NODE 3ac07164Microsoft CAPI
Ravi Pandya <rpandya@netcom.com>Wed, 9 Oct 1996 08:28:43 -0700 (PDT)
>From today's HotWired Packet http://www.packet.com:
"Today Microsoft is using similar technology as part of its Cryptography
API: You can't load an encryption engine into Windows 95 or Windows NT
unless that engine has been specially signed by Microsoft's corporate key.
The reason for this restriction, says the company, is the Clinton
administration: Microsoft couldn't have gotten export permission for its
operating systems if users could easily plug in crypto engines that hadn't
been approved. "
This is disturbing, if true, though I suspect there is also a less ominous
reason: you certainly want your cryptography provider to be trusted, and you
want to be sure the code has not been altered. The implications really
depend on Microsoft's policy on signing cryptography engines, and whether
they allow a way to delegate signature authority.
Ravi
NODE 7e0a2630Re: Microsoft CAPI
Mike McNally <m5@tivoli.com>Wed, 9 Oct 1996 09:48:23 -0700 (PDT)
Ravi Pandya wrote:
> ... You can't load an encryption engine into Windows 95 or
> Windows NT unless that engine has been specially signed by
> Microsoft's corporate key.
And so what happens when the Microsoft key is compromised? It might
be hard to break by purely cryptographic means, but surely there are
some people at Microsoft who aren't millionaires.
______c_________________________________________________________________
Mike M Nally * IBM % Tivoli * Austin TX * How quickly we forget that
mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com * "deer processing" and "data
http://www.io.com/~m101/ * processing" are different!
NODE 32ed189cMicrosoft Millionaires and Billionaires
"Timothy C. May" <tcmay@got.net>Wed, 9 Oct 1996 12:45:45 -0700 (PDT)
At 11:45 AM -0500 10/9/96, Mike McNally wrote:
>And so what happens when the Microsoft key is compromised? It might
>be hard to break by purely cryptographic means, but surely there are
>some people at Microsoft who aren't millionaires.
Indeed, not all Microserfs are millionaires. Accessing the URL,
http://microsoft.com/list_of_millionaires, I find that as of the close of
business yesterday, there were 13 non-millionaires at Microsoft. Seven were
part-time janitors, three were in food service, and the remaining three had
no identifiable jobs. (And two of the janitors are expected to become
millionaires any day now.)
And http://microsoft.com/list_of_billionaires reports three on the list.
Glad to be of help.
--Klaus
"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM
that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology."
[NYT, 1996-10-02]
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
NODE e00220dcRe: Microsoft CAPI
Jim McCoy <mccoy@communities.com>Wed, 9 Oct 1996 13:09:22 -0700 (PDT)
Mike McNally <m5@tivoli.com> writes:
>Ravi Pandya wrote:
>> ... You can't load an encryption engine into Windows 95 or
>> Windows NT unless that engine has been specially signed by
>> Microsoft's corporate key.
>
>And so what happens when the Microsoft key is compromised? It might
>be hard to break by purely cryptographic means, but surely there are
>some people at Microsoft who aren't millionaires.
But who may want to be, eh? :)
Actually it is also possible to use a much more overt route and just
patch around anything which is doing the signature checking (possibly
on just a temporary basis if the checks are only made when the engine
is first loaded.)
jim
NODE d3d57789Re: Microsoft CAPI
Andrew Loewenstern <andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com>Wed, 9 Oct 1996 13:14:20 -0700 (PDT)
Mike McNally writes:
> And so what happens when the Microsoft key is compromised?
> It might be hard to break by purely cryptographic means, but
> surely there are some people at Microsoft who aren't
> millionaires.
I ask: "Who Cares?" It is easy enough to distribute with the secure-non-GAK
plug-in a patch for disabling the module authentication. Heck, you could
even make an ActiveX applet that did it...
andrew
"Click Here to Download and Install Real Crypto"