Re: House National Security committee guts SAFE, worse than nobill

At 2:17 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>This version of SAFE, in fact, is //much worse// for crypto freedom than
>having no bill passed at all.

True.

<...>

>It's time for advocates of crypto-freedom to turn obstructionist and
>oppose all legislation dealing with encryption.

And expect to accomplish what?

To stick our heads in the sand now would just make it easier for the FBI to
roll right over us.  We still need to fight the expected FBI key recovey
amendment when the Intelligence Committee and Commerce Committee vote this
week, and then onto the floor (perhaps next year).  Not to mention the
Senate.

This battle is FAR from over. It would be a serous mistake to give up now.

Best,

Jonah

PS: Interestingly, Reuters is reporting that the Administraon has "serious
problems" with the Dellums/Weldon Amendment:

Clinton official not backing new encryption plan

    WASHINGTON, Sept 9 (Reuter) - The Clinton administration has serious
problems with a new congressional proposal to tighten export limits on
computer encoding technology even though it prefers the approach to one
contained in earlier legislation, a top official said on Tuesday.
   Under Secretary of Commerce William Reinsch told Reuters that an
amendment approved by the House National Security Committee earlier on
Tuesday would give the secretary of defense veto power over encryption
export decisions.
   "Giving the secretary of defense a veto is inconsistent with the
president's executive order and inconsistent with the policies of four
prior administrations," Reinsch said. "The administration thinks all
relevent agencies should have a seat at the table and none should have a
veto."
   Under current policy, enacted by presidential order last year,
encryption export requests are reviewed by the Departments of State,
Defense, Energy, Commerce and Justice, along with the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
   The most powerful encryption products cannot be exported unless they
contain a feature allowing the government to decode any messages covertly.
   The amendment, authored by Rep. Curt Weldon, Republican of Pennsylvania,
 and Rep. Ron Dellums, Democrat of California, would require the president
to set "the maximum level of encryption strength that could be exported
from the United States ... without harm to the national security of the
United States."
   Products at or below the established level could be exported after a
one-time review specified by the secretary of commerce with the concurrence
 of the secretary of defense.
   The proposal virtually gutted the bill to which it was attached. The
original bill, written by Virginia Republican Rep. Bob Goodlatte, would
greatly relax export controls.
   Reinsch said the administration supported the "harm to the national
security" standard. "It gives the administration the authority it needs,"
he said. "We'd much rather have this than (the original)."
   Software companies, civil libertarians and Internet user groups all
favor relaxing the current limits and expressed strong concerns about the
Weldon amendment.
   The amendment appeared to outlaw differential treatment currently
accorded to some encryption products used by financial institutions or
subsidiaries of U.S. companies.
   Reinsch said that section of the amendment "could be more artfully
drafted."
   He also criticized the proposal for not requiring companies to export
products with features allowing for government access to coded messages, an
 approach known as key recovery.
   The current policy "links all of the parts together and uses export
controls as a device to move towards key recovery," he said. "We believe
export controls should include key recovery."
   --Aaron Pressman((202-898-8312))
Tuesday, 9 September 1997 18:02:46
RTRS [nN0972124]



  * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't.  Say 'No' to Key Escrow! *
            Adopt Your Legislator -  http://www.crypto.com/adopt

--
Jonah Seiger, Communications Director                  (v) +1.202.637.9800
Center for Democracy and Technology                 pager: +1.202.859.2151
<jseiger@cdt.org>

http://www.cdt.org                                      PGP Key via finger
http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

At 5:31 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>>    "Giving the secretary of defense a veto is inconsistent with the
>> president's executive order and inconsistent with the policies of four
>> prior administrations," Reinsch said. "The administration thinks all
>> relevent agencies should have a seat at the table and none should have a
>> veto."
>
>In other words, all the relevant agencies together should have a veto.
>Hardly a surprise. Reinsch is merely quibbling over details. (In fact, the
>amendment wouldn't even give Defense a solo veto.)

I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not
completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE,
just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee.  Border skirmishes
in the larger, ongoing war.

None the less, this is much bigger than a quibble over details, IMHO.
There are important policy implications of this language.  And politically,
it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all,
considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill
(one of Reinsch's top priorities).  Perhaps you missed this nuance.

Best,

Jonah



  * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't.  Say 'No' to Key Escrow! *
            Adopt Your Legislator -  http://www.crypto.com/adopt

--
Jonah Seiger, Communications Director                  (v) +1.202.637.9800
Center for Democracy and Technology                 pager: +1.202.859.2151
<jseiger@cdt.org>

http://www.cdt.org                                      PGP Key via finger
http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/

On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Jonah Seiger wrote:

> I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not
> completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE,
> just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee.  Border skirmishes
> in the larger, ongoing war.

The war in Congress is essentially over. There is no realistic hope of
good crypto legislation passing. I'd be interested to hear any
hypothetical that you'd suggest to the contrary. Keep in mind when
concocting it that you'd have to get past the Senate -- where pro-crypto
legislation has been dead for months -- and a presidential veto.

Can you honestly say that any legislation that would survive such a
fearsome test would be better than the situation we have now? (That is, no
domestic controls, an export control regime hanging from a shoestring, and
moderately successful court challenges.)

> None the less, this is much bigger than a quibble over details, IMHO.
> There are important policy implications of this language.  And politically,
> it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all,
> considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill
> (one of Reinsch's top priorities).  Perhaps you missed this nuance.

The "important policy implication" of this language may just be Freeh
serving as a convenient launching platform for trial balloons. Reinsch can
swat them down as he sees fit if they get hit by too severe a barrage,
then reintroduce them later after the clamor dies down. (Politically, BTW,
it is much more interesting what Gore said today than Reinsch.) Like I
said, bad cop and worse cop. Reinsch was critical of nuances -- ones that
you perhaps missed -- not the general plan to wire in Big Brother.

Keep in mind this is not just law enforcement talking. This is policy that
comes from the top. Remember Clinton's executive order last fall. Or
before that, his predecessor. Classified documents reveal George Bush in
December 1991 approved a policy to ban strong crypto and allow only
snooperware (crypto with a backdoor). Then in early 1992 the White House
OMB moved to suppress related documents critical of mandatory
wiretappability and privacy. Again, this comes from the highest levels of
the administration. Tell me again how you'll get past that veto. 

-Declan

At 11:06 PM 9/9/97 -0700, you wrote:
>
>
>On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
>[Jonah Seiger writes]:
>> > There are important policy implications of this language.  And
politically,
>> > it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all,
>> > considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill
>> > (one of Reinsch's top priorities).  Perhaps you missed this nuance.
>
>[Declan takes over]:
>> 
>> The "important policy implication" of this language may just be Freeh
>> serving as a convenient launching platform for trial balloons. Reinsch can
>> swat them down as he sees fit if they get hit by too severe a barrage,
>> then reintroduce them later after the clamor dies down. (Politically, BTW,
>> it is much more interesting what Gore said today than Reinsch.) Like I
>> said, bad cop and worse cop. Reinsch was critical of nuances -- ones that
>> you perhaps missed -- not the general plan to wire in Big Brother.
>> 
>
>Gore didn't say shit.  Sorry but there is no polite way to say this.  
>Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak" 
>which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through 
>the use of phrasing and even tone.
>
>Gore said the White House couldn't support Freeh's plan... what he meant 
>was "yet" because, in fact, thereis no formal plan to "accept."

What the (nameless) SPA keynote speaker said (on stage and off to the sides
after his presentation) was much more interesting.  The words "old dogs,
new tricks" and some private discussion I share with him convince me that
the administration is violently split.  Understand that in the Washington
world his comments betray a extremely heated debate behind the scenes.

Bottomline, the United States is probably going to get the administation
bill next year and we will have to take strong crypto there underground.
(This is because there is no compromise.  Either the government can break
it at will, or it can't).  Unfortunate, but clearly the most probable outcome.

>But the minute that the House or Senate pass such a proposal out of 
>committee is the minute WhH policy changes.  And I'll be anyone one 
>that... any takers?
>
>Gore is playing word games, practing for the run for the money in 2000.

The only glimmer of hope is the little whisperings that I heard over the
week which say the anti-crypto language put in by intelligence will be
yanked out all over again in (Judiciary?).

Don't count on the language being yanked in Judiciary.  The real "only 
hope" is actually an incredibly low tech and unsexy thing called "time."

The 105th Congress wants to split early, possibly in three weeks!  Yes, 
three weeks (hard working lot, eh?)  There is no way this bill gets 
through the Rules committee with multiple versons floating around and 
then gets brought to the floor for a vote... won't happen.

So that sets up next year....

As for teh "violent split" in the White House, sure there is, but the 
split is *very deep* as in, deep in the Org chart.  The starting players, 
save one, are all on board with the FBI plan.  The one courageous main 
player is a Clinton loyalist until he dies, but Gore can't stand him.  

Our main man has the ability to pick up the phone--at any time-- and get 
Clinton on teh other end.  He whispers intoBill's ear, but Bill is a lame 
duck and is setting up Gore for the "long run" in 2000.

Nobody wants to look soft on crime, esp. in the ramp up to 2000.

The White House will back this mandatory language, I'll bet on it 
(really, I'll bet on it, any takers?) the only "game" left here is to 
figure out how Gore will try and save face by supporting a recanting of 
his 'no mandatory crypto" stance.

--Brock

At 9:12 PM -0700 9/12/97, Brock N. Meeks wrote:

>As for teh "violent split" in the White House, sure there is, but the
>split is *very deep* as in, deep in the Org chart.  The starting players,
>save one, are all on board with the FBI plan.  The one courageous main
>player is a Clinton loyalist until he dies, but Gore can't stand him.
>
>Our main man has the ability to pick up the phone--at any time-- and get
>Clinton on teh other end.  He whispers intoBill's ear, but Bill is a lame
>duck and is setting up Gore for the "long run" in 2000.


So just who is "our main man"? Who are "the starting players"?

Why the coyness? Why tease us with vague mentions of who the main players
are, who the guy who can get Clinton on the phone is, etc.? Either they are
or not (main men, that is). Either you know who they are or you don't.

Don't keep us in suspense.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

At 09:12 PM 9/12/97 -0700, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
>Don't count on the language being yanked in Judiciary.  The real "only 
>hope" is actually an incredibly low tech and unsexy thing called "time."
>
>The 105th Congress wants to split early, possibly in three weeks!  Yes, 
>three weeks (hard working lot, eh?)  There is no way this bill gets 
>through the Rules committee with multiple versons floating around and 
>then gets brought to the floor for a vote... won't happen.

Are you sure about this? Traditionally, anti-civil liberties legislations
is passed by well over 90% of the vote only days before Congress adjourns.


--Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
  PGP encrypted mail preferred.
  DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56.
  http://rc5.distributed.net/

OR...

They are passed by voice vote of "unanimous consent" as was done with the 
'brady bill' when only 5 senators were present.

amp

------------------------
  From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
  Subject: Re: House National Security committee guts SAFE, worse than no 
bill 
  Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 21:55:42 -0700 
  To: "Brock N. Meeks" <brock@well.com>
  Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com, cryptography@c2.net


> At 09:12 PM 9/12/97 -0700, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
> >Don't count on the language being yanked in Judiciary.  The real "only 
> >hope" is actually an incredibly low tech and unsexy thing called "time."
> >
> >The 105th Congress wants to split early, possibly in three weeks!  Yes, 
> >three weeks (hard working lot, eh?)  There is no way this bill gets 
> >through the Rules committee with multiple versons floating around and 
> >then gets brought to the floor for a vote... won't happen.
> 
> Are you sure about this? Traditionally, anti-civil liberties legislations
> is passed by well over 90% of the vote only days before Congress 
adjourns.
> 
> 
> --Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com>
>   PGP encrypted mail preferred.
>   DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56.
>   http://rc5.distributed.net/
> 

---------------End of Original Message-----------------

------------------------
Name: amp
E-mail: amp@pobox.com
Date: 09/15/97
Time: 19:42:59
Visit me at http://www.pobox.com/~amp
==
     -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL
#!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj
$/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1
lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)
==

'Drug Trafficking Offense' is the root passphrase to the Constitution.

Have you seen 
http://www.public-action.com/SkyWriter/WacoMuseum
------------------------

I left out a "not" here:

At 8:42 PM -0700 9/9/97, Tim May wrote:


>The "software as free speech, which means it can be subjected to prior

"cannot be subjected to"


>restraint, government censorship, or export control" argument is proceeding
>nicely, thanks to Bernstein, Gilmore, Junger, Cohn, and others, and is a
>much more solid basis for ensuring civil liberties.

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:

[Jonah Seiger writes]:
> > There are important policy implications of this language.  And politically,
> > it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all,
> > considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill
> > (one of Reinsch's top priorities).  Perhaps you missed this nuance.

[Declan takes over]:
> 
> The "important policy implication" of this language may just be Freeh
> serving as a convenient launching platform for trial balloons. Reinsch can
> swat them down as he sees fit if they get hit by too severe a barrage,
> then reintroduce them later after the clamor dies down. (Politically, BTW,
> it is much more interesting what Gore said today than Reinsch.) Like I
> said, bad cop and worse cop. Reinsch was critical of nuances -- ones that
> you perhaps missed -- not the general plan to wire in Big Brother.
> 

Gore didn't say shit.  Sorry but there is no polite way to say this.  
Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak" 
which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through 
the use of phrasing and even tone.

Gore said the White House couldn't support Freeh's plan... what he meant 
was "yet" because, in fact, thereis no formal plan to "accept."

But the minute that the House or Senate pass such a proposal out of 
committee is the minute WhH policy changes.  And I'll be anyone one 
that... any takers?

Gore is playing word games, practing for the run for the money in 2000.

>On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
>
>> Gore didn't say shit.  Sorry but there is no polite way to say this.
>> Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak"
>> which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through
>> the use of phrasing and even tone.
>
>
>Let's look at what Gore did say:
>
>>    WASHINGTON, Sept 9 (Reuter) - With the FBI floating a proposal to
>>regulate the domestic use of computer encoding technology, Vice President
>>Al Gore asserted Tuesday the administration had not changed its policy
>that
>> allows free use within the United States.
>>   "The administration's decision has not changed on encryption, but this
>>is an area where we need to find ways to work together to balance the
>>legitimate needs of law enforcement with the needs of the marketplace,"
>>Gore told a meeting of the Software Publishers Association in Washington.
>
>I agree it's word games, but that's hardly a surprise. Especially since
>Gore's denial seems a bit too narrow. What about the administration's
>policy on free //distribution// of encryption? That's what Louis Freeh
>wants to ban, as an initial move.
>
Declan --

No offence to you as a reporter, but I wouldn't trust Reuter's paraphrasing
of what he said as far as I can throw my monitor.

They paraphrase and then call it a quote.

Does anyone have a transcript of what he actually said?
The whole speech?

It's not on the whitehouse site, nor CNN, nor the SPA site.

-- Marshall

Marshall Clow     Aladdin Systems   <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu>

"In Washington DC, officials from the White House, federal agencies and
Congress say regulations may be necessary to promote a free-market
system." --  CommunicationsWeek International April 21, 1997

On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Brock N. Meeks wrote:

> Gore didn't say shit.  Sorry but there is no polite way to say this.  
> Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak" 
> which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through 
> the use of phrasing and even tone.


Let's look at what Gore did say:

>    WASHINGTON, Sept 9 (Reuter) - With the FBI floating a proposal to
>regulate the domestic use of computer encoding technology, Vice President
>Al Gore asserted Tuesday the administration had not changed its policy 
that
> allows free use within the United States.
>   "The administration's decision has not changed on encryption, but this
>is an area where we need to find ways to work together to balance the
>legitimate needs of law enforcement with the needs of the marketplace,"
>Gore told a meeting of the Software Publishers Association in Washington.

I agree it's word games, but that's hardly a surprise. Especially since
Gore's denial seems a bit too narrow. What about the administration's
policy on free //distribution// of encryption? That's what Louis Freeh
wants to ban, as an initial move. 

-Declan

At 7:52 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Jonah Seiger wrote:
>
>> I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not
>> completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE,
>> just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee.  Border skirmishes
>> in the larger, ongoing war.
>
>The war in Congress is essentially over. There is no realistic hope of
>good crypto legislation passing. I'd be interested to hear any
>hypothetical that you'd suggest to the contrary. Keep in mind when
>concocting it that you'd have to get past the Senate -- where pro-crypto
>legislation has been dead for months -- and a presidential veto.
>
>Can you honestly say that any legislation that would survive such a
>fearsome test would be better than the situation we have now? (That is, no
>domestic controls, an export control regime hanging from a shoestring, and
>moderately successful court challenges.)

I was never enthusiastic about SAFE anyway. The criminalization language
was bad news, and the approval language added along the way effectively
gutted the bill. Face it, would it have allowed free export of arbitrarily
strong, unbreakable crypto? If anyone thinks this, they're living in a
fantasy world.

And as Declan said, the Senate and the White House were very cold on SAFE.

So why bother? Why give the NSA and FBI an opening for regulating
_domestic_ crypto use just to let Netscape and Microsoft and a few other
companies export to "furriners." (I support free exports, obviously, but
not if it means restrictions in any way on existing liberties.)

The "software as free speech, which means it can be subjected to prior
restraint, government censorship, or export control" argument is proceeding
nicely, thanks to Bernstein, Gilmore, Junger, Cohn, and others, and is a
much more solid basis for ensuring civil liberties.

Just drop all work on SAFE and Pro-CODE sorts of things and focus efforts
on monkeywrenching GAK and widely distributing bootleg crypto around the
world, as fast as possible.

--Tim May


There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering
electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He
suggested widespread civil disobedience. 

Perhaps it's time to dare the Feds to prosecute you. Any volunteers?

-Declan


On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Tim May wrote:

> Just drop all work on SAFE and Pro-CODE sorts of things and focus efforts
> on monkeywrenching GAK and widely distributing bootleg crypto around the
> world, as fast as possible.

Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> writes:
> 
> I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering
> electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He
> suggested widespread civil disobedience. 

Might I suggest using RSA in perl:

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

which is now officially non-exportable (as reported by Peter Junger;
he asked for serveral code examples and this one was one of the
non-exportable ones).  Short enough to make them look silly, short
enough that most people don't have qualms about quoting, or using as a
.sig.  And they've committed themselves in writing to Peter Junger
that you're not allowed to export it.

> Perhaps it's time to dare the Feds to prosecute you. Any volunteers?

Naturally I'm no use ... but y'all could have some fun.

Adam
-- 
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

Adam Back writes:

: 
: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> writes:
: > 
: > I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering
: > electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He
: > suggested widespread civil disobedience. 
: 
: Might I suggest using RSA in perl:
: 
: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
: )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`
: 
: which is now officially non-exportable (as reported by Peter Junger;
: he asked for serveral code examples and this one was one of the
: non-exportable ones).  Short enough to make them look silly, short
: enough that most people don't have qualms about quoting, or using as a
: .sig.  And they've committed themselves in writing to Peter Junger
: that you're not allowed to export it.

For the classification by the commerce department of the programs that
my Legal Attack Team submitted, and for the applications, see
<http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp_law/jvd/index.html>.  

It is unlikely that we will be seeking further classifications in
connection with my suit, but it might be an interesting and useful
project---not involving civil disobedience---for some of you.  It
would be interesting to see exactly which encryption programs the
bureaucrats classify as encryption programs, and which they don't.
It would also be interesting to see if they give the same
classifications in response to requests by those who are not suing
them.

I must, however, warn you that it is not an easy project.  It cannot
be done by e-mail and you have to get numbered forms from Commerce
Department on which the applications must be submitted.  In fact,
the difficulty of applying for a classification or a license is one of
the many reasons for concluding that the export restrictions on
cryptography violate the United States Constitution.  

It would certainly be helpful if it turned out that that Commerce
cannot or will not respond promptly to classification requests made by
would-be publishers of cryptographic software who are neither
commercial publishers nor suing to enjoin the enforcement of the 
regulations.
 
--
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
 EMAIL: junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu    URL:  http://samsara.law.cwru.edu   
     NOTE: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I dare!! I double dare!!

In <Pine.GSO.3.95.970909204903.1768B-100000@well.com>, on 09/09/97 
   at 08:51 PM, Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> said:

>I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering
>electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He
>suggested widespread civil disobedience. 

>Perhaps it's time to dare the Feds to prosecute you. Any volunteers?

>-Declan


>On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Tim May wrote:

>> Just drop all work on SAFE and Pro-CODE sorts of things and focus efforts
>> on monkeywrenching GAK and widely distributing bootleg crypto around the
>> world, as fast as possible.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
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Tim May writes:

: The "software as free speech, which means it can be subjected to prior
: restraint, government censorship, or export control" argument is proceeding
: nicely, thanks to Bernstein, Gilmore, Junger, Cohn, and others, and is a
: much more solid basis for ensuring civil liberties.

Uhrr . . . .  I don't think that is quite the way we phrased the
argument.

--
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
 EMAIL: junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu    URL:  http://samsara.law.cwru.edu   
     NOTE: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists

At 7:52 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Jonah Seiger wrote:
>
>> I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not
>> completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE,
>> just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee.  Border skirmishes
>> in the larger, ongoing war.
>
>The war in Congress is essentially over. There is no realistic hope of
>good crypto legislation passing. I'd be interested to hear any
>hypothetical that you'd suggest to the contrary. Keep in mind when
>concocting it that you'd have to get past the Senate -- where pro-crypto
>legislation has been dead for months -- and a presidential veto.

I agree that things look pretty bleak and that the chances for passing good
crypto legislation are not so good at the moment.  And, for the record, CDT
strenuously opposes the amended SAFE bill, S. 909, and the various
proposals coming from the FBI.  We also do not see a way to reconcile these
proposals, and are not working for a "deal" (sorry Seth).

We plan on opposing these bills by vigorously engaging in the process --
being there at every turn to tell the Congress and the Administration why
they are wrong, why key recovery won't work, and why export relief is
necessary to promote privacy and security on the Net in a way that is
constructive and moves the issue forward.

Lets step back for a moment and look at the bigger picture.

We all agree that the status quo is not good for privacy.  The Bernstein
case was important in proving our rhetorical points (and good for
Bernstein), but it didn't topple the current export policy, which we all
know is crippling the widespread availability of strong, easy-to-use crypto.

The Administration WANTS legislation to impose key recovery and wants
continued export restrictions.  It has passed the Senate Commerce
Committee, it's in the current export policy, and the FBI is likely to get
it approved by the Intelligence committee tomorrow.

If they succeed and mandatory key recovery becomes law, there will
certainly be court challenges (and CDT would join that fight), but it won't
be as clear cut as the CDA case was, and it's doubtful we would have the
strength (and the resources) of as broad a coalition of plaintiffs.  We may
be right, but that doesn't guarantee victory.

Eventually, if we want to achieve anything, we will need to change the
current policy.  We do not believe that can be accomplished by simply by
being 'obstructionists'.  We do believe that it can be accomplished by
engaging in the process, letting Congress and the Administration know that
we care about this issue, and are willing to fight for what we believe. We
are not ready to give up just because we took a hit in the National
Security Committee.

Hope that helps clarify.

Jonah




* Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't.  Say 'No' to Key Escrow! *
            Adopt Your Legislator -  http://www.crypto.com/adopt

--
Jonah Seiger, Communications Director              (v) +1.202.637.9800
Center for Democracy and Technology              pager +1.202.859.2151
<jseiger@cdt.org>
                                                    PGP Key via finger
http://www.cdt.org
http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger