NODE 7ff2d69fBXA Testimony at SAFE Hearing
John Young <jya@pipeline.com>Sun, 7 Sep 1997 08:03:33 +0800
See William Reinsch's testimony on the administration's
encryption policy at the September 4 SAFE hearing:
http://jya.com/bxa090497.htm
Perhaps dissimulating, or not then clued to the draft GAK bill,
Reinsch states:
1. Foreign crypto products are not as widely available as export
control critics claim, and thus do not threaten US products.
2. The administration is against mandatory key escrow.
3. Finds the SAFE bill unhelpful but likes its crypto-criminalization
provision and favors McCain-Kerrey's Secure Public Network
Act bill or other legislation that will:
Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose
any type or strength of encryption.
Explicitly state that participation in a key management
infrastructure is voluntary .
Set forth legal conditions for the release of recovery
information to law enforcement officials pursuant to lawful
authority and provide liability protection for key recovery
agents who have properly released such information.
Criminalize the misuse of keys and the use of encryption to
further a crime.
Offer, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business of
providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to obtain
government recognition, allowing them to market the
trustworthiness implied by government approval.
----------
Leads to the testimony of NSA's Cowell and Justice's Litt would
be appreciated.
Representative Weldon remarked at length about encryption and
defense matters on September 4, supporting the administration's
policy:
http://jya.com/weldon.txt (46K)
NODE 10d8bc0aRe: BXA Testimony at SAFE Hearing
Declan McCullagh <declan@pathfinder.com>Mon, 8 Sep 1997 03:44:22 +0800
Keep in mind that what you have is prepared testimony, written sometimes
days before the guy actually speaks, often by his assistant. Often folks
depart from it substantially; sometimes they ignore it completely.
The most interesting part of a hearing is the back-and-forth q&a period
where folks have to depart from prepared text and think on their feet. For
that you need the transcript.
-Declan
On Sat, 6 Sep 1997, John Young wrote:
> See William Reinsch's testimony on the administration's
> encryption policy at the September 4 SAFE hearing:
>
> http://jya.com/bxa090497.htm
>
> Perhaps dissimulating, or not then clued to the draft GAK bill,
> Reinsch states:
>
> 1. Foreign crypto products are not as widely available as export
> control critics claim, and thus do not threaten US products.
>
> 2. The administration is against mandatory key escrow.
>
> 3. Finds the SAFE bill unhelpful but likes its crypto-criminalization
> provision and favors McCain-Kerrey's Secure Public Network
> Act bill or other legislation that will:
>
> Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose
> any type or strength of encryption.
>
> Explicitly state that participation in a key management
> infrastructure is voluntary .
>
> Set forth legal conditions for the release of recovery
> information to law enforcement officials pursuant to lawful
> authority and provide liability protection for key recovery
> agents who have properly released such information.
>
> Criminalize the misuse of keys and the use of encryption to
> further a crime.
>
> Offer, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business of
> providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to obtain
> government recognition, allowing them to market the
> trustworthiness implied by government approval.
>
> ----------
>
> Leads to the testimony of NSA's Cowell and Justice's Litt would
> be appreciated.
>
> Representative Weldon remarked at length about encryption and
> defense matters on September 4, supporting the administration's
> policy:
>
> http://jya.com/weldon.txt (46K)
>
>
NODE 15853a88Re: BXA Testimony at SAFE Hearing
Apache <apache@bear.apana.org.au>Sun, 7 Sep 1997 16:55:17 +0800
> Perhaps dissimulating, or not then clued to the draft GAK bill,
> Reinsch states:
[/\]
> 3. Finds the SAFE bill unhelpful but likes its crypto-criminalization
> provision and favors McCain-Kerrey's Secure Public Network
> Act bill or other legislation that will:
...
> Offer, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business of
> providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to obtain
> government recognition, allowing them to market the
> trustworthiness implied by government approval.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
BWHAHAHA this is some kind of sick joke surely.
Get ur crypto here folks, it's approved by the gubermint.
NODE 5a7d5bbcRe: BXA Testimony at SAFE Hearing
"William H. Geiger III" <whgiii@amaranth.com>Sun, 7 Sep 1997 20:40:00 +0800
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
In <1.5.4.32.19970906234350.00705f64@pop.pipeline.com>, on 09/06/97
at 07:43 PM, John Young <jya@pipeline.com> said:
>See William Reinsch's testimony on the administration's
>encryption policy at the September 4 SAFE hearing:
> http://jya.com/bxa090497.htm
>Perhaps dissimulating, or not then clued to the draft GAK bill, Reinsch
>states:
>1. Foreign crypto products are not as widely available as export control
>critics claim, and thus do not threaten US products.
Lie
>2. The administration is against mandatory key escrow.
Lie
>3. Finds the SAFE bill unhelpful but likes its crypto-criminalization
>provision and favors McCain-Kerrey's Secure Public Network Act bill or
>other legislation that will:
> Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose
> any type or strength of encryption.
Lie
> Explicitly state that participation in a key management
> infrastructure is voluntary .
Lie
> Set forth legal conditions for the release of recovery
> information to law enforcement officials pursuant to lawful
> authority and provide liability protection for key recovery
> agents who have properly released such information.
Any time they want it.
> Criminalize the misuse of keys and the use of encryption to
> further a crime.
Any and all uses will be a crime.
> Offer, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business of
> providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to obtain
> government recognition, allowing them to market the
> trustworthiness implied by government approval.
They don't want it nor do they need it.
- --
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0
Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
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