New Crypto Application

Greetings fellow Cyphers...

I'm creating a new _text_ cryptography program.  The encryption algorithm,
using a symmetrical is going to be as strong as legally allowed, and after
copyrighting the program, I'm going to release the source code and explain
everything about it (since it can be reverse engineered anyways).  The
reason I'm sending this e-mail to you is my request for more knowledge, and
if you're like me, then you have an extreme thirst for knowledge!  Any
algorithm, key hashing, user interface, or other important suggestions you
might have will help me immensely, and hey, maybe you'll get a free copy of
this program when it comes out, but otherwise you will just have to wait
until someone cracks the copyprotection because I'm going to make that
extremely hard to do.  I was going to call the program AlphaNumeric
Encryption, but that says pretty much nothing...  I might just call it
something like Cipher Pad (or Cypher Pad if nobody cares that I use
"cypher") , since it's only for text encryption.  If you have a better idea
for a name for this program, then please suggest it to me.

Thanks,

Guillotine

On Sun, 27 Jul 1997, Guillotine wrote:

> I'm creating a new _text_ cryptography program.

If you are not useing a well know and strong cyper method I suggest you
post details of your meathod to sci.crypt where thay will (most likely)
pick holes in it.

Please excuse my spelling as I suffer from agraphia see the url in my header. 
Never trust a country with more peaple then sheep. Buy easter bilbies.
Save the ABC Is $0.08 per day too much to pay?   ex-net.scum and proud
I'm sorry but I just don't consider 'because its yucky' a convincing argument

? the platypus {aka David Formosa} wrote:

> On Sun, 27 Jul 1997, Guillotine wrote:
> 
> > I'm creating a new _text_ cryptography program.
> 
> If you are not useing a well know and strong cyper method I suggest you
> post details of your meathod to sci.crypt where thay will (most likely)
> pick holes in it.

	From the sci.crypt FAQ...

http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/hypertext/faq/bngusenet/sci/crypt/top.html

2.3. How do I present a new encryption scheme in sci.crypt?

  ``I just came up with this neat method of encryption. Here's some
  ciphertext: FHDSIJOYW^&%$*#@OGBUJHKFSYUIRE. Is it strong?'' Without a
  doubt questions like this are the most annoying traffic on sci.crypt.

  If you have come up with an encryption scheme, providing some
  ciphertext from it is not adequate. Nobody has ever been impressed by
  random gibberish. Any new algorithm should be secure even if the
  opponent knows the full algorithm (including how any message key is
  distributed) and only the private key is kept secret. There are some
  systematic and unsystematic ways to take reasonably long ciphertexts
  and decrypt them even without prior knowledge of the algorithm, but
  this is a time-consuming and possibly fruitless exercise which most
  sci.crypt readers won't bother with.

  So what do you do if you have a new encryption scheme? First of all,
  find out if it's really new. Look through this FAQ for references and
  related methods. Familiarize yourself with the literature and the
  introductory textbooks.

  When you can appreciate how your cryptosystem fits into the world at
  large, try to break it yourself! You shouldn't waste the time of tens
  of thousands of readers asking a question which you could have easily
  answered on your own.

  If you really think your system is secure, and you want to get some
  reassurance from experts, you might try posting full details of your
  system, including working code and a solid theoretical explanation, to
  sci.crypt. (Keep in mind that the export of cryptography is regulated
  in some areas.)

  If you're lucky an expert might take some interest in what you posted.
  You can encourage this by offering cash rewards---for instance, noted
  cryptographer Ralph Merkle is offering $1000 to anyone who can break
  Snefru-4---but there are no guarantees. If you don't have enough
  experience, then most likely any experts who look at your system will
  be able to find a flaw. If this happens, it's your responsibility to
  consider the flaw and learn from it, rather than just add one more
  layer of complication and come back for another round.

  A different way to get your cryptosystem reviewed is to have the NSA
  look at it. A full discussion of this procedure is outside the scope
  of this FAQ.

  Among professionals, a common rule of thumb is that if you want to
  design a cryptosystem, you have to have experience as a cryptanalyst.

-- 
dkp at iname dot com * Exit the System.
4B63 E55D 1C92 68E3 8700 0EBF 5CDD 5538
--

At 11:15 AM -0700 7/28/97, Dave K-P wrote:
>? the platypus {aka David Formosa} wrote:
>
>> On Sun, 27 Jul 1997, Guillotine wrote:
>>
>> > I'm creating a new _text_ cryptography program.
>>
>> If you are not useing a well know and strong cyper method I suggest you
>> post details of your meathod to sci.crypt where thay will (most likely)
>> pick holes in it.
>
>	From the sci.crypt FAQ...


What's a "FAQ"?

I think I'll just go ahead and challenge people to break my
SuperWhammomatic, CryptoPadalyzer. (I spent more time coming up with the
name than I did working on the algorithm, so I hope you all like it.)



--Tim "the Newbie"


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

On Tue, 29 Jul 1997, Tim May wrote:

> What's a "FAQ"?
> 
> I think I'll just go ahead and challenge people to break my
> SuperWhammomatic, CryptoPadalyzer. (I spent more time coming up with the
> name than I did working on the algorithm, so I hope you all like it.)
> 
> 
> 
> --Tim "the Newbie"

Aw shux Tim, ROT13's been broken since the days of Caesar, and there's
enough implementations of it already... :)

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos================
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    |Prying open my 3rd eye. So good to see you|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder@sundernet.com|once  again.   I thought you were hidinng.|/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |And you thought that I had run away.      |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |Chasing the tail of dogma. I opened my eye|.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|and there we were....                     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com ===========================

Guillotine <guill@xmission.com> writes:

> Greetings fellow Cyphers...

I guess that doesn't include me, but greetings anyway.

> I'm creating a new _text_ cryptography program.

Will a user be able to uuencode a binary file and pretend that it's text?

> The encryption algorithm,
> using a symmetrical is going to be as strong as legally allowed,

Better hurry - there are no legal restrictions in the U.S. on how hard you can
make it for internal use, but that may change soon.

> and after
> copyrighting the program,

It's copyrighted the moment you've written it. Some people spend $10
on registering their copyright with the Library of Congress. You can
even file your source code there.

> I'm going to release the source code and explain
> everything about it (since it can be reverse engineered anyways).

That's a commendable idea. However if your program will use reasonable
strng encryption, you should talk to a knowledgeable lawyer before
publishing it in a way which might be construed as "exporting" it.

> The
> reason I'm sending this e-mail to you is my request for more knowledge, and
> if you're like me, then you have an extreme thirst for knowledge!

You sound like you could use some.

[snip]
>                        I was going to call the program AlphaNumeric
> Encryption, but that says pretty much nothing...  I might just call it
> something like Cipher Pad (or Cypher Pad if nobody cares that I use
> "cypher") , since it's only for text encryption.  If you have a better idea
> for a name for this program, then please suggest it to me.

How about "One-Time Sanitary Pad"?

(Note to the list: I have been having little problems indeed (some of my
systems hacks for OS/2 no longer working under Microsquish) but they're
almost entirely fixed or rewritten now.  Microsquish sucks indeed. I'm
glad I have a backup OS/2 box.)

---

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

At 03:24 PM 7/27/97 -0600, Guillotine wrote:
>I'm creating a new _text_ cryptography program.  

What do you mean by "text cryptography"?  You'll only accept text as input,
or you'll produce your output in ASCII, or you'll produce your output
as English-like words?  None of the common encryption algorithms treats
text input any differently that raw bits, and it's worth taking whatever
input you have and compressing it to reduce the amount of data the
encryption and transmission phases need to handle.  Producing printable
ASCII as an output format isn't a cryptography issue - it's just a 
simple reversable transform from a bunch of raw bits to printable,
and there's no excuse for inventing a new format rather than using
MIME encoding, uuencode, or btoa, unless you're doing something extremely
creative with Unicode...  

Producing output as English-like words is more interesting.
It's a steganography issue, not a cryptography issue, since you should
be doing the secure part first anyway, but it can be useful for
obscuring the fact that you're using crypto in a message.
The canonical reference is to Peter Wayner's Mimic Functions,
which let you model an arbitrary context-free grammar for output,
but you should also look around for "texto".  (The other canonical
reference is to "PHB", Dilbert's program that disguises the message
in Pointy Haired Boss jargon, but I'm not aware that anyone's written it.)

A good book to read on cryptois Bruce Schneier's "Applied Cryptography",
which discusses most of the current algorithms and how they're used.
>The encryption algorithm,
>using a symmetrical is going to be as strong as legally allowed, 

There are no legal restrictions on cryptography strength in the US;
only restrictions on what's exportable, and even then you need permission. 

#			Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts@ix.netcom.com
# You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp
#   (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies.  Thanks.)

At 1:23 AM -0700 7/29/97, Craig Strickland wrote:

>This triggered a thought that may have already been discussed, but I thought
>I'd throw it out anyway.  Since the export of cryptography = munitions, what
>happens if I write an application that's the "shell", and contract with a
>national and resident of a foreign country to write the crypto module.  I do
>not export the crypto technology other than sending them a printed book
>(which Phil Karn's filing determined was exportable as a non-munition).
>
>I then retail the software as a 2-component system (distantly like PGP 2.6.3i
>could have been) on the web.  FTP the "shell" from my domestic site, and FTP
>the "crypto" from the foreign site.  Both install to make the seamless
>finished product.
>
>Anyone seen anything in ITAR addressing such a hiring arrangement?


This is called "providing crypto hooks," at least in the many threads on
this list and on Usenet where the details of this have been discussed.

It is generally interpreted--but there has not yet been a good court case
to test it, that I know of--that providing a "hook" or place to drop in
crypto is a violation of the ITARs/replacements for the ITARs.

Ditto for exporting expertise designed to circumvent the ITARs. Thus,
RSADSI cannot tell Rivest and the others to go take a 6-month in Monte
Carlo or Switzerland and develop the next generation there.

Again, this interpretation has not gotten a clear test in the courts.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <v0310280bb003e90f25d0@[207.167.93.63]>, on 07/29/97 
   at 11:43 AM, Tim May <tcmay@got.net> said:

>This is called "providing crypto hooks," at least in the many threads on
>this list and on Usenet where the details of this have been discussed.

>It is generally interpreted--but there has not yet been a good court case
>to test it, that I know of--that providing a "hook" or place to drop in
>crypto is a violation of the ITARs/replacements for the ITARs.

>Ditto for exporting expertise designed to circumvent the ITARs. Thus,
>RSADSI cannot tell Rivest and the others to go take a 6-month in Monte
>Carlo or Switzerland and develop the next generation there.

>Again, this interpretation has not gotten a clear test in the courts.

Well I export software on a daily basis that "provides crypto hooks". I
also provide advice and consultations to those overseas on crypto &
security related issues. Matter of fact I have someone right now working
on a Russian translation for my software (I wonder if they are still on
the verbotten list along with Cuba & Iran) an a Chinese translation has
already been completed.

I also have a clause in software license that allows anyone to use my
software for free if they live in a totalitarian country where crypto is
baned (like France perhaps USA soon).

The government can only take away our rights if we let them do it. I for
one will not be a party to Washington's criminal conspiracy to subvert the
Constitution of the United States of America.


- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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On Tue, 29 Jul 1997, Tim May wrote:

> This is called "providing crypto hooks," at least in the many threads on
> this list and on Usenet where the details of this have been discussed.

I wonder what will happen with future operating systems that use the
everything is an object approact - where one can simply call ANY method in
an object...  (Sort of like OpenDOC, if it didn't die...) of course some
methods will be marked as private, but supposing that someone forgot to
mark a method as private... say somewhere in the core of the OS, right
before the TCP stack. <evil grin> 

And suppose you could patch that code with code that uh, compresses, yeah,
that's the ticket, uh, compresses it with a very slow and shitty
compression algorithm that need, uh, a compression dictionary (key) to
decompress, yeah, that's the ticket. :) 

And suppose everyone wrote their apps and operating systems to be
patchable in this way....

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos================
.+.^.+.|  Ray Arachelian    |Prying open my 3rd eye. So good to see you|./|\.
..\|/..|sunder@sundernet.com|once  again.   I thought you were hidinng.|/\|/\
<--*-->| ------------------ |And you thought that I had run away.      |\/|\/
../|\..| "A toast to Odin,  |Chasing the tail of dogma. I opened my eye|.\|/.
.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|and there we were....                     |.....
======================== http://www.sundernet.com ===========================

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 08:10 07/28/97 -0700, Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>At 03:24 PM 7/27/97 -0600, Guillotine <guill@xmission.com> wrote:
>>The encryption algorithm,
>>using a symmetrical is going to be as strong as legally allowed, 
>
>There are no legal restrictions on cryptography strength in the US;
>only restrictions on what's exportable, and even then you need permission. 

This triggered a thought that may have already been discussed, but I thought 
I'd throw it out anyway.  Since the export of cryptography = munitions, what 
happens if I write an application that's the "shell", and contract with a 
national and resident of a foreign country to write the crypto module.  I do 
not export the crypto technology other than sending them a printed book 
(which Phil Karn's filing determined was exportable as a non-munition).

I then retail the software as a 2-component system (distantly like PGP 2.6.3i 
could have been) on the web.  FTP the "shell" from my domestic site, and FTP 
the "crypto" from the foreign site.  Both install to make the seamless 
finished product.

Anyone seen anything in ITAR addressing such a hiring arrangement?

I'm not planning it, just spewing hypotheticals that tickle my curiosity.
- --
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Web:       http://pobox.com/~tgi/         Amateur:   KE4QJN
PGP Key:   Available from key server: pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu
           Fingerprint: E6 E1 25 DE 7C 6F 34 CD  E7 75 ED 21 7E 45 6E D7

"Our task of creating a socialist America can only succeed when those who
would resist us have been totally disarmed."  Sara Brady, Chairman, Handgun
Control, to Sen. Howard Metzanbaum, The National Educator, January 1994,
Page 3.

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Craig Strickland wrote:
[snip]
> I then retail the software as a 2-component system (distantly like PGP 2.6.3i
> could have been) on the web.  FTP the "shell" from my domestic site, and FTP
> the "crypto" from the foreign site.  Both install to make the seamless
> finished product.
> 
> Anyone seen anything in ITAR addressing such a hiring arrangement?

My memory is a bit foggy on this one, but didn't the gov't ask 
Netscape (and others?) to stop producing programs with the hooks
for strong encryption in them, in spite of the fact that they 
did _not_ provide that strong encryption?  It was pretty weird
at the time, and hard to believe, but the discussions it 
generated then should be in the archives somewhere.

On the other hand, the political climate wrt ITAR is changing,
so you may not have to go to such lengths in the near future.

dmac@bway.net

David Macfarlane writes:

> My memory is a bit foggy on this one, but didn't the gov't ask 
> Netscape (and others?) to stop producing programs with the hooks
> for strong encryption in them, in spite of the fact that they 
> did _not_ provide that strong encryption?

The story was that NSA had asked the NCSA folks to remove the
PEM/PGP hooks in their web server source.  See, for example,
    http://consult.ncsa.uiuc.edu/docs/httpd/Upgrade.html


-- Jeff