Re: June 18th SF C'punks meeting: export controls on trial

> ...  There will also
> be a regular 2nd-Saturday c'punks meeting this month (I think it's at
> PGP, Inc.)

Hi all; I haven't seen the agenda yet, but if there is time & interest,
I would be willing to organize a PGP key-signing party.

Signify interest by mailing your key -- or a pointer to it -- to me
by Friday.  Come to the c'punks meeting with photo ID and your PGP
fingerprint.

It would also be way cool if we could get some of the folks at PGP Inc.
to join in.

More info on key-signing parties will be at
www.best.com/~falconer/keyparty.html by tommorrow.

	-ed falk

["cypherpunks-announce@toad.com" deleted as that is really not a list for
discussions.]


At 4:23 PM -0700 6/11/97, Ed Falk wrote:

>Hi all; I haven't seen the agenda yet, but if there is time & interest,
>I would be willing to organize a PGP key-signing party.
>
>Signify interest by mailing your key -- or a pointer to it -- to me
>by Friday.  Come to the c'punks meeting with photo ID and your PGP
>fingerprint.

"Sigh." Why do people persist in thinking that a photo ID is useful for PGP
keysignings?

I view a keysigning as saying that the person I know as "Lucky Green" is
asking me to sign the key he presents as his key, not whether Missouri
issued him a driver's license in that name, nor whether the company he
worked for in Munich issued him a photo ID under than name.

This is what the "web of trust" is all about.  It is _not_ about True Names
as proved by photo IDs.

(However, for those lacking photo IDs sufficient for Ed's purposes, I'm
asking Eric Hughes (not his True Name) if I can borrow his badge laminator.
I'll set it up outside the keysigning room. Bring a photo of some sort and
I'll make you a Yoyodyne Corporation employee badge.)

--Tim May (not his True Name)

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

Tim May <tcmay@got.net> writes:
> (However, for those lacking photo IDs sufficient for Ed's purposes, I'm
> asking Eric Hughes (not his True Name) if I can borrow his badge laminator.

Is that the long-haired guy I had a dinner with once?  How time flies.

- Timmy May

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

Tim May said:
> "Sigh." Why do people persist in thinking that a photo ID is useful for PGP
> keysignings?
Because _these_ people _are_ binding true names to keys.  That's what
_this_ is about.  

These people are saying "I know of sufficient proof that this 
person is who they say they are".  You can do this with a person 
you know without the aid of photo id, even if the "true name" isn't 
in the key. Alternatively, (as is the case here) you can verify the 
identify of unknown people with sufficient photo id.

And so each person becomes their own Verisign...

That sounds a lot like the web of trust... each person assigns a
certain amount of trust to others... If I believe that Joe makes 
absolutely certain that any key he signs is valid then I assign him
a high trust.  If Joe chooses to sign somebody's key because he saw
five forms of ID and did a credit check, spiffy.  If Joe signs a
key because it happens to be his brother, even better.  But the point
is that I trust Joe.

How people choose to verify other's identity is somewhat irreverent.  
More important, I think, is the question of who to trust.  So Tim,
if you think that photo ID is a poor method of verifying someone's
identity, doesn't sign a key on that alone.  Also make sure that the
people you assign trust to have the same ideas about photo id.

For others who don't share your thoughts on this matter, they can feel
free to trust photo ID.  And still others can trust them (thus trusting
photo ID by proxy)... But that's what the web of trust is about.  Each
person can trust different things (and people)...  I think that's what
makes the web of trust so flexible.  Each person is free to choose who
and what they trust.

				Josh

-----------------------------Joshua E. Hill-----------------------------
|         You never find a lost article until you replace it.          |
------------------------jehill@w6bhz.calpoly.edu------------------------

At 8:31 AM -0700 6/12/97, Bill Frantz wrote:
>IMHO - What you are really signing is the binding between the data
>associated with the key (usually an email address) and the key.  You are
>saying that the secret key holder is (one of the) person(s) who has access
>to that account, and not some man in the middle in the middle.  If you ask
>to see Lucky Green's, or Futplex's, or Black Unicorn's picture ID, you will
>either see a forgery or an ID issued by an organization not interested in
>birth certificates.

I am fairly often accused of being arrogant, of being a "know it all." I
have never claimed to be an expert on PGP, and I certainly am not. I use
the MacPGP version which became available in '92, and will eventually star
t working with PGP 5.x (which I have, and have installed, but not spent
much time with).

I generated a 1024-bit key in '92, right after PGP 2.0 appeared, and
participated in a key signing, etc., shortly thereafter. It happened that
my ISP at that time had just changed from Portal to Netcom. (Now it's
"got.net", a fairly typical local provider of non-shell ISP services.)

I can't understand (hint: someone please explain) why I get so many
requests to send the "tcmay@got.net" key, as opposed to the
"tcmay@netcom.com" key so widely available. I thought the key signings were
about the Person Widely Known as "Tim May" being associated with the key
signed, not some temporary e-mail address.

My binding was between the key, and "me." Those who wanted to send messages
to "me" could assume that only "I" could read it. The address
"tcmay@netcom.com" vs. "tcmay@got.net" is not central. Any concern that
"tcmay@got.net" is somehow not the keyholder of that '92 key is a nonissue.

If the keyserver databases focus on such ephemera as the current ISP
account, then they are focussing on the wrong things.

Am I missing something central?

--Tim May, whose e-mail deliverer has changed a few times, but whose key
remains constant. Which is more important?




There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

Tim May wrote:
> I can't understand (hint: someone please explain) why I get so many
> requests to send the "tcmay@got.net" key, as opposed to the
> "tcmay@netcom.com" key so widely available. I thought the key signings were
> about the Person Widely Known as "Tim May" being associated with the key
> signed, not some temporary e-mail address.

You get so many requests to send the "tcmay@got.net" key because certain
pgp-aware email programs can encrypt mail using the recipient address,
if it is in the sender's keyring. Therefore, it is more convenient if
the addressee's email address is in the user id field.

	- Igor.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <v03102800afc652637f93@[207.167.93.63]>, on 06/12/97 
   at 06:47 PM, Tim May <tcmay@got.net> said:

>At 8:31 AM -0700 6/12/97, Bill Frantz wrote:
>>IMHO - What you are really signing is the binding between the data
>>associated with the key (usually an email address) and the key.  You are
>>saying that the secret key holder is (one of the) person(s) who has access
>>to that account, and not some man in the middle in the middle.  If you ask
>>to see Lucky Green's, or Futplex's, or Black Unicorn's picture ID, you will
>>either see a forgery or an ID issued by an organization not interested in
>>birth certificates.

>I am fairly often accused of being arrogant, of being a "know it all." I
>have never claimed to be an expert on PGP, and I certainly am not. I use
>the MacPGP version which became available in '92, and will eventually
>star t working with PGP 5.x (which I have, and have installed, but not
>spent much time with).

>I generated a 1024-bit key in '92, right after PGP 2.0 appeared, and
>participated in a key signing, etc., shortly thereafter. It happened that
>my ISP at that time had just changed from Portal to Netcom. (Now it's
>"got.net", a fairly typical local provider of non-shell ISP services.)

>I can't understand (hint: someone please explain) why I get so many
>requests to send the "tcmay@got.net" key, as opposed to the
>"tcmay@netcom.com" key so widely available. I thought the key signings
>were about the Person Widely Known as "Tim May" being associated with the
>key signed, not some temporary e-mail address.

>My binding was between the key, and "me." Those who wanted to send
>messages to "me" could assume that only "I" could read it. The address
>"tcmay@netcom.com" vs. "tcmay@got.net" is not central. Any concern that
>"tcmay@got.net" is somehow not the keyholder of that '92 key is a
>nonissue.

>If the keyserver databases focus on such ephemera as the current ISP
>account, then they are focussing on the wrong things.

>Am I missing something central?

Well yes, :)

There are different levels of trust and authentication in the web of
trust.

Many (most?) people using PGP will never physically meet and authenticate
keys. Their security model does not require this. Instead what PGP is used
for is a verification method that I am talking to the same person at
tcmay@got.net in my correspondance even though I do not know who he is
physically. So over a period of time of exchanging PGP signed messages I
can authentincate that all of these messages are all comming from
tcmay@got.net who claims to be Tim May. I know that this is not much but
at least I know it's not Dimitri or someone else forging the messages from
that account (though I don't know if all this time tcmay@got.net has
really been one of Dimitri's accounts and that Tim May is really dead).

I also use PGP to sign all my distributed source code & binaries for my
programs. I also sign all my posts. My sharware customers can verify that
the software if from me and unmodified and can also verify any public post
regarding the software. Depending on how concerned on this they may be
satisfied that seeing the code signed with the same key that I use for my
mailing list and in all my public post as enough authentication that the
code is valid (though there is nothing preventing them from taking
stronger methods of authentication upto and including flying down to FL
and meeting me in person).

You also have PGP add-on software that does lookups of keys by e-mail
address. This is a convient feature if one is working with large keyrings.
You do run into the problem of e-mail addresses changing and having
multiple keys with the same address. In my software I make use of a
default file where a key can be assinged to an e-mail address regardless
of what is in the userid. YMMV with other software, from my own testing I
have found that most will either take the first key found with duplicats
or complain of "no key found" with address changes.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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On Thu, 12 Jun 1997, Tim May wrote:

> I can't understand (hint: someone please explain) why I get so many
> requests to send the "tcmay@got.net" key, as opposed to the
> "tcmay@netcom.com" key so widely available. I thought the key signings were
> about the Person Widely Known as "Tim May" being associated with the key
> signed, not some temporary e-mail address.

Have you set up another userid on the key and resubmit it to the key
servers and avoid the confusion.

> My binding was between the key, and "me." Those who wanted to send messages
> to "me" could assume that only "I" could read it. The address
> "tcmay@netcom.com" vs. "tcmay@got.net" is not central. Any concern that
> "tcmay@got.net" is somehow not the keyholder of that '92 key is a nonissue.

Most people out there only know you via your e-mail address.  How do they
know if "tcmay@netcom.com" is the same as "tcmay@got.net" and not
"mallet@nsa.gov"?  When looking for someone's key, most people look by
e-mail address.  (It is the only "unique" id other than key id or
fingerprint that people have to go on.)

> If the keyserver databases focus on such ephemera as the current ISP
> account, then they are focussing on the wrong things.

What do you want keyservers to go on?  You have to have some way of
obtaing the keys for an individual.  It could be some other Tim May out
there.  (Name collision is pretty common, especially since everyone and
his extended family are getting on the net.)

> Am I missing something central?
> 
> --Tim May, whose e-mail deliverer has changed a few times, but whose key
> remains constant. Which is more important?

Uh... Making the key reflect you address so people can find it...  Or as
was said in Dr. Strangelove "It is not a deterent if you keep it a
secret!".

alano@teleport.com | "Those who are without history are doomed to retype it."

IMHO - What you are really signing is the binding between the data
associated with the key (usually an email address) and the key.  You are
saying that the secret key holder is (one of the) person(s) who has access
to that account, and not some man in the middle in the middle.  If you ask
to see Lucky Green's, or Futplex's, or Black Unicorn's picture ID, you will
either see a forgery or an ID issued by an organization not interested in
birth certificates.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz@netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

Bill Frantz said:
> IMHO - What you are really signing is the binding between the data
> associated with the key (usually an email address) and the key.  

I think that you are signing the data, but not quite the 
description area. I think you are signing the key. Something 
like the statement "I believe that anything signed by this key 
came from the person known as 'X'".  This could be an e-mail 
address, pseudonym a DNA sequence, or whatever... The key (and
hopefully the binding between the key and the person in meat 
space) is what remains constant... not necessarily what the 
person chooses to go by.

			Josh

-----------------------------Joshua E. Hill-----------------------------
|                 Quantized Revision of Murphy's Law:                  |
|                   Everything goes wrong all at once.                 |
--------------------------jehill@w6bhz.calpoly.edu----------------------

At 6:47 PM -0700 6/12/97, Tim May wrote:
>At 8:31 AM -0700 6/12/97, Bill Frantz wrote:
>>IMHO - What you are really signing is the binding between the data
>>associated with the key (usually an email address) and the key.  You are
>>saying that the secret key holder is (one of the) person(s) who has access
>>to that account, and not some man in the middle in the middle.  If you ask
>>to see Lucky Green's, or Futplex's, or Black Unicorn's picture ID, you will
>>either see a forgery or an ID issued by an organization not interested in
>>birth certificates.
>
>My binding was between the key, and "me." Those who wanted to send messages
>to "me" could assume that only "I" could read it. The address
>"tcmay@netcom.com" vs. "tcmay@got.net" is not central. Any concern that
>"tcmay@got.net" is somehow not the keyholder of that '92 key is a nonissue.

My answer was a pure SPKI answer.  As a first approximation, in SPKI your
identity is your key.  Meatspace doesn't enter into it at all.  This avoids
the naming problem of meatspace (i.e. Which John Smith).

Much of the problem with PGP key signing is there is no complete agreement
on what it means.  I chose to have it mean that there verification of the
binding between the data associated with the key and the key.

If you have a version of the key with no signatures, then you can change
the data field and re-sign with the associated secret key.  Since the data
field has changed, you properly need to have others re-verify the validity
of the binding.


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz@netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <v0300786dafc68637a08c@[207.94.249.152]>, on 06/12/97 
   at 10:14 PM, Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com> said:

>At 6:47 PM -0700 6/12/97, Tim May wrote:
>>At 8:31 AM -0700 6/12/97, Bill Frantz wrote:
>>>IMHO - What you are really signing is the binding between the data
>>>associated with the key (usually an email address) and the key.  You are
>>>saying that the secret key holder is (one of the) person(s) who has access
>>>to that account, and not some man in the middle in the middle.  If you ask
>>>to see Lucky Green's, or Futplex's, or Black Unicorn's picture ID, you will
>>>either see a forgery or an ID issued by an organization not interested in
>>>birth certificates.
>>
>>My binding was between the key, and "me." Those who wanted to send messages
>>to "me" could assume that only "I" could read it. The address
>>"tcmay@netcom.com" vs. "tcmay@got.net" is not central. Any concern that
>>"tcmay@got.net" is somehow not the keyholder of that '92 key is a nonissue.

>My answer was a pure SPKI answer.  As a first approximation, in SPKI your
>identity is your key.  Meatspace doesn't enter into it at all.  This
>avoids the naming problem of meatspace (i.e. Which John Smith).

>Much of the problem with PGP key signing is there is no complete
>agreement on what it means.  I chose to have it mean that there
>verification of the binding between the data associated with the key and
>the key.

>If you have a version of the key with no signatures, then you can change
>the data field and re-sign with the associated secret key.  Since the
>data field has changed, you properly need to have others re-verify the
>validity of the binding.

I don't think that any changes that he would make to his key would need
re-verification provided that he signed those changes. Take the following
scenario:

John Doe creates a key and signs it:

pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe
sig                        John Doe (0xFFFFFFFF)

Now 3 other people verify that the key does belong to John Doe and sign
the key:

pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC) 

Now John adds an aka to his key and signs it.

pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC) 
aka                        John Doe john.doe@who-is-it.com
sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)

Since John Doe is the only one who could sign the key with the new aka one
can assume that the aka is as valid as the original userid.

 
- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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At 10:33 PM -0700 6/12/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>In <v0300786dafc68637a08c@[207.94.249.152]>, on 06/12/97
>   at 10:14 PM, Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com> said:
>>If you have a version of the key with no signatures, then you can change
>>the data field and re-sign with the associated secret key.  Since the
>>data field has changed, you properly need to have others re-verify the
>>validity of the binding.
>
>I don't think that any changes that he would make to his key would need
>re-verification provided that he signed those changes. Take the following
>scenario:
>
>John Doe creates a key and signs it:
>
>pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe
>sig                        John Doe (0xFFFFFFFF)
>
>Now 3 other people verify that the key does belong to John Doe and sign
>the key:
>
>pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
>sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
>sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
>sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
>sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC)
>
>Now John adds an aka to his key and signs it.
>
>pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
>sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
>sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
>sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
>sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC)
>aka                        John Doe john.doe@who-is-it.com
>sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
>
>Since John Doe is the only one who could sign the key with the new aka one
>can assume that the aka is as valid as the original userid.

So if John Doe wants to be known as "president@whitehouse.gov" or "Tim May
<tcmay@got.net>" all he has to do is change the field, and upload the
changed key to the key servers, and all the signatures should remain good?


-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz       | The Internet was designed  | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506     | to protect the free world  | 16345 Englewood Ave.
frantz@netcom.com | from hostile governments.  | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <v03007874afc71e205651@[207.94.249.152]>, on 06/13/97 
   at 11:00 AM, Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com> said:

>At 10:33 PM -0700 6/12/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>>In <v0300786dafc68637a08c@[207.94.249.152]>, on 06/12/97
>>   at 10:14 PM, Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com> said:
>>>If you have a version of the key with no signatures, then you can change
>>>the data field and re-sign with the associated secret key.  Since the
>>>data field has changed, you properly need to have others re-verify the
>>>validity of the binding.
>>
>>I don't think that any changes that he would make to his key would need
>>re-verification provided that he signed those changes. Take the following
>>scenario:
>>
>>John Doe creates a key and signs it:
>>
>>pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe
>>sig                        John Doe (0xFFFFFFFF)
>>
>>Now 3 other people verify that the key does belong to John Doe and sign
>>the key:
>>
>>pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
>>sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
>>sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
>>sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
>>sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC)
>>
>>Now John adds an aka to his key and signs it.
>>
>>pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
>>sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
>>sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
>>sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
>>sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC)
>>aka                        John Doe john.doe@who-is-it.com
>>sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
>>
>>Since John Doe is the only one who could sign the key with the new aka one
>>can assume that the aka is as valid as the original userid.

>So if John Doe wants to be known as "president@whitehouse.gov" or "Tim
>May <tcmay@got.net>" all he has to do is change the field, and upload the
>changed key to the key servers, and all the signatures should remain
>good?

Well remember that John Doe is only adding an AKA to his key not deleteing
the old userid and replacing it with a new one. This is very important.

pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC)
aka                        John Doe president@whitehouse.gov
sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)


If he were to remove the old userid and replace it with a new one you
would have:

pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe president@whithouse.gov
sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)

without any autheticating signatures.

The first case all we have is a change of address while in the second we
have a change of identity.



- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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vUXHsUjL+3BPhddyGc0qU2q8GqsBEvqklPYFGfT1nYAI8/v4J1Qd81gOLvxEvnrZ
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VtonV7HFyiU=
=wy43
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

On Fri, 13 Jun 1997, Bill Frantz wrote:

> >pub 2048/FFFFFFFF 01/01/90 John Doe john.doe@anonymous.com
> >sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
> >sig                        Mary Jane  (0xAAAAAAAA)
> >sig                        Tom Thumb  (0x11111111)
> >sig                        Tiny Tim   (0xCCCCCCCC)
> >aka                        John Doe john.doe@who-is-it.com
> >sig                        John Doe   (0xFFFFFFFF)
> >
> >Since John Doe is the only one who could sign the key with the new aka one
> >can assume that the aka is as valid as the original userid.
> 
> So if John Doe wants to be known as "president@whitehouse.gov" or "Tim May
> <tcmay@got.net>" all he has to do is change the field, and upload the
> changed key to the key servers, and all the signatures should remain good?

Well, no, not really.  See, the way PGP handles keys (at least the RSA
keys) makes it very difficult to remove an id once it's hit a keyserver.

Oh yeah, a signature also encompasses the key-id that you sign when you
sign the key.  So the signatures would fail if the key-id they referred to
was drastically changed...

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Ryan Anderson - <Pug Majere>     "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
randerso@ece.eng.wayne.edu                        Ohio = VYI of the USA 
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
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