HP announcement

HP has info on its new crypto stuff on the web now:

<http://www.hp.com/go/security> and
<http://www.hp.com/go/icf>.

It's apparently a crypto coprocessor embedded in a board or chip which
looks for a "policy token" (which is software/data, delivered via network
or smartcard) which is doled out by local "policy servers", "developed and
managed in conformance with national policy". 

Sounds to me like they want to be able to turn off strong crypto the way
they can turn off high-detail GPS during politically/militarily sensitive
events. 

As the press release notes,

"ICF is designed to run any current or future cryptographic algorithms.
Algorithms for key recovery also can be used. "Keys" are strings of
computer code that lock and unlock data. Key recovery is a method that
allows users to unscramble encrypted data if they lose their keys. Users
can decide whether to use key recovery, based on personal needs or domestic
-- or foreign -- government regulations. 

ICF cryptographic units, which can support keys of any length, are
exportable because they are disabled until a Policy Activation Token
activates them again. Policy Activation Tokens can be either a downloadable
software module or a smart card. Policy Activation Tokens trigger
particular algorithms for specific applications, based on needs.
Additionally, ICF adapts easily to current government encryption policies,
new encryption algorithms and changing key-recovery schemes. Customers who
use ICF-based products are offered long-term investment protection, with
rapid flexibility to meet changing needs." 

ICF is "International Cryptography Framework". 

The press release includes quotes from US and French government officials
indicating that the new system will meet their needs.


--
Greg Broiles                | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell:
gbroiles@netbox.com         | 
http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto.
                            |

Greg Broiles wrote:
> 
> HP has info on its new crypto stuff on the web now:

One of the subheadings in the white paper: "Toward a New Commercial
Order."  Ya gotta love it.

A lot of the security (that is, "security" from the point of view of
nervous Federales) seems to rely on certificates and tokens that are
supposedly spoof-proof (I guess).  Looks to me as if application 
certificates will be rather difficult to protect from being "abused".
It's also not clear to me how they'd prevent my flying to Luxembourg,
getting a Policy token that allows any & all crypto functions, and
then flying my butt back to Singapore for an encryption party.


______c_________________________________________________________________
Mike M Nally * IBM % Tivoli * Austin TX  * How quickly we forget that
mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com  * "deer processing" and "data
http://www.io.com/~m101/                 * processing" are different!

Greg wrote:

> Sounds to me like they want to be able to turn off strong crypto the way
> they can turn off high-detail GPS during politically/militarily sensitive
> events. 

That's my analysis as well. That, and we will see crypto strength based on 
the application. Credit card numbers get 3DES, email gets 40bit RC4.

[...]
> Users
> can decide whether to use key recovery, based on personal needs or domestic
> -- or foreign -- government regulations. 

The decision which type of crypto to use is not solely up to the 
user. If it was, a non-US user could just decide to turn on strong 
crypto. The Policy Token must therefore contain a field indicating GAK is 
"optional" or mandatory.

What does this mean? Policy tickets are served from central Policy
Servers. Foreigners only get servers that will turn GAK on by default. US
users get servers, run by an unspecified agency, that will initially send
tickets with a "GAK optional" value. This value can be changed to "GAK
mandatory" in times of national emergencies, suspected terrorist
activities, suspicious behavior, you know the drill.

Flip a central switch, and all crypto goes from "non-GAK" to "GAK". Which of 
course makes it GAK from the outset.

--Lucky

At 1:26 PM -0600 11/18/96, Mike McNally wrote:

>A lot of the security (that is, "security" from the point of view of
>nervous Federales) seems to rely on certificates and tokens that are
>supposedly spoof-proof (I guess).  Looks to me as if application
>certificates will be rather difficult to protect from being "abused".
>It's also not clear to me how they'd prevent my flying to Luxembourg,
>getting a Policy token that allows any & all crypto functions, and
>then flying my butt back to Singapore for an encryption party.

Or using the method someone (Duncan?) suggested a few years ago: recruit a
bunch of derelicts and winos and other such "invisibles" to apply for
Official Permissions in their own True Names, pay them off with the bottle
of Thunderbird promised them, and, voila!, one has a unique Official
Permission (policy card, for example).

Absent biometric identification or other complicated verification (such as
geographic methods...I'm dubious), I can't see how this wouldn't work.

(And I think there will be dozens of other ways to subvert the H-P/Intel
system.)

--Tim May


"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM
that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology."
[NYT, 1996-10-02]
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."