Re: anonymous credit

Hal Finney wrote:
> 
> Here is a simpler example of Wei's anonymous credit idea.  We can call it
> the "borrowing cryptographers".

Hal,
  I have been following this thread with interest (no pun intended), and
have had the foresight to not add to ideas that go beyond my own ability
to follow.
  (I have to read your posts several times to even begin to grasp some
of them.)

  I am wondering what other concrete examples you might be able to add
to the one in this post which might point to an actual funtional
implementation of the ideas you have been promulgating.
  Many of the CypherPunks discussions involve largely theoretical
concepts which need much development to be practical, but it seems to
me that in this post you are approaching a level where what you are
discussing might actually be feasibly introduced in various microcosmic
situations.

  Being a Canadian, and therefore semi-socialist by nature, I am 
thinking along the lines of Credit Union applicability of your ideas.
Credit Unions often take the form of small groups of individuals or
companies with common aims and/or backgrounds/interests.
  The basic idea behind many Credit Unions is that they are more prone
to lend money to individuals or institutions which are promoting ideas
which can be profitable, but which the average banker or loan agency
would not understand sufficiently to advance money on.

  For example, having an interest in the issues you are discussing, I
might be ameniable to getting involved in an effort to fund the
development of the 'Hal-Wei Anonymous Credit' program.
  The advantage of a Credit Union setup is that I know that it is run
with an eye to realistic chances of success being considered, but also
will take into account efforts that should be funded which may have
only a marginal chance of financial success, but will further the 
general cause of those things I am interested in.

  Truly there are a rising number of issues today which might benefit
from the ability to participate anonymously in the funding of causes
in which one has an interest.
  While AP is one of the more startling and newsworthy (?) aspects
of anonymous lottery/credit systems, there are a multitude of minor
causes which might benefit from the ability to engage in an anonymous
credit system, as well.
  A simple example might be those who wish to financially back a legal
challenge of their health-care system, without risking being denied
benefits as a result of their participation.

  I think that some of the CypherPunks' contributions to computer
technology go largely unrecognized because of the fact that they
aide those who do not wish to draw attention to themselves, for the
most part.
  There isn't a week that goes by without my receiving an email from
someone who thanks me for the benefit they have gained by my introducing
them to encryption or anonymous remailers, yet I doubt that many of them
give the same feedback to those who provide those services. Remailer
operaters seem to mostly receive shit and abuse for feedback, as a
result of their efforts, yet I know from experience that there are many
to whom their services have been a blessing.

-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

>   There isn't a week that goes by without my receiving an email from
> someone who thanks me for the benefit they have gained by my introducing
> them to encryption or anonymous remailers, yet I doubt that many of them

Toto hints at some issues here that I've been wondering about for a while 
now.  What are some effective strategies for securely introducing 
"newbies" to the world of cryptography and anon remailers?  I'm 
currently attending college, which means that my peers all use email very 
regularly -- a ripe environment for use of cryptography in email, I should 
think.  However, nearly everyone's email accounts are on a central Unix 
machine, which brings up many issues about the (lack of) security of 
private keys on multiuser machines.

My question is this -- is it better for the crypto community in the long 
run to have more people using encryption, but perhaps insecurely, or 
to have fewer users whose communications are more cryptographically secure?

-Eric

--
Thus the time may have come to abandon the cool, measured language of
technical reports -- all that talk of "perturbations" and "surprises" and
"unanticipated events" -- and simply blurt out: "Holy shit!  Ten thousand
years!  That's incredible!"
			-- Kai Erikson, _A_New_Species_of_Trouble_, 1994.

Eric Nystrom wrote:
> >   There isn't a week that goes by without my receiving an email from
> > someone who thanks me for the benefit they have gained by my introducing
> > them to encryption or anonymous remailers, yet I doubt that many of them
> 
> Toto hints at some issues here that I've been wondering about for a while 
> now.  What are some effective strategies for securely introducing 
> "newbies" to the world of cryptography and anon remailers?  I'm 
> currently attending college, which means that my peers all use email very 
> regularly -- a ripe environment for use of cryptography in email, I should 
> think.  However, nearly everyone's email accounts are on a central Unix 
> machine, which brings up many issues about the (lack of) security of 
> private keys on multiuser machines.
> 
> My question is this -- is it better for the crypto community in the long 
> run to have more people using encryption, but perhaps insecurely, or 
> to have fewer users whose communications are more cryptographically secure?

Multiuser Unix Security == No Security.

Your users may have illusions, but not true security.

First thing I'd suggest is to explain them that nothing that goes through 
that central unix machine is truly secure.

	- Igor.

On Mon, 14 Apr 1997 ichudov@algebra.com wrote:

> Multiuser Unix Security == No Security.
> 
> Your users may have illusions, but not true security.
> 
> First thing I'd suggest is to explain them that nothing that goes through 
> that central unix machine is truly secure.

It's absolutely true that nothing on a centralized Unix machine is truly 
secure.  However, is abandoning all pretenses of crypto and security in 
favor of holding out for a utopian ideal really the best solution?  Does 
using encryption for email on multiuser machines actually hurt the cause 
of the security community in the long run?

(I'm not asking rhetorical questions here -- I'm truly looking for some 
thoughts on this.)

-Eric 

--
Thus the time may have come to abandon the cool, measured language of
technical reports -- all that talk of "perturbations" and "surprises" and
"unanticipated events" -- and simply blurt out: "Holy shit!  Ten thousand
years!  That's incredible!"
			-- Kai Erikson, _A_New_Species_of_Trouble_, 1994.

Eric Nystrom wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 14 Apr 1997 ichudov@algebra.com wrote:
> 
> > Multiuser Unix Security == No Security.
> > 
> > Your users may have illusions, but not true security.
> > 
> > First thing I'd suggest is to explain them that nothing that goes through 
> > that central unix machine is truly secure.
> 
> It's absolutely true that nothing on a centralized Unix machine is truly 
> secure.  However, is abandoning all pretenses of crypto and security in 
> favor of holding out for a utopian ideal really the best solution?  Does 
> using encryption for email on multiuser machines actually hurt the cause 
> of the security community in the long run?
> 

I would not call it truly "utopian". There is not much that's needed to
achieve reasonable personal security, protecting from attacks from the
Internet  -- an individual (pesonal) computer system that offers no
internet services. Could be bought for $300 or less.

	- Igor.

On Tue, 15 Apr 1997 ichudov@algebra.com wrote:

> I would not call it truly "utopian". There is not much that's needed to
> achieve reasonable personal security, protecting from attacks from the
> Internet  -- an individual (pesonal) computer system that offers no
> internet services. Could be bought for $300 or less.

That makes a lot of sense for data security in the general sense, but I'm 
uncertain how useful that would be in terms of helping the user have more 
secure email.  Is there an offline mail reader for standard Unix systems 
that would run on a platform like you describe?  

-Eric

--
Thus the time may have come to abandon the cool, measured language of
technical reports -- all that talk of "perturbations" and "surprises" and
"unanticipated events" -- and simply blurt out: "Holy shit!  Ten thousand
years!  That's incredible!"
			-- Kai Erikson, _A_New_Species_of_Trouble_, 1994.

Eric Nystrom wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 15 Apr 1997 ichudov@algebra.com wrote:
> 
> > I would not call it truly "utopian". There is not much that's needed to
> > achieve reasonable personal security, protecting from attacks from the
> > Internet  -- an individual (pesonal) computer system that offers no
> > internet services. Could be bought for $300 or less.
> 
> That makes a lot of sense for data security in the general sense, but I'm 
> uncertain how useful that would be in terms of helping the user have more 
> secure email.  Is there an offline mail reader for standard Unix systems 
> that would run on a platform like you describe?  
> 

Yes, there is one.

	- Igor.

On Tue, 15 Apr 1997 ichudov@algebra.com wrote:

> > secure email.  Is there an offline mail reader for standard Unix systems 
> > that would run on a platform like you describe?  
> 
> Yes, there is one.

Okay, what is it, what are the requirements, where do I find it, does it 
require special Unix software (and if so, what is that, and where do I 
find it too)?

-Eric

--
Thus the time may have come to abandon the cool, measured language of
technical reports -- all that talk of "perturbations" and "surprises" and
"unanticipated events" -- and simply blurt out: "Holy shit!  Ten thousand
years!  That's incredible!"
			-- Kai Erikson, _A_New_Species_of_Trouble_, 1994.

> It's absolutely true that nothing on a centralized Unix machine is truly 
> secure.  However, is abandoning all pretenses of crypto and security in 
> favor of holding out for a utopian ideal really the best solution?  Does 
> using encryption for email on multiuser machines actually hurt the cause 
> of the security community in the long run?
> 
> (I'm not asking rhetorical questions here -- I'm truly looking for some 
> thoughts on this.)

Since security is not binary (i.e. talking of secure and insecure is
nonsense.  You must talk of more or less secure.), you have to look at the
threats.  If you are sending email from a multi-user Unix machine, encrypting
it removes some threats (e.g. wiretaping) without adding any new threats.
(There are still the continuing parade of UNIX holes based on the C string
model.)

I would say that if users don't think they are safe, just think they are
a bit safer, then encrypting on a multi-user machine is a good thing because
it is more secure than not encrypting.  It is still less secure than a 
single-user system with Tempest shielding.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz                   Periwinkle  --  Computer Consulting
(408)356-8506                 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz@netcom.com             Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

William S. Frantz wrote:
> > It's absolutely true that nothing on a centralized Unix machine is truly 
> > secure.  However, is abandoning all pretenses of crypto and security in 
> > favor of holding out for a utopian ideal really the best solution?  Does 
> > using encryption for email on multiuser machines actually hurt the cause 
> > of the security community in the long run?
> > 
> > (I'm not asking rhetorical questions here -- I'm truly looking for some 
> > thoughts on this.)
> 
> Since security is not binary (i.e. talking of secure and insecure is
> nonsense.  You must talk of more or less secure.), you have to look at the
> threats.  If you are sending email from a multi-user Unix machine, encrypting
> it removes some threats (e.g. wiretaping) without adding any new threats.
> (There are still the continuing parade of UNIX holes based on the C string
> model.)
> 
> I would say that if users don't think they are safe, just think they are
> a bit safer, then encrypting on a multi-user machine is a good thing because
> it is more secure than not encrypting.  It is still less secure than a 
> single-user system with Tempest shielding.

right, the real problem is that users start thinking that they are
really safe, and start doing dumb things.

	- Igor.

application/pgp-message

Eric Nystrom wrote:
>  What are some effective strategies for securely introducing
> "newbies" to the world of cryptography and anon remailers? 

  I have found that rather than promoting encryption and anony
remailers, that it is much more effective for me just to be aware
of when someone mentions a problem they are having that can be
solved by crypto/remailers.
  I always try to give them a short list of what is required to
use various options, and what is gained by them.
  The biggest thing to me is to try to point them toward a level
of technology that they are capable of using, or will be capable
of learning, given the level of their problem.

  The following remailers are ones I recommend for totally newbie
computer wrestlers who need a graphic interface and have access
to a browser.
http://www.myemail.net/anonymous.htm
http://www.ozemail.com.au/~geoffk/anon/anon.html

> My question is this -- is it better for the crypto community in the long
> run to have more people using encryption, but perhaps insecurely, or
> to have fewer users whose communications are more cryptographically secure?

  My opinion is that the more people who use encryption with an
understanding of what level of security they are getting, then
the more people who will eventually graduate to higher levels
of security when using crypto.
  If teenagers use crypto to keep their private diary safe from
little brother or sister's prying eyes, then they will begin to
learn more about it at an early age. If little brother or sister
is a computer whiz, and cracks their diary open, then they will
get a valuable life lesson that may save them from  more costly
lessons in the future.

  Also, if a wide range of people are using crypto, whether it
is strong and secure or not, then there will be a larger group
of people interested in the government or their employer not 
interfering with their use of it.
-- 
Toto
"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"
http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

On Mon, 14 Apr 1997, Toto wrote:

>   I have found that rather than promoting encryption and anony
> remailers, that it is much more effective for me just to be aware
> of when someone mentions a problem they are having that can be
> solved by crypto/remailers.

Do you do consulting work for a specific audience that would be inclined 
to need to use remailers and encryption more than the average user, or 
are you referring more to just "average" friends?  If it is the second 
case, especially, I think that many of us might benefit from some 
specific scenarios in which you proposed encryption and remailers as 
solutions. 

>   The biggest thing to me is to try to point them toward a level
> of technology that they are capable of using, or will be capable
> of learning, given the level of their problem.

What programs do you usually suggest?  On my Linux box, I use pine 3.95's 
filter hooks to use PGP relatively seamlessly, but the multiuser system 
that most of my peers use email on does not have a version of pine 
capable of supporting filters.  I've looked into Raph's premail, and have 
set it up successfully, but it seems a bit obtuse for a normal user.  
(Plus I *REALLY* don't like the idea of storing my passphrase on the 
multiuser system as well.)

>   Also, if a wide range of people are using crypto, whether it
> is strong and secure or not, then there will be a larger group
> of people interested in the government or their employer not 
> interfering with their use of it.

This brings up an interesting point -- should we crypto users try and 
work with the system administrators to get PGP set up systemwide, or 
should we just try to do it on our own, as unobtrusively as possible?  A 
systemwide implimentation of PGP would probably be advantageous, but to 
ask for that certainly risks bringing attention to otherwise unobtrusive 
activities that the system administrators might not like.

-Eric

--
Thus the time may have come to abandon the cool, measured language of
technical reports -- all that talk of "perturbations" and "surprises" and
"unanticipated events" -- and simply blurt out: "Holy shit!  Ten thousand
years!  That's incredible!"
			-- Kai Erikson, _A_New_Species_of_Trouble_, 1994.