NODE 1063e873Re: Fwd: Re: Quor's cypher
Antonomasia <ant@notatla.demon.co.uk>Tue, 30 Sep 1997 08:24:22 +0800
nobody@REPLAY.COM: (21 Sep 1997)
> This is a really nifty encryption program. It runs about half the speed
> of rc4, but seems much more secure.
>
> --- Forwarded Message:
>
> From: quor@nym.alias.net
> Subject: Re: tell me what you think of this...
>
> [snip]
>
> /* Qcypher.c */
>
> [snip]
Has anybody got anything good against this ? I can get about
1/32 of the state with a simple form of differential cryptanalysis,
but can't see how to progress it beyond that.
My attack takes a long chunk of known text and looks for repetition.
ppppppppppppppp.11.pppppppppppppppppppppp
ccccccccccccccc.22.cccccccccccccccccccccc
When a two neighbouring p-c pairs are the same you can test
whether they have the same value of a and b.
(That is a_n == a_n+1 and b_n == b+n+1, a != b usually.)
This involves 16 inputs to each byte - very cheap.
What I really want next is to know "a".
Because c is always known (it's only a counter) if you always knew
"a" you'd have a handle on "b" because only 2 (predictable) elements of
the state array change with each byte encrypted.
--
##############################################################
# Antonomasia ant@notatla.demon.co.uk #
# See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ #
##############################################################
NODE f978cef4Re: Fwd: Re: Quor's cypher
nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)Thu, 2 Oct 1997 16:13:23 +0800
Antonomasia <ant@notatla.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> My attack takes a long chunk of known text and looks for repetition.
>
> ppppppppppppppp.11.pppppppppppppppppppppp
> ccccccccccccccc.22.cccccccccccccccccccccc
>
> When a two neighbouring p-c pairs are the same you can test
> whether they have the same value of a and b.
> (That is a_n == a_n+1 and b_n == b+n+1, a != b usually.)
>
> This involves 16 inputs to each byte - very cheap.
> What I really want next is to know "a".
Wouldn't this only happen (on average) in one out of every 65536 p-c
pairs? Since the state array is changed entirely with every 128 bytes
encrypted, 1 out of 2^16 doesn't seem to help much.