
"The Day After ... in Cyberspace II", MR-797-DARPA.

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR797

The report describes the results of an exercise sponsored by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) using the RAND "The Day After..."
methodology to elicit the views of participants on research and investment
strategies addressing the security and safety of systems and networks
supporting various U.S. physical and functional infrastructures. The
exercise was held on March 23, 1996 in Washington D.C., and involved
approximately 60 participants from government, universities, and commercial
industries involved with the U.S. information infrastructure.

Has this report been discussed on the list?

----------------
Is it possible to "sterilize" data passing through our telecommunications
systems?

Billions of bits of data pass through our national information
infrastructure each second. Some of those bits represent information about
individual citizens' login and password combinations, social security and
credit card numbers, account information, health status, and innumerable
other sensitive information items. Our nation has superb communications
monitoring tools, housed primarily in the National Security Agency.
However, the NSA is precluded by law from collecting information about U.S.
citizens. When incidents of "information warfare" are being waged against
U.S. systems, could key data flows be "sterilized" or "sanitized" by
computer hardware and/or software in such a manner that the NSA could help
monitor and track perpetrators in cyberspace without violating these laws?
This topic was raised during exercise discussions. We have not studied all
the relevant laws and regulations to assess whether such sterilization
measures would allow the power of NSA's analyses to be brought to bear on
telecommunications involving U.S. citizens, but perhaps the topic merits
further investigation. If so, what kinds of pattern detection and
replacement algorithms would suffice to accomplish this goal?


Sponsor development of an aircraft-like "black box" recording device

When a cyberspace security incident happens, it is often not detected in
real time, and the trail back to the perpetrator becomes lost. Could a
"black box" recording device be developed, to be attached to key nodes or
links of cyberspace systems, that would record every transaction passing
through that node or link during the last n minutes (where n=5 or 10, for
example)? If so, that record would be invaluable in tracing the source of
incidents, whether they are accidental or deliberately perpetrated.
Thousands of such systems would be required to cover key links or nodes;
could they be made robust, inexpensive, and ultra-reliable?


PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61  81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9
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Snoop Daty Data           | Internet: azur@netcom.com
Grinder                   |
Sacred Cow Meat Co.       |
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                          Hacker Opportunities
                          (Let's Make Lots Of Money)

I've got the brains, you've got the tricks
Let's make lots of money
You've got the code, I've got the hacks
Let's make lots of ...

I've had enough of scheming and messing `round with jerks
My crypto code's compiled, I'm afraid it doesn't work
I'm looking for a partner, someone who gets things fixed
Ask yourself this question: do you want to be rich?

I've got the brains, you've got the tricks
Let's make lots of money
You've got the code, I've got the hacks
Let's make lots of money

You can tell I'm educated, I studied at CalTech
Doctored in mathematics, I could've been set
I can program a computer, choose the perfect time
If you've got the inclination, I have got the crime

Ooooh, there's a lot of opportunities
If you know when to take them, you know
There's a lot of opportunities
If there aren't, you can make them (Make or break them)

I've got the brains, you've got the tricks
Let's make lots of money
Let's make lots of ...

You can see I'm single-minded, I know what I could be
How do you feel about it? Come, take a walk with me
I'm looking for a partner regardless of expense
Think about it seriously, you know it makes sense

Let's (Got the brains)
Make (Got the tricks)
Let's make lots of money (Money)
Let's (You've got the code)
Make (I've got the hacks)
Let's make lots of money (Money)
I've got the brains (Got the brains)
You've got the code (Got the hacks)
Let's make lots of money (Money)
Money!

At 7:08 PM -0800 10/27/96, Steve Schear wrote:
>I came across some interesting passages in the RAND Corp. study, An
>Exploration of Cyberspace Security R&D Investment Strategies for DARPA:
>"The Day After ... in Cyberspace II", MR-797-DARPA.

>Has this report been discussed on the list?

Not that I recall. From the excerpts you included, it looks very naive, in
the sense of being unsophisticated. And the "NSA is forbidden by law" point
is a real howler; obviously the authors are unaware of Bamford's book, not
to mention other confirmations of NSA domestic intercepts.

...
>However, the NSA is precluded by law from collecting information about U.S.
>citizens. When incidents of "information warfare" are being waged against

>Sponsor development of an aircraft-like "black box" recording device
>
>When a cyberspace security incident happens, it is often not detected in
>real time, and the trail back to the perpetrator becomes lost. Could a
>"black box" recording device be developed, to be attached to key nodes or
>links of cyberspace systems, that would record every transaction passing
>through that node or link during the last n minutes (where n=5 or 10, for
>example)? If so, that record would be invaluable in tracing the source of
>incidents, whether they are accidental or deliberately perpetrated.
>Thousands of such systems would be required to cover key links or nodes;
>could they be made robust, inexpensive, and ultra-reliable?

Sure, with "traffic escrow," all traffic will be escrowed. Of course, there
are just a few minor problems with the Constitution saying one has to
escrow what's on one's computers without a warrant, and with privacy issues
galore. And there the minor issue of storage of all of these terabytes of
data....

But if RAND wants to get on the bucks being doled out over this
"information warfare" hype, they've got to put some of their best and
brightest new college grads to writing papers like this.

--Tim May

"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM
that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology."
[NYT, 1996-10-02]
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."