Re: Newt's phone calls

Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote in article <5bp18k$1cc@life.ai.mit.edu>...

> GSM encrypts only the links to the station - the traffic goes in the
> clear through the station.  Plus A5 (crypto algorithm used in GSM) is
> weak, 40 bits of effective key space.
> 
> It could be worse to have poor crypto, than no crypto,

I disagree for two reasons, first there is a big difference between having
poor locks and no locks. Most locks can be picked by an expert, they are
effective against many theifs however.

Second if everyone in the world was using 40 bit email encryption it
would prevent most of the "promiscuous" interception of communications.

The danger in weak crypto is thinking that it is strong crypto. GSM is
weak crypto but stops the type of snooping the Martins engaged in.
If you know not to talk about something secret on one then low
crypto is better than having a signal anyone can pick up on a 
device from radio shack.

		Phill

Mr. Hallam-baker said:
> Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote in article <5bp18k$1cc@life.ai.mit.edu>...
> 
> > GSM encrypts only the links to the station - the traffic goes in the
> > clear through the station.  Plus A5 (crypto algorithm used in GSM) is
> > weak, 40 bits of effective key space.
> > 
> > It could be worse to have poor crypto, than no crypto,
> 
> I disagree for two reasons, first there is a big difference between having
> poor locks and no locks. Most locks can be picked by an expert, they are
> effective against many theifs however.
> 
> Second if everyone in the world was using 40 bit email encryption it
> would prevent most of the "promiscuous" interception of communications.

    Third (as Mr. Vulis <insult deleted> observed) the jump from using poor 
crypto to using good crypto is a lot shorter than not using crypto to 
using good crypto. 

    Once people get it in there heads that crypto is good to use, then 
it is easier to convince them to use "unbreakable" crypto than to convince 
non-crypto-users.