9 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child
At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote: >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable. No? Please prove your assertion. Your claim is similar to IPG's - nobody has done it yet. Your claim is stronger - hardly anybody has worked on IPG's algorithm, nor are they likely to. diGriz
John Anonymous MacDonald writes: > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote: > >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable. > > No? Please prove your assertion. You can't prove a negative. The best IPG could say is that it can't be broken with current technology. Next week someone might come up with a new way to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable. You point could have been that the same problem exists for proofs- that next week someone could come up with a way to prove, for all time, that an algorithim really IS unbreakable. So, to cover that posibility I should have said "it's currently impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable". :-) -- Eric Murray ericm@lne.com ericm@motorcycle.com http://www.lne.com/ericm PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF
On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote: > John Anonymous MacDonald writes: > > > > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote: > > >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable. > > > > No? Please prove your assertion. > > You can't prove a negative. The best IPG could say is that > it can't be broken with current technology. > Next week someone might come up with a new way > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable. Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ. No, I'm not volunteering. -- Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern Vote Monarchist Switzerland
Black Unicorn wrote: > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote: > > John Anonymous MacDonald writes: > > > > > > > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote: > > > >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable. > > > > > > No? Please prove your assertion. > > > > You can't prove a negative. The best IPG could say is that > > it can't be broken with current technology. > > Next week someone might come up with a new way > > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable. > > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ. No, I'm not volunteering. As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure. Thank you. - Igor.
Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Black Unicorn wrote:
> > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > John Anonymous MacDonald writes:
> > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable.
> > > > No? Please prove your assertion.
> > > You can't prove a negative. The best IPG could say is that
> > > it can't be broken with current technology.
> > > Next week someone might come up with a new way
> > > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable.
> > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ. No, I'm not volunteering.
If you want to do that, why not do so as a response to Don's FAQ?
> As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as
> to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure.
Is the concept here that: Whereas conventional crypto generates/hashes
a *key* with which to encode the text, IPG generates a *pad* from a key,
more or less the length of the text, with which to encode the text??
It seems to me they're putting an additional layer of stuff ("OTP") between
the key generation and the actual encoding, so what's the problem with that,
as a concept?On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Dale Thorn wrote:
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > Black Unicorn wrote:
> > > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > John Anonymous MacDonald writes:
> > > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > > >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable.
>
> > > > > No? Please prove your assertion.
>
> > > > You can't prove a negative. The best IPG could say is that
> > > > it can't be broken with current technology.
> > > > Next week someone might come up with a new way
> > > > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable.
>
> > > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ. No, I'm not volunteering.
>
> If you want to do that, why not do so as a response to Don's FAQ?
>
> > As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as
> > to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure.
>
> Is the concept here that: Whereas conventional crypto generates/hashes
> a *key* with which to encode the text, IPG generates a *pad* from a key,
> more or less the length of the text, with which to encode the text??
>
> It seems to me they're putting an additional layer of stuff ("OTP") between
> the key generation and the actual encoding, so what's the problem with that,
> as a concept?
>
That is one reasonable interpretation/explanation of what we are doing.
It is also extremely fast and is used one time only, guaranteed unless the
user deliberately sabotages their own system.
The process is quite simple and discussed in detail at our web site,
netprivacy.com
Obviously, a number of you have read it.
With kindest regards,
Don Wood-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Dale Thorn wrote:
> Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > Black Unicorn wrote:
> > > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > John Anonymous MacDonald writes:
> > > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > > >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable.
>
> > > > > No? Please prove your assertion.
>
> > > > You can't prove a negative. The best IPG could say is that
> > > > it can't be broken with current technology.
> > > > Next week someone might come up with a new way
> > > > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable.
>
> > > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ. No, I'm not volunteering.
>
> If you want to do that, why not do so as a response to Don's FAQ?
>
> > As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as
> > to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure.
>
> Is the concept here that: Whereas conventional crypto generates/hashes
> a *key* with which to encode the text, IPG generates a *pad* from a key,
> more or less the length of the text, with which to encode the text??
>
> It seems to me they're putting an additional layer of stuff ("OTP") between
> the key generation and the actual encoding, so what's the problem with that,
> as a concept?
a) what they're claiming is OTP isn't OTP. They use algorithmicly
generated "random" numbers. Random numbers can't be algorithmicly
generated. If the numbers in "OTP" aren't random, it isn't OTP. Its also
very vulnerable.
--Deviant
PGP KeyID = E820F015 Fingerprint = 3D6AAB628E3DFAA9 F7D35736ABC56D39
Traveling through hyperspace isn't like dusting crops, boy.
-- Han Solo
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
iQEVAwUBMphhTDCdEh3oIPAVAQHkUwf/TrWD92xbC+jE+FT4rZ0OFeNmhwqrd+wn
nQOuazsKxmeK9+Kcp8/RUX9gQB6zIDiweEJJYStZvN/U+PEWOxOlFbaoFyMw5iVv
t832kYmtuNS1mqOwN8FK1EJrV6m3dI+zLq1+svfjwkKOpmwhMJsOyYEkiR9zuH9a
68Bdlioksutw/GIfkfQ6NFIgGxhN5736Mg6On8rq8Y+pdgg6ce3vIsxYydj/bE8s
W2v//wNFSvLY0iOVK0weHX9rGL1W0ITH34gfiSct6cZZYLMdxynjLm+NmENontQo
mW9ry3h9t/H/IwadXLt3I3PjzY6pNiQYmMWXuNk5X43rjV2wPweCCQ==
=uZnB
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----On Sun, 24 Nov 1996, The Deviant wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Dale Thorn wrote:
>
> > Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> > > Black Unicorn wrote:
> > > > On Sat, 23 Nov 1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > > John Anonymous MacDonald writes:
> > > > > > At 8:09 AM 11/23/1996, Eric Murray wrote:
> > > > > > >No, you can't. It's impossible to prove an algorithim unbreakable.
> >
> > > > > > No? Please prove your assertion.
> >
> > > > > You can't prove a negative. The best IPG could say is that
> > > > > it can't be broken with current technology.
> > > > > Next week someone might come up with a new way
> > > > > to break ciphers that renders the IPG algorithim breakable.
> >
> > > > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ. No, I'm not volunteering.
> >
> > If you want to do that, why not do so as a response to Don's FAQ?
> >
> > > As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as
> > > to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure.
> >
> > Is the concept here that: Whereas conventional crypto generates/hashes
> > a *key* with which to encode the text, IPG generates a *pad* from a key,
> > more or less the length of the text, with which to encode the text??
> >
> > It seems to me they're putting an additional layer of stuff ("OTP") between
> > the key generation and the actual encoding, so what's the problem with that,
> > as a concept?
>
> a) what they're claiming is OTP isn't OTP. They use algorithmicly
> generated "random" numbers. Random numbers can't be algorithmicly
> generated. If the numbers in "OTP" aren't random, it isn't OTP. Its also
> very vulnerable.
>
To quote the bard, King John, Act II at the end, Mad World, Mad Kings, Mad
Composition. We have repeatedly stated that we do not generate random
numbers, and agree that only hardware can generate true random numbers. I
have worked on more OTPs than probably all of the public responders to
the cypherpunks lists put together. I know what kinds of tests that an OTP
must pass, and what they look like - I have designed very comprehensive
systems to analyzed them.
What I was trying to do, using the neologism of "Software OTP," was to
point out that the encryptor stream will pass any of the tests that as
hardware produced OTP will. It is quite remarkable that so many of you
Simpleton's talk about the system without looking at it. Many of you have
and have found it to be intriguing. Paul Bradley admits to downloading the
system, he spent over five hours doing it according to our log, but he says
that he never did anything with it. Anyone that believes that also
believes that Paul knows how to brute force OTPs.
With Kindest regards,
Don Wood
[AIgor:
> > Someone needs to write an IPG and Don Wood FAQ. No, I'm not volunteering.
>
> As a crypto amateur, I would appreciate a good technical explanation as
> to why IPG's algorithm cannot be considered secure.
I am sure that someone will correct me if I am wrong, but:
The algorythm cannot be considered secure until it has been
peer-reviewed. They refuse to release the algorythm for review, simply saying
that "you can't break the code" therefore "it is secure". I personally have
a hard time with the cryptograms in the sunday newspaper, never mind something
that would take a real cryptographer longer than a cup of coffee to figure
out.
Am I close here?
Petro, Christopher C.
petro@suba.com <prefered for any non-list stuff>
snow@smoke.suba.com