NODE f2519c64Securing Electronic Mail Within HMG
John Young <jya@pipeline.com>Mon, 18 Nov 1996 23:51:18 -0800 (PST)
We have received from an anonymous source a document titled:
"Securing Electronic Mail Within HMG, Part I, Infrastructure
and Protocol." 21 March 1996.
>From the Introduction:
"This document is the first part of CESG's recommendations for
securing electronic mail within HMG. The main objective of the
recommendations is to facilitate pan-government secure inter-
operability of electronic mail, by simplifying the implementation
of secure electronic mail within government, ensuring secure
electronic mail between departments is possible, attempting to
facilitate future inter-operability with commercial users,
maximising the use of commercial technology in a controlled manner,
whilst allowing access to keys for data recovery or law enforcement
purposes if required."
Other sections describe:
2. Authentication Framework
3. Confidentiality Framework
4. Security Protocol
The document refers to the Royal Holloway program for TTP critiqued
by Ross Anderson and others as "EuroClipper." Perhaps those with
more knowledge could make an assessment.
The document consists of 13 pages of text and diagrams, with
a few gaps.
-----
http://jya.com/sem.htm (35 kb with 7 jpg images)
NODE ffe5d396Re: Securing Electronic Mail Within HMG
Ben Laurie <ben@gonzo.ben.algroup.co.uk>Tue, 19 Nov 1996 04:57:11 -0800 (PST)
John Young wrote:
>
> We have received from an anonymous source a document titled:
>
> "Securing Electronic Mail Within HMG, Part I, Infrastructure
> and Protocol." 21 March 1996.
>
> From the Introduction:
>
> "This document is the first part of CESG's recommendations for
> securing electronic mail within HMG. The main objective of the
> recommendations is to facilitate pan-government secure inter-
> operability of electronic mail, by simplifying the implementation
> of secure electronic mail within government, ensuring secure
> electronic mail between departments is possible, attempting to
> facilitate future inter-operability with commercial users,
> maximising the use of commercial technology in a controlled manner,
> whilst allowing access to keys for data recovery or law enforcement
> purposes if required."
>
> Other sections describe:
>
> 2. Authentication Framework
>
> 3. Confidentiality Framework
>
> 4. Security Protocol
>
> The document refers to the Royal Holloway program for TTP critiqued
> by Ross Anderson and others as "EuroClipper." Perhaps those with
> more knowledge could make an assessment.
>
> The document consists of 13 pages of text and diagrams, with
> a few gaps.
This document is available on the Web, at:
http://www.xopen.org/public/tech/security/pki/casm/casm.htm
see also my "addendum" to Anderson & Roe's paper (which is actually a critique
of the above proposal, rather than RH itself) at:
http://www.algroup.co.uk/crypto/rh.html
Cheers,
Ben.
--
Ben Laurie Phone: +44 (181) 994 6435 Email: ben@algroup.co.uk
Freelance Consultant and Fax: +44 (181) 994 6472
Technical Director URL: http://www.algroup.co.uk/Apache-SSL
A.L. Digital Ltd, Apache Group member (http://www.apache.org)
London, England. Apache-SSL author