NODE b55a9708Escrow system design query
Michael Wilson <0005514706@MCIMAIL.COM>Mon, 15 Sep 1997 08:05:57 +0800
Does anyone know of a solid document out there in the web that actually
describes the proposed key escrow backbone network? After wading through
considerable junk in the search engines (my, but the net is wordy on the
topic), I didn't turn up anything that looked like architecture.
MW
NODE 28e00536Re: Escrow system design query
Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>Mon, 15 Sep 1997 15:01:00 +0800
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At 08:03 PM 9/14/97 -0400, Michael Wilson wrote:
>Does anyone know of a solid document out there in the web that actually
>describes the proposed key escrow backbone network? After wading through
>considerable junk in the search engines (my, but the net is wordy on the
>topic), I didn't turn up anything that looked like architecture.
Back during Clipper, there was, if not an actual design for an escrow system,
at least a bunch of fabrication intended to add verisimilitude to an
otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative. The amount of framework it would
take to do an escrow system capable of handling every key from Verisign
and Netscape is substantially beyond anything anyone was really funded for;
much easier to do the job for a few thousand Clipperphones, and build
infrastructure as sales pick up. Building an infrastructure for a system
that has keys generated by users, by the millions, is much harder than
building one for a small centralized system.
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Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
NODE d303db16GAK will probably be economically impossible
Robert Hettinga <rah@shipwright.com>Mon, 15 Sep 1997 21:19:05 +0800
At 2:53 am -0400 on 9/15/97, Bill Stewart wrote:
> Building an infrastructure for a system
> that has keys generated by users, by the millions, is much harder than
> building one for a small centralized system.
Which is why I now believe that GAK, of any form, is doomed. It's
economically impossible.
For instance, it will be much cheaper to double encrypt to a corporate key
ala PGP than to escrow, and so the government may require access to those
keys instead. However, even then the cost of key management -- especially
for communications -- will choke any attempt to manage duplicate-encryption
keys as well. Probably for all but a few kinds of files, like those kept by
the people at the tops large hierarchical organizations. The government,
say? :-).
Those few files the government will be able to decrypt will provide a basis
for claims of their plan's efficacy, of course, just like noise-level
"examples" of welfare helping someone as "proof" of economic efficacy for
the welfare state allowed its perpetuation for so many years. But you
cannot ignore reality forever, as Britain discovered with welfare almost 15
years ago, and we're only now figuring out for ourselves in the US. Even
totalitarianism cannot ignore economic reality, as Russia and China have
shown us.
Not that capitalism equals freedom, of course, but there can be a sizeable
correlation, particularly when your average business is a small one. :-).
However, I think that in the case of GAK, this act of totalitarianism is
economically impossible. If GAK's implemented, people may get hurt before
it finally goes away, but it eventually won't be useful for much from a
national security prospective, and its maintenance costs will eventually
choke it.
Actually, it's probably not possible to make even the prototypes physically
practicable, much less economically so, even if Washington does pass a law
mandating their existence. It would be like passing the 1963 law which
formed Comsat, in, say, 1933. Particularly if the use of strong
cryptography continues it's exponential increase.
That's because the primary economic benefit for deploying the strongest
possible cryptography still remains. You can't do business over the
internet without it.
(It has been this central fact which keeps me interested in cryptography
and the cypherpunks list in particular, and my conversion over time to a
cryptoanarchic world-view has been based on this fact. Oddly enough, I find
most of the philosophic and political arguments on cypherpunks to have a
largely economic component to them at root, which makes sense, because
market reality is just as tangible as physics. Physical reality dictates
politics and philosophy, and not the other way around.)
Anyway, you can, however, do business over the net without GAK, and since,
I claim, the eventual lowest-cost transaction on the internet will be some
form of anonymous digital bearer certificate, it will never be the case
that GAK is economically necessary, even under the ruse of enforcing
non-repudiation.
In fact, even if all transactions remain book-entry ones, the exploding
total transaction volume and competition to make those transactions
efficient will make GAK economically impossible, because it provides no
tangible benefit to those who use cryptography for business. There's no
economic return on the additional cost.
The cost of anything is the foregone alternative, and the cost of GAK
causes you to forego a lot of money and potential revenue and doesn't buy
you anything in return.
Cheers,
Bob Hettinga
-----------------
Robert Hettinga (rah@shipwright.com), Philodox
e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/
NODE 83af933eThe great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible)
nospam-seesignature@ceddec.comMon, 15 Sep 1997 23:56:21 +0800
If I have to GAK my keys, and there then exists a pgp-gak, then we simply
recruit the same CPU power that generated the millions of DES keys to just
run pgpk-gak with the shortest keylength and send billions of keys to the
GAKserver each week. Many from out of the US if pgp-gak becomes available
there.
My test software uses a loop that generates a new pair every few seconds
on a pentium (and found some very obscure bugs). I would be required to
send all those to the gak.gov. If they really want them...
What it probably means is the govenrment will issue keys or have to
license people to create them.
NODE 44e86f1bRe: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible)
amp@pobox.comTue, 16 Sep 1997 11:18:11 +0800
------------------------
From: nospam-seesignature@ceddec.com
Subject: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible)
Date: Mon, 15 Sep 1997 11:41:53 -0400
To: cypherpunks <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net>
>
> If I have to GAK my keys, and there then exists a pgp-gak, then we simply
> recruit the same CPU power that generated the millions of DES keys to
> just
> run pgpk-gak with the shortest keylength and send billions of keys to the
> GAKserver each week. Many from out of the US if pgp-gak becomes
> available
> there.
> My test software uses a loop that generates a new pair every few seconds
> on a pentium (and found some very obscure bugs). I would be required to
> send all those to the gak.gov. If they really want them...
> What it probably means is the govenrment will issue keys or have to
> license people to create them.
which bugs would those be? key generation is pretty critical. i'd be
interested in any strange results you've found.
------------------------
Name: amp
E-mail: amp@pobox.com
Date: 09/15/97
Time: 22:04:56
Visit me at http://www.pobox.com/~amp
==
-export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL
#!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj
$/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1
lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)
==
'Drug Trafficking Offense' is the root passphrase to the Constitution.
Have you seen
http://www.public-action.com/SkyWriter/WacoMuseum
------------------------
NODE aefcdbd0Re: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible)
nospam-seesignature@ceddec.comWed, 17 Sep 1997 06:51:52 +0800
On Mon, 15 Sep 1997 amp@pobox.com wrote:
> From: nospam-seesignature@ceddec.com
> >
> > My test software uses a loop that generates a new pair every few seconds
> > on a pentium (and found some very obscure bugs). I would be required to
> > send all those to the gak.gov. If they really want them...
>
> which bugs would those be? key generation is pretty critical. i'd be
> interested in any strange results you've found.
None specifically in PGP 5.0 or 2.6.2 itself, but I did find the
limitation of 13 bits on compression, that the MPI encoding would not
accept integers with leading zero bytes, but would with leading zero bits
(this was one obscure bug since I had to randomly generate a value much
less than the modulus), and the fact that an ElGamal key value causes
segfaults. I was implementing a library and found where my code and real
PGP didn't get along. Some combinations aren't generated by PGP, and some
aren't accepted.
--- reply to tzeruch - at - ceddec - dot - com ---
NODE ab020419Re: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible)
Tim May <tcmay@got.net>Tue, 16 Sep 1997 08:39:50 +0800
At 8:41 AM -0700 9/15/97, nospam-seesignature@ceddec.com wrote:
>If I have to GAK my keys, and there then exists a pgp-gak, then we simply
>recruit the same CPU power that generated the millions of DES keys to just
>run pgpk-gak with the shortest keylength and send billions of keys to the
>GAKserver each week. Many from out of the US if pgp-gak becomes available
>there.
>
>My test software uses a loop that generates a new pair every few seconds
>on a pentium (and found some very obscure bugs). I would be required to
>send all those to the gak.gov. If they really want them...
>
>What it probably means is the govenrment will issue keys or have to
>license people to create them.
"There ain't no such thing as free escrow."
Some fee will be collected to register keys. "To defray costs" (never mind
that the government is the party _requiring_ the damned escrow!).
This will stop the "flooding attacks" which a free key escrow system would
generate. It will also, sadly for us, put an end to many applications where
keys are generated quickly, transiently, and on an ad hoc basis. There
simply will be no time to register the keys, and the $10 (or whatever)
processing fee will be unacceptable for these applications.
--Tim May
There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
NODE b289a964Re: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible)
Ray Arachelian <sunder@brainlink.com>Wed, 24 Sep 1997 06:01:23 +0800
On Mon, 15 Sep 1997, Tim May wrote:
> This will stop the "flooding attacks" which a free key escrow system would
> generate. It will also, sadly for us, put an end to many applications where
> keys are generated quickly, transiently, and on an ad hoc basis. There
> simply will be no time to register the keys, and the $10 (or whatever)
> processing fee will be unacceptable for these applications.
That all depends on how they are set up to accept such key requests. Fer
instance, say they set up a nice litte web site that takes in credit
cards... can we say ping flood boys and girls?
Suppose they set up a mail in system where you have to mail letters to
them. We simply go through every magazine we find and send subscribtion
requests to that address. As most mags will happily send a free issue
this will do wonders... Send them to "Joe Smith, Care Of Key Escrow..."
:)
If they set up a phone line, we call the phone line and keep it busy...
If they set up a system whereby mistakes have to be refiled, then we
simply all march down there and demand that we get our keys registered and
we always make mistakes in something or other, or we forget our ID's.
There may still be ways to spam them and keep them from implementing
anyway... If not there's always Toto and the suitcase approach I
suppose.... And heck I'm sure someone is willing to donate $1M for such an
endeavor...
Denial of service attacks are always possible somehow or other... It's a
question of what we're willing to donate to the effort.
=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos==============
.+.^.+.| Ray Arachelian |Prying open my 3rd eye. So good to see |./|\.
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.+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|my eye and there we were.... |.....
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