Re: CMR versus GAK?

Lutz wrote:

>May be in your (poor) country. There is a world outside US.

Good point, and note that there are many other worlds within the US
besides the LOOD stud-employer-has-manifest-destiny-control 
version.

But it is good marketing to sell fearful business owners gadgets
and to perpetuate their sense of knowing what's going on behind
their backs, as with frightened pols, spies, cops, parents and 
straights, leaky prophylactics supplemented with arms to bear 
when the hints of betrayal and inadequacy become unbearable. 

Not that the gadgets and arms work when you can't ID or crosshair 
the elusive backalley cats aprowl.

Same goes for workers and youngsters who think the bosses and
oldsters are duncemunge: WSJ, Dilbert and Phrack are funnies to 
avoid the admitting the deeper complicity of secret crossovers by
your favorite peer group into the opposing camps, political, economic, 
legal, scientific, not to say no longer secure national and sexual borders.

LOOD = Long Out Of Date

On Mon, Oct 27, 1997 at 07:45:38AM -0500, John Young wrote:
> Lutz wrote:
> 
> >May be in your (poor) country. There is a world outside US.
> 
> Good point, and note that there are many other worlds within the US
> besides the LOOD stud-employer-has-manifest-destiny-control 
> version.
> 
> But it is good marketing to sell fearful business owners gadgets
> and to perpetuate their sense of knowing what's going on behind
> their backs, as with frightened pols, spies, cops, parents and 
> straights, leaky prophylactics supplemented with arms to bear 
> when the hints of betrayal and inadequacy become unbearable. 

Implicit you make the notion there is no merit.  But experience is a 
harsh mistress -- employees do steal.  This is not fiction, but fact.

> Not that the gadgets and arms work when you can't ID or crosshair 
> the elusive backalley cats aprowl.
> 
> Same goes for workers and youngsters who think the bosses and
> oldsters are duncemunge: WSJ, Dilbert and Phrack are funnies to 
> avoid the admitting the deeper complicity of secret crossovers by
> your favorite peer group into the opposing camps, political, economic, 
> legal, scientific, not to say no longer secure national and sexual borders.

People change.  Usually, they learn.  Sometimes they burn.

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html

At 07:03 AM 10/27/1997 -0800, Kent Crispin wrote:
>Implicit you make the notion there is no merit.  But experience is a 
>harsh mistress -- employees do steal.  This is not fiction, but fact.

Sure.  The securities industry is especially concerned about the problem,
since there are many combinations of people who can rip of the others;
there's enough money floating around fast enough that anybody even
marginally dishonest can make lots of money quickly,
just as they can make money by arbitraging other market inefficiencies.

- broker and customer conspire to rip off the house
- broker and house conspire to rip off customer
- broker and insider conspire to rip off insider's company
- broker and insiders conspire to rip off outsiders
- broker leaves for another house, taking customers
- broker, customer, and house conspire to avoid taxes
- broker and customer conspire to otherwise hide money
- broker and customer conspire to transfer money to another customer
- broker and house conspire to deceive auditors

Some of these get controlled by the house to preserve its money;
some get controlled by regulators trying to "help" consumers,
some get controlled by the house because too many disgruntled customers
cuts into your reputation capital.  (Insider trading is especially like this.)
For the most part, this gets handled by extensive recordkeeping and auditing,
and the value of CAK/CMR is diluted here because it's mostly providing
access to information that was already being provided anyway.
You're better off using the PGP SMTP filters to _require_ encryption....
				Thanks! 
					Bill
Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF  3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

On Tue, Oct 28, 1997 at 10:50:14PM -0800, Bill Stewart wrote:
> At 07:03 AM 10/27/1997 -0800, Kent Crispin wrote:
> >Implicit you make the notion there is no merit.  But experience is a 
> >harsh mistress -- employees do steal.  This is not fiction, but fact.
> 
> Sure.  The securities industry is especially concerned about the problem,
> since there are many combinations of people who can rip of the others;
> there's enough money floating around fast enough that anybody even
> marginally dishonest can make lots of money quickly,
> just as they can make money by arbitraging other market inefficiencies.
> 
> - broker and customer conspire to rip off the house
> - broker and house conspire to rip off customer
> - broker and insider conspire to rip off insider's company
> - broker and insiders conspire to rip off outsiders
> - broker leaves for another house, taking customers
> - broker, customer, and house conspire to avoid taxes
> - broker and customer conspire to otherwise hide money
> - broker and customer conspire to transfer money to another customer
> - broker and house conspire to deceive auditors
>
> Some of these get controlled by the house to preserve its money;
> some get controlled by regulators trying to "help" consumers,
> some get controlled by the house because too many disgruntled customers
> cuts into your reputation capital.  (Insider trading is especially like this.)
> For the most part, this gets handled by extensive recordkeeping and auditing,
> and the value of CAK/CMR is diluted here because it's mostly providing
> access to information that was already being provided anyway.
> You're better off using the PGP SMTP filters to _require_ encryption....

Requiring encryption is a win, of course.  However, requiring 
encryption increases the value of CMR, because you have more 
opportunity for important records to be lost.  Especially as legally 
binding digital signatures become common -- you could have an actual 
contract, worth large sums of money, lost forever because someone 
forgot their passphrase.

My wife works for an "investment banking boutique" and my freedom to
invest is pretty tightly constrained.  I have first-hand experience
with the controls involving insider trading, and I have a fair
familiarity with the business practices there.  IMO you have it
exactly backward: the CMR model fits extremely well with the type of
controls I am familiar with.  Indeed it is true that there is
extensive record-keeping and auditing -- highly secure record-keeping;
secured conference rooms, careful procedures controlling who has what
information, etc.  CMR would fit right in as a valued addition, not a 
useless redundancy. 

-- 
Kent Crispin				"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html