Re: Anon

As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin
has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well.
Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and
inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed.  He has an article in
the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas.

BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long
article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age)
about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information
traffic.

Hal

Brin's argument has two ideas that I find annoying.  One is
that the changes he forsees are inevitable, the other is that security
is not about economics.

	The idea that universal surveillance is inevitable is based on
the assumption that everyone lives in a city, and the technologies of
spying can be cheaply deployed.  A good deal of privacy can be
obtained by moving a small or large distance away.  Monitoring
technology is not cheap.  When it is cheap, the network links to
connect it all will still be expensive.  (etc.  The economics of a
surveillance state lead to something in the mix, people, cameras,
policemen to make arrests etc, being expensive.)

	The second mistake is related, and assumes that the rich can
be forced to give up the privacy that the poor have already lost.  The
expense of a defense is related to the effort involved in breaking
that defense.  If I have a mansion with grounds, I can deploy defenses
against the low cost cameras and bugs for less than my privacy is
worth to me.  I can also team up with my neighbors to have a well
defended enclave.

	So the surveillance state that Brin wants will not apply to
the rich, but only the poor.  I wonder if it will affect him.

Adam

Hal Finney wrote:
| As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin
| has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well.
| Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and
| inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed.  He has an article in
| the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas.
| 
| BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long
| article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age)
| about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information
| traffic.
| 
| Hal
| 


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume

Adam Shostack wrote:
> Brin's argument has two ideas that I find annoying.  One is that the
> changes he forsees are inevitable, the other is that security
> is not about economics.
> The idea that universal surveillance is inevitable is based on
> the assumption that everyone lives in a city, and the technologies of
> spying can be cheaply deployed.  A good deal of privacy can be
> obtained by moving a small or large distance away.  Monitoring
> technology is not cheap.  When it is cheap, the network links to
> connect it all will still be expensive.  (etc.  The economics of a
> surveillance state lead to something in the mix, people, cameras,
> policemen to make arrests etc, being expensive.)

[snippo]

The rich, whether living alone or in an enclave, will have security
technology several generations behind Big Brother.  But then, Big Bro'
is not just one agency.  The NSA will be able to monitor the rich 100%
no matter what they do, whereas the FBI (in 1996 for example) will not
be so well equipped.

As far as the unit cost of surveillance goes, it's cheaper every day.
Hard disk (and other storage) space is way, way up per dollar, processing
speeds and I/O are improving greatly per dollar, and the type of custom
database software and O/S employed by the top surveillance pros is not
at all analogous to the stuff most people use on Unix, DOS, or other
common small computer systems.  I did some pioneer work in high-speed
database work, and the software makes a BIG difference in unit cost of
surveillance.

Sometimes, when ordinary controls don't work because specific groups of
people put up more than the normal amount of resistance, stronger measures
are employed to counter the resistance, i.e., Willie Williams bombing the
Move neighborhood in Philly, Reno burning down the Waco "compound", or
W.T. "Burn-'em" Sherman making his point in Georgia (USA).

Dale Thorn wrote:
| Adam Shostack wrote:
| > Brin's argument has two ideas that I find annoying.  One is that the
| > changes he forsees are inevitable, the other is that security
| > is not about economics.
| > The idea that universal surveillance is inevitable is based on
| > the assumption that everyone lives in a city, and the technologies of
| > spying can be cheaply deployed.  A good deal of privacy can be
| > obtained by moving a small or large distance away.  Monitoring
| > technology is not cheap.  When it is cheap, the network links to
| > connect it all will still be expensive.  (etc.  The economics of a
| > surveillance state lead to something in the mix, people, cameras,
| > policemen to make arrests etc, being expensive.)

| As far as the unit cost of surveillance goes, it's cheaper every day.
| Hard disk (and other storage) space is way, way up per dollar, processing
| speeds and I/O are improving greatly per dollar, and the type of custom
| database software and O/S employed by the top surveillance pros is not
| at all analogous to the stuff most people use on Unix, DOS, or other
| common small computer systems.  I did some pioneer work in high-speed
| database work, and the software makes a BIG difference in unit cost of
| surveillance.

	Could you give me a cost estimate for keeping video of the
last 10 minutes of 250 million lives?  This is essentially one of
Brin's suggestions, and it strikes me as astoundingly pricey, even if
you just consider the cost of cameras, fiber, switches, and vcrs, and
ignore the problem of deciding what tape to keep.

	Some back of the envelope leads me to over a trillion,
figuring that a second of video takes 10kb, and disk costs about
$50/mb.  250m cameras at $40 each, fiber connections at $400 each,
etc.

Adam

-- 
"Pretty soon, you're talking about real money."

Adam Shostack wrote:
> 	Could you give me a cost estimate for keeping video of the
> last 10 minutes of 250 million lives?  This is essentially one of
> Brin's suggestions, and it strikes me as astoundingly pricey, even if
> you just consider the cost of cameras, fiber, switches, and vcrs, and
> ignore the problem of deciding what tape to keep.
> 
> 	Some back of the envelope leads me to over a trillion,
> figuring that a second of video takes 10kb, and disk costs about
> $50/mb.  250m cameras at $40 each, fiber connections at $400 each,
> etc.

That's 50 CENTS per megabyte, but actually it is twice less than that.

My calculation (storage costs only, assume 10kb/sec/person):

6000KB * 0.25c/MB * 2.5E8 = 375 million.

Good money, but not even close to your number.

Also, storing data on optical disks is about $20/600MB, which is only
three cents per megabyte -- ten times less than above.

Even though this is storage media cost alone, 37.5 million surely 
sounds like a reasonable number -- it is 15 cents per person, or
90 cents per hour, or $22.6 per day per person. A little steep, but after
several years this cost may decline tenfold.

Of course my rough calculation missed a lot of important expenses.

	- Igor.

Igor Chudov @ home wrote:
> Adam Shostack wrote:
> >       Could you give me a cost estimate for keeping video of the
> > last 10 minutes of 250 million lives?  This is essentially one of
> > Brin's suggestions, and it strikes me as astoundingly pricey, even if
> > you just consider the cost of cameras, fiber, switches, and vcrs, and
> > ignore the problem of deciding what tape to keep.
> >       Some back of the envelope leads me to over a trillion,
> > figuring that a second of video takes 10kb, and disk costs about
> > $50/mb.  250m cameras at $40 each, fiber connections at $400 each,
> > etc.

> That's 50 CENTS per megabyte, but actually it is twice less than that.
> My calculation (storage costs only, assume 10kb/sec/person):
> 6000KB * 0.25c/MB * 2.5E8 = 375 million.
> Good money, but not even close to your number.
> Also, storing data on optical disks is about $20/600MB, which is only
> three cents per megabyte -- ten times less than above.
> Even though this is storage media cost alone, 37.5 million surely
> sounds like a reasonable number -- it is 15 cents per person, or
> 90 cents per hour, or $22.6 per day per person. A little steep, but after
> several years this cost may decline tenfold.
> Of course my rough calculation missed a lot of important expenses.

The idea of keeping exhaustive real-time video on all persons is a straw-
man fallacy, I believe.  The real issue is to be able to serveil all or
nearly all persons simultaneously, then, using techniques that won't be
available to the general population for many years (if ever), the agencies
in question can analyze the info and narrow the more intensive aspects of
the surveillance to selected persons.

> Hal Finney wrote:
> | As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin
> | has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well.
> | Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and
> | inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed.  He has an article in
> | the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas.
> | 
> | BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long
> | article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age)
> | about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information
> | traffic.
> | 
> | Hal
> | 
> 
> 

Our December Wired has yet to put in its appearance, so I haven't
had a chance to read it yet, except for a quick scan of Neal's
article (at Fry's) to make sure the intrepid editors at Wired hadn't 
screwed up my quotes. I did, however, review some notes on this subject 
that David Brin gave to Steve Jackson, back when Steve and I were 
working on IO.COM a couple years ago. 

There are many arguments against David's position; let's grant the
possibility of near-perfect surveilance if it has popular support
(which is pretty dubious, but has been addressed by others), and
see what arguments remain:

1) I would conjecture that popular approval would make or break
   this kind of system. It's amazing what kind of spontaneous civil
   disobedience can spring up once there's a critical mass of 
   distaste for something like this.

   (Taiwan story warning...) This reminds me of the pirate cable
   TV wars, which hit their peak during my stay there -- essentially,
   the government had outlawed cable TV altogether, mostly because
   they controlled most of the existing media outlets, and didn't
   believe the citizen-units needed more than what they had. Various
   entrepreneurs began wiring Taipei for cable -- sloppy, ad-hoc
   cable lays that were strung from building to building. The gov't
   would come and cut the cables; new cables would be laid. People
   paid their cable bills, but could never quite manage to identify
   the cable installer when the government came around asking. 
   Programming consisted of a van with a bunch of VCRs and a small
   satellite dish, that would plug into the network at various places.
   It go to the point where in some areas there was so much cable, it
   was tricky to figure out which were the old ones and which were
   the new. Eventually, the government gave up and licensed some
   cable operators.

   One could very much see this sort of thing working in reverse.

2) At the moment in this country, we're seeing civil liberties in
   general being rolled back because right now most people are 
   more afraid of crime that they're afraid of the government. This
   was not always the case, and it's unlikely to remain the case.
   We're essentially losing these liberties because people have MTV-
   attention spans, the media is complacent, and, frankly, the
   government hasn't done enough awful things recently enough, to 
   enough different kinds of people to provoke general disquiet. 

   Give it time, and a few more Wacos.

3) I would argue that perfect surveilance lives in the same realm
   of Platonic ideals as "chairness" and "perfect security."  So
   there are going to be some exceptions, and some flaws.

   Now, given this less-than-perfect surveilance state, that is, 
   surveilance is easier than privacy; a few people can have some
   privacy, but it's really expensive and requires spending some
   multiple of what opponents spend on surveilance (this is the
   opposite of how things are now, but humor me.) Who is going to
   have this privacy? What are they going to do with it? What is
   the public reaction going to be to the abuses that grow out
   of this? My guess is that large governments and large corporations
   will have this privacy (a matter of national security, etc.)
   and will eventually succumb to temptation and use it to perpetrate 
   various nasty things on the general populace while keeping 
   themselves in power.

   Full knowledge != full wisdom. Also, in time, all monopolists get
   complacent and stupid.

4) Assuming that enough people get riled up, see #1. If the 
   state of affairs can be reversed, folks will try to reverse it;
   if not, it's been nice knowing you, citizen-units.

Contrast this to what happens against a backdrop of privacy; it's
possible for much smaller entities to take larger entities (such
as governments or large corporations) by surprise, to outmaneuver
them, swarm over them, and pull them down. (I can't seem to
shake the image of primitive hunters going for a mastodon, here...)
It helps prevent the perpetuation of especially dense concentrations
of wealth & power, it allows markets to function properly, and 
enables folks to plot against tyrannical governments. 

In Brin's world, how does the little startup protect its technology
from Microsoft?

In Brin's world, how does a new political party campaign against the 
unscrupulous incumbents, who have access to the tiny bit of remaining 
privacy, while they have none?

In Brin's world, how does a Christian in Iran avoid that knock on
the door?

Some things to think about.

Doug

PS -- DO read Neal Stephenson's article in the same Wired; it's 
      a bit boosterish, but it's the funniest tract on fiber
      optic cable you'll ever read. It gives a good idea of
      where things are headed (deregulation, disintermediation 
      of cable laying services, cable as speculative investment
      as opposed to guaranteed utility, etc.). I'd argue things
      aren't headed that way as quickly as Neal indicates, but
      certainly where FLAG is landing, it's acting as a catalyst
      for change of this sort.

PPS -- Does anyone know why Fry's gets Wired _weeks_ before actual
       subscribers?

Doug Barnes <cman@c2.net> writes:
>    (Taiwan story warning...) This reminds me of the pirate cable
>    TV wars, which hit their peak during my stay there -- essentially,
>    the government had outlawed cable TV altogether, mostly because
>    they controlled most of the existing media outlets, and didn't
>    believe the citizen-units needed more than what they had. Various
>    entrepreneurs began wiring Taipei for cable -- sloppy, ad-hoc
>    cable lays that were strung from building to building. The gov't
>    would come and cut the cables; new cables would be laid. People
>    paid their cable bills, but could never quite manage to identify
>    the cable installer when the government came around asking.
>    Programming consisted of a van with a bunch of VCRs and a small
>    satellite dish, that would plug into the network at various places.
>    It go to the point where in some areas there was so much cable, it
>    was tricky to figure out which were the old ones and which were
>    the new. Eventually, the government gave up and licensed some
>    cable operators.

Now, what would the U.S. government (state or los federales) do in a similar
situation? They'd probably fine any resident found with a cable TV thousands
of dollars and if that didn't work, they'd start jailing people. Maybe even
burn a few TV viewers, a la Waco. :-)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

Doug Barnes wrote:
> > Hal Finney wrote:
> > | As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin
> > | has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well.
> > | Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and
> > | inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed.  He has an article in
> > | the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas.

[snip]

> There are many arguments against David's position; let's grant the
> possibility of near-perfect surveilance if it has popular support
> (which is pretty dubious, but has been addressed by others), and
> see what arguments remain:
> 1) I would conjecture that popular approval would make or break
>    this kind of system. It's amazing what kind of spontaneous civil
>    disobedience can spring up once there's a critical mass of
>    distaste for something like this.
>    (Taiwan story warning...) This reminds me of the pirate cable
>    TV wars, which hit their peak during my stay there -- essentially,
>    the government had outlawed cable TV altogether, mostly because
>    they controlled most of the existing media outlets, and didn't
>    believe the citizen-units needed more than what they had. Various
>    entrepreneurs began wiring Taipei for cable -- sloppy, ad-hoc
>    cable lays that were strung from building to building. The gov't
>    would come and cut the cables; new cables would be laid. People
>    paid their cable bills, but could never quite manage to identify
>    the cable installer when the government came around asking.
>    Programming consisted of a van with a bunch of VCRs and a small
>    satellite dish, that would plug into the network at various places.
>    It go to the point where in some areas there was so much cable, it
>    was tricky to figure out which were the old ones and which were
>    the new. Eventually, the government gave up and licensed some
>    cable operators.

[mo' snip]

The above comments, and the snipped comments about "a few more Wacos will
wake the people up etc.", assume that the govt. hasn't learned anything
about the politics of mass surveillance over the past few decades.

In fact, they've learned a lot.  The surveillance can be kept completely
quiet, and when they need to take someone out, they can do that very
quietly as well.  And not a whole lot of people will be angry, because
they'll crank up the reputation destructo-machine/P.R. press to preclude
any problems there.

Waco was an aberration, because key people were hiding behind a quantity
of other non-key people, and the FBI blundered in and grandstanded to the
point of creating a Kent State kind of scene.  To suggest that future
Waco's are necessary to take out troublemakers is shortsighted.