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Re: FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls

6 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child

NODE bb802be7Re: FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls
The on-line NYT's claim today that everyone except the 
administration is opposed to its crypto policy is daring
hyperbole. What's your take on that?

  http://jya.com/crypto-tops.htm
NODE 43019edaRe: FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls
Its a pretty aggressive claim.  There are plenty of law
enforcement types who want strong crypto, understanding that it stops
crime.  But when you say "top law enforcement advisors," sure.

	I don't know anyone outside of LE who wants a government
policy on this stuff anymore.

Adam 


John Young wrote:
| The on-line NYT's claim today that everyone except the 
| administration is opposed to its crypto policy is daring
| hyperbole. What's your take on that?
| 
|   http://jya.com/crypto-tops.htm
| 


-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume
NODE 0c69f1ccRe: FBI calls for mandatory key escrow; Denning on export ctrls
The article says:

   September 4, 1997
   Encryption Tops Wide-Ranging Net Agenda in Congress
   By JERI CLAUSING

   WASHINGTON -- As Congress returns from its summer break this week, it
   faces a host of legislative initiatives that could shape the future of
   online privacy, commerce and jurisdiction.

   Topping the agenda is encryption, an issue that has pitted President
   Clinton and his top crime fighters against virtually everybody else.

I think that's basically right. Who else (besides perhaps local and state
"crime fighters," the spooks, and some key escrow-happy businesses) 
supports this policy?

-Declan


On Thu, 4 Sep 1997, John Young wrote:

> The on-line NYT's claim today that everyone except the 
> administration is opposed to its crypto policy is daring
> hyperbole. What's your take on that?
> 
>   http://jya.com/crypto-tops.htm
> 
>
NODE e45a53e2Freeh is Marked for Deletion
At 6:43 AM -0700 9/4/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>The article says:
>
>   September 4, 1997
>   Encryption Tops Wide-Ranging Net Agenda in Congress
>   By JERI CLAUSING
>
>   WASHINGTON -- As Congress returns from its summer break this week, it
>   faces a host of legislative initiatives that could shape the future of
>   online privacy, commerce and jurisdiction.
>
>   Topping the agenda is encryption, an issue that has pitted President
>   Clinton and his top crime fighters against virtually everybody else.
>
>I think that's basically right. Who else (besides perhaps local and state
>"crime fighters," the spooks, and some key escrow-happy businesses)
>supports this policy?

Who supports this policy? All those who count in this democratic world:
NSA, FBI, NIST, DEA, FinCEN. BND, Mossad, GCHQ, DGSE, Annam, DIA, Chobetsu,
.....


We're in a state of war with these war criminals.

Freeh must be removed by any means necessary. His calling for mandatory (or
involuntary) key escrow marks him as unworthy of continued tenure. He is
marked for deletion.

--Tim May

There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws.
Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!"
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^1398269     | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
NODE 685b21c5Re: Freeh is Marked for Deletion
Timothy C. May writes:

> Freeh must be removed by any means necessary. His calling for mandatory (or
> involuntary) key escrow marks him as unworthy of continued tenure. He is
> marked for deletion.

Dan Quayle was Bush's life insurance.  Who is Freeh's?

----- And now, cryptography fans, I am appending a message I posted at
least 8 times to the list yesterday, with nothing appearing except one
message with no body attached.  In case someone out there has actually
been getting all of them, I apologize in advance.

Subject: Cypherpunk Action Items

Timothy C. May writes:

 > OK, you asked. This isn't a comprehensive list.

 > 1. Fully secure machine to machine connections for the Net,
 > as in Gilmore's "SWAN" project. This makes the Net
 > unsnoopable by the NSA and other TLAs, and makes encryption
 > an automatic (at this level...individual users will of
 > course still encrypt on top of this, as relying on others
 > is never enough).

Sounds reasonable.  I presume we are talking about end-to-end
encryption being the default for connections, and not link
encryption over various hops of the Net here.

 > 2. A usable form of Chaum's cash, a la Goldberg's or
 > Schear's or Back's or whomever's implementation. An
 > evolution of Magic Money, Hashcash, etc., using full
 > strength algorithms. Backing can be decentralized. Less
 > emphasis on deals with banks, more emphasis on guerilla
 > deployment, a la PGP.

Nice, but who is going to be the first to back modular exponents
with actual money?  I recall this being a big stumbling block
back when Chaumiam Cash discussions appeared previously on the
list.  Something like NetCash (The agents.com flavor, not the
Netcash/Netcheque paper), although not very anonymous, is
infinitely more suited to micropayments and integration into
various transport protocols.

 > 3. Distributed, decentralized data bases, a la Eternity,
 > Blacknet, etc. My number one candidate: a commercial credit
 > rating data base not bound by the U.S.' "Fair Credit
 > Reporting Act." Let lenders and landlords find out the dirt
 > on those who welshed on loans or who skipped out on leases,
 > regardless of what the FCRA says. (This could technically be
 > located today in any non-U.S. country, practically, but
 > access by U.S. persons and corporations would have to be
 > done circumspectly. A good use for blinded cash, of the
 > _fully_ untraceable sort, e.g. payer- and payee-anonymous
 > sort.)

I'm still a fan of my "Network Cache Server" approach to
anonymous message pools and distributed data bases, even if only
to reduce spam and provide a completely reliable Usenet.

This then embeds into the Net three levels of communication, with
varying degrees of latency and reliability.

       UDP:  Alice says, "Here's some octets for Bob.  I hope
             they don't get lost in transit."

       TCP:  Alice and Bob are within sight of each other and
             toss octets back and forth, each replacing any the
             other fails to catch.

       NCS:  Alice says to her local cache service, "Here are
             some octets which expire in 10 minutes and a
             micropayment."  Alice gets a 256 bit receipt,
             which may be presented to any other cache server
             to retrieve Alice's octets in the next 10 minutes.

 > 4. Wider use of persisistent pseudonyms. Most of the
 > "anonymous" posts we see are signed in cleartext with names
 > like "TruthMonger," "BombMonger," etc., with little use of
 > PGP sigs to ensure persistence. Spoofing is trivial.
 > Checking sigs is up to the *end reader*, for example, to
 > see that "Pr0duct Cipher" really is the same nym that's in
 > the past posted as Pr0duct Cipher, but it might be useful
 > for us to start really making more use of this sig checking,
 > and even to maintain our own data base of nyms and their
 > public keys, as a kind of demonstration testbed.

This is really a user action item, not a Cyperpunks action item.
The techology to do this already exists.  Like most people, I
will start signing all my posts if I am spoofed in a believable
way, and enjoy the plausable deniability that comes with not
signing them if I am not.

 > What I meant be "the wrong stuff" is the recent focus on
 > breaking simple ciphers that were known to be breakable 20
 > years ago...just a matter of applying the computons in the
 > right way.

Correct.  This continuous brute-forcing of wider and wider keys
has ceased to entertain.  Unless someone comes up with a way to
make less computing power do more keys, I'm really not interested
in hearing about it.

Of course, the first such efforts served to show how distributed
efforts could be mounted on the Net, how much computing power you
could snarf for free, and other interesting things.  However, now
that these things are known, repeating the experiment every week
is not necessary.

--
     Mike Duvos         $    PGP 2.6 Public Key available     $
     enoch@zipcon.com   $    via Finger                       $
         {Free Cypherpunk Political Prisoner Jim Bell}
NODE d3e68ee4Re: Freeh is Marked for Deletion
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

on or about 970904:0808 
    Tim May <tcmay@got.net> expostulated:
[snip on Declan...]

+We're in a state of war with these war criminals.

+Freeh must be removed by any means necessary. His calling for mandatory
+(or involuntary) key escrow marks him as unworthy of continued tenure.
+He is marked for deletion.

    Is not the word EXPUNGE what you mean?  
    suits my feelings, just fine.


 "When I die, please cast my ashes upon Bill Gates. 
     For once, let him clean up after me! " 
        --Christian Worley

 ______________________________________________________________________
 "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 

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