British Telecom merger with MCI

Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when
British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees
concerned with the security of communications will not be able to
disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their
employer, or to their ``foreign'' bosses and colleagues, without first
getting permission from the Office of Defense Trade Controls under
the ITAR?

--
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
Internet:  junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu    junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu
		     URL:  http://samsara.law.cwru.edu

BT/MCI aka Concert will have offices based in London and
 Washington. Technically Concert won't be a foreign company
 I guess.

 Zaid

On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Peter D. Junger wrote:

> 
> Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when
> British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees
> concerned with the security of communications will not be able to
> disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their

It's reasonably  trivial to get export licences from both countries 
for foreign subsidiaries. Also, British Telecom and GCHQ have a 
friendly working relationship, and any merger is unlikely to change
these facts.

Simon

Simon Spero wrote:

| On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Peter D. Junger wrote:
| > Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when
| > British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees
| > concerned with the security of communications will not be able to
| > disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their
| 
| It's reasonably  trivial to get export licences from both countries 
| for foreign subsidiaries. Also, British Telecom and GCHQ have a 
| friendly working relationship, and any merger is unlikely to change
| these facts.

Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices
of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans.  See
www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter 

Adam


-- 
Celebrate Guy Fawkes day.  Send a revolutionary to Congress.

On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Adam Shostack wrote:
> 
> Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices
> of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans.  See
> www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter 

That's unusual- certainly for the bigger companies

Simon Spero sez:
> 
> On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Adam Shostack wrote:
> > 
> > Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices
> > of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans.  See
> > www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter 
> 
> That's unusual- certainly for the bigger companies

It is far worse. Every time Qualcomm wishes to send a bug fix to
their Hong Kong switch, they must go through the entire song&dance
re: NSA/Commerce/etc.

Clearly harassment of The Enemy by Big Brother.


-- 
A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz@nrk.com
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Adam Shostack wrote:

> Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices
> of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans.  See
> www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter 

[whoops] 
That's unusual - certainly, for the bigger companies it seems to be pretty
automatic, especially for NATO countries. Of course, it could just be that 
Phil is "known to the authorities".

> On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Adam Shostack wrote:
> 
> > Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices
> > of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans.  See
> > www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter 
> 
> [whoops] 
> That's unusual - certainly, for the bigger companies it seems to be pretty
> automatic, especially for NATO countries. Of course, it could just be that 
> Phil is "known to the authorities". 

Sorry that the follow up is so late,  but can anyone give me *any*
examples where export of 3DES has been approved?  Please be as specific
as possible as to destination countries, use, etc.  First hand
knowledge is preferred.

Thanks,
Eric Blossom

Can you offer up examples of 3des export?  Demonstrating that the law
is arbitrarily enforced would probably be a big, big win on the 1st
ammendment grounds.  They can't censor Phil and not censor Stew Baker
for the same speech.

Adam


Simon Spero wrote:

| > Phil Karn failed to get an export license for 3des for foriegn offices
| > of Qualcomm, staffed by Americans.  See
| > www.eff.org/pub/Crypto/ITAR_export/nsa_3des_export_denial_0396.letter 
| 
| [whoops] 
| That's unusual - certainly, for the bigger companies it seems to be pretty
| automatic, especially for NATO countries. Of course, it could just be that 
| Phil is "known to the authorities". 
| 


-- 
Celebrate Guy Fawkes day.  Send a revolutionary to Congress.

On Mon, 4 Nov 1996, Peter D. Junger wrote:

> 
> Has anyone figured out how this merger can work, particularly when
> British Telecom will be the surviving party, when those MCI employees
> concerned with the security of communications will not be able to
> disclose any cryptographic software or technical data to their
> employer, or to their ``foreign'' bosses and colleagues, without first
> getting permission from the Office of Defense Trade Controls under
> the ITAR?
> 

Crypto developed within a company can be revealed to other parts of the
company, and GB is an ally of the US -- Nobody's going to say anything
when they _do_ "violate" the ITAR

 --Deviant
The world is not octal despite DEC.