Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?

At 11:29 AM 11/8/1996, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote:
> Peter's point: If everyone in the US wants a ban on strong crypto,
> excepth the people on this list and the million-odd terrorists who are
> using strong crypto to murder, rape, pillage, etc., then strong crypto
> will be banned.

Yes, you've mostly got it.  I would quibble a little bit - if any of
the real bad things happens (id est, Assassination Politics) even many
of the members of this list will be calling for GAK.

> Furthermore, terrorrim and etc do not depend upon secure
> communications to work. People tend to be able to talk face-to-face in
> isolated environs, this is just as effective as a good public-key
> cryptosystem. Crypto won't suddenly protect the types of people who
> are professional killers/terrorists from scrutiny. It meerly would
> allow them to communicate securely over distances of more than 10
> feet. This, IMO, is not much of a win for them.

Face-to-face communications in isolated environs does not a cryptoanarchy
make.

> So, you're right. Given the proper conditions, strong crypto could
> probably be mostly stopped. However, these conditions are quite
> unlikely to arise.

I agree that they are unlikely to arise.  But, this raises a sticky
point for the GAKers - what's all the hurry?  Why don't we work with
the technology for awhile and see what develops before scurrying off
to outlaw it?

Here's what they cannot say: "We want to ban cryptography now because
it won't be that bad and people will want to use it."  Maybe that's
part of the classified debriefing that the Star Chamber gets to see.

Outlawing cryptography has some obvious problems.  It is expensive.
It impedes activities which are nearly universally seen as positive,
such as net commerce.  Combined with the increasing capability for
mass surveillance and computer assisted population management, it
has Orwellian implications.  Outlawing cryptography - at this time -
has a high political cost because there is so little justification
for it.  That means indecisive judges, indecisive politicians,
and an increasingly vocal pro-crypto movement.

Peter Hendrickson
ph@netcom.com

At 9:50 AM -0800 11/8/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote:
>At 11:29 AM 11/8/1996, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote:

>> Furthermore, terrorrim and etc do not depend upon secure
>> communications to work. People tend to be able to talk face-to-face in
>> isolated environs, this is just as effective as a good public-key
>> cryptosystem. Crypto won't suddenly protect the types of people who
>> are professional killers/terrorists from scrutiny. It meerly would
>> allow them to communicate securely over distances of more than 10
>> feet. This, IMO, is not much of a win for them.
>
>Face-to-face communications in isolated environs does not a cryptoanarchy
>make.

Yes, but you're the one talking about bombings, mass killings, Sarin gas
attacks, and other such examples of "terrorism." You cite the presence of
these things as why the Constitution will effectively be suspended and why
neighbors will cheerfully conduct vigilante raids on their suspected
terrorists.

Crypto anarchy is not the same thing as terrorism. Calling terrorism
"crypto anarchy" does not make it so.

--Tim May


"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM
that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology."
[NYT, 1996-10-02]
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."