NODE 6512904eRE: Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE
jay holovacs <holovacs@idt.net>Sat, 27 Sep 1997 05:31:19 +0800
==========================
>From: "Paul Spirito" <berezina@qed.net>
>Date: Thu, Sep 25, 1997 11:58 PM
>
>And next year *is* an election year. If nothing awful happens, it shouldn't be much of an issue, but sooner or later there'll be a big bang made by terrorists who've used crypto in the plotting, & then anyone who opposed the FBI line will get drubbed, perhaps fatally (i.e. they'll lose their seat).
On the other hand a publicized security disaster or "infowar" attack could spin things in the other direction.
Jay
NODE 4dcf448cengineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)
Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk>Sun, 28 Sep 1997 08:31:15 +0800
Jay Holovacs <holovacs@idt.net> writes:
> [dangers of horseman spin or reichstag fire tatics from Free & gang]
>
> On the other hand a publicized security disaster or "infowar" attack
> could spin things in the other direction.
Reckon cypherpunks can knock up a few of those.
So lets here some ideas for good photogenic infowar attacks which show
that the lack of crypto is dangerous.
Stuff internet protocols at low level (say DNS) due to lack of crypto
and too centralised design? We could do that I think. The guy from
alternic rigged DNS root to point at him, we could rig it to point to
zip.
In the clear or poorly ciphered banking protocols (say private leased
lines).
etc.
Adam
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