New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"

An article in today's (Fri, Oct 3) New York Times (CyberTimes)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/100397pgp.html>
describes the new release of "PGP for Business Security 5.5," which
contains mechanisms that incorporate key recovery mechanism that can either
be volontary or be enforced by using PGP's software for controlling a
company's SMTP server -- the server can verify that all encrypted messages
include the corporate public key (or conform to other corporate policies):

"The new version also includes some of the most sophisticated techniques
for enforcing this policy through the corporation. The most novel may be a
new version of software controlling a company's SMTP server, the machine
that acts as the central mailroom for a corporation. PGP provides a
software agent that will read all of the mail to make sure that it complies
with the corporate policy. This may include requiring all messages to be
signed with digital signatures or include a backdoor that the management
can use to read the message. If the software agent discovers a message
violates the policy, it can either return it to sender or simply log a copy.

"PGP implements the backdoor with a central key. Each message is  encrypted
with both the public key of the recipient and the public key of the
management. The message can only be read by someone holding the
corresponding private keys, in this case the recipient and the management.
The software allows the management to use different master keys for
different departments by customizing the software.

... "Bruce Schneier, an encryption expert and author of the popular book
Applied Cryptography, said that the new announcement "sounds like
everything the FBI ever dreamed of." He also predicts that criminals will
find ways to circumvent the restrictions while honest people may be more
vulnerable to illicit use of the master key."
---
Coincidently, the same issue of the New York Times has an editorial
<http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/editorial/03fri4.html> attacking
FBI director Louis Freeh's request that Congress "outlaw the
manufacture and distribution of encryption programs the Government cannot
instantly crack.

Martin Minow minow@apple.com

Though I hate the conmcept of key escrow, it actually makes sense for 
corporations to be able to have access to internal documents. Why they 
think having key escrow in place will stop people from being able to use 
other encryption as well is beyond me. I guess it's the same (stupid) 
mentality of the feds. They don't think anyone would be smart enough to use 
the escrowed encryption a a wrapper for the non-escrowed encryption.

amp

------------------------
  From: Martin Minow <minow@apple.com>
  Subject: New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of" 
  Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 07:30:33 -0700 
  To: risks@csl.sri.com
  Cc: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net


An article in today's (Fri, Oct 3) New York Times (CyberTimes)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/100397pgp.html>
describes the new release of "PGP for Business Security 5.5," which
contains mechanisms that incorporate key recovery mechanism that can either
be volontary or be enforced by using PGP's software for controlling a
company's SMTP server -- the server can verify that all encrypted messages
include the corporate public key (or conform to other corporate policies):

=snip=

---------------End of Original Message-----------------

------------------------
Name: amp
E-mail: amp@pobox.com
Date: 10/04/97
Time: 00:52:55
Visit me at http://www.pobox.com/~amp
==
     -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL
#!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj
$/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1
lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)
==

'Drug Trafficking Offense' is the root passphrase to the Constitution.

Have you seen 
http://www.public-action.com/SkyWriter/WacoMuseum
------------------------

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

At 12:52 AM 10/4/97 -0500, amp@pobox.com wrote:
>
>Though I hate the conmcept of key escrow, it actually makes sense for 
>corporations to be able to have access to internal documents. Why they 
>think having key escrow in place will stop people from being able to use 
>other encryption as well is beyond me. I guess it's the same (stupid) 
>mentality of the feds. They don't think anyone would be smart enough to use 
>the escrowed encryption a a wrapper for the non-escrowed encryption.

The idea behind escrow in a company is to let each employee have their own 
key (and secret key/pass-phrase) so that they can digitally sign e-mails, and 
send encrypted e-mail, but with the escrow to let other people access this 
mail.  This is not any more surveilance than already exists in a corporate 
environment, and I believe it's main purpose is *not* inside the corporation, 
but for secure communications with people in other companies, typically 
partners, suppliers, clients, etc.

I can't see a problem with it in this situation.

Oh, and one of the bills in Congress seemed to prohibit the US Government 
from using escrow in this way in government agencies.  I can't see a 
justification for this.  [Other than normal FOI reasons.]  Think military 
communicating with weapons contractors if you need an excuse for this kind of 
encryption in the first place.
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Anderson - <Pug Majere>     "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
randerso@ece.eng.wayne.edu         
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

http://simson.vineyard.net/clips/96.SJMN.PGPBusinessEdition.html

[...]
                             PRETTY LOOSE PRIVACY
[...]
   Published: April 2, 1996
   BY SIMSON L. GARFINKEL
[...]
   Viacrypt, an Arizona company that sells the popular program Pretty
   Good Privacy, or PGP, last month announced a new version tailored for
   businesses. The new program allows companies to ''decrypt'' -- and
   then read -- information sent to or received by employees without
   their knowledge or consent.
[...]
   An employee's right to privacy is nebulous at best. The Electronic
   Communications Privacy Act of 1986 specifically allows companies to
   monitor the electronic mail of their own employees.
   
   That has not stopped Zimmermann from complaining loudly about the PGP
   name being used in a product that allows someone other than the author
   or the intended recipient access to information. Viacrypt owns the
   licensing rights to sell the commercial versions of PGP.
   
   ''PGP does not stand for back doors,'' said Zimmermann. ''I don't mind
   if they sell a program that has a back door in it, but they shouldn't
   call it PGP.''
[...]
   ''If your employer can read your mail anytime he wants, without your
   permission, that goes against the spirit of the PGP trademark,'' said
   Zimmermann.

Quote of the Year: ''PGP does not stand for back doors,'' said Zimmermann.
''I don't mind if they sell a program that has a back door in it, but they
shouldn't call it PGP. If your employer can read your mail anytime he
wants, without your permission, that goes against the spirit of the PGP
trademark."

At 4:25 AM -0700 10/5/97, Anonymous wrote:
>http://simson.vineyard.net/clips/96.SJMN.PGPBusinessEdition.html
...
>                             PRETTY LOOSE PRIVACY
>[...]
>   Published: April 2, 1996
>   BY SIMSON L. GARFINKEL
...
>   That has not stopped Zimmermann from complaining loudly about the PGP
>   name being used in a product that allows someone other than the author
>   or the intended recipient access to information. Viacrypt owns the
>   licensing rights to sell the commercial versions of PGP.
>
>   ''PGP does not stand for back doors,'' said Zimmermann. ''I don't mind
>   if they sell a program that has a back door in it, but they shouldn't
>   call it PGP.''
>[...]
>   ''If your employer can read your mail anytime he wants, without your
>   permission, that goes against the spirit of the PGP trademark,'' said
>   Zimmermann.

Pretty Good Point, I'd say. And we ought to keep quoting these comments.

I agree that an employer has a "right" to read employee mail, sent on
company time with company resources.

However, a program which facillitates this has no business being called
"Pretty Good Privacy." As Phil notes, it goes against the whole spirit of
PGP. It's surveillance, pure and simple.

Further, while businesses have every right to monitor their workers (Hey,
I'm not saying I _like_ this, just that the alternative of banning such
monitoring would be abusive to a property owner's rights), we should not be
_encouraging_ the spread of such technologies. Especially given the very
real risk that wide deployment of "Business PGP" could present.

Wide deployment of "Business PGP" would also make eventual GAK much easier
to implement. One plausible scenario is that companies would have to make
available the escrowed copies of e-mail upon request by law enforcement.
(Such records are of course already subject to subpoena, not to mention
inspection by various and sundry other government agencies.)

A further scenario is that "Business PGP" is _mandated_ within businesses
or corporations by the ever-increasing regulatory web imposed by
government. The SEC will want to ensure that insider trading is not being
discussed, the FTC will want to snoop on possible anti-competitive
communications, the DEA will want to investigate use of corporate shipping
systems for drug distribution, and, of course, the various intelligence
agencies will want access.

"Business PGP" will be just another requirement, like certain accounting
practices, like OSHA requirements, etc. Random inspections will force
compliance, with fines for violations.

Under this scenario, the so-called "rights" of individuals will not even
arise, as the government rules will affect businesses, which are not held
to have rights in the same way individuals are. (I happen to disagree, and
think the owners of XYZ Corporation have the same rights to do with their
property as J. Random Citizen has, but the courts have ruled otherwise.)

The wide adoption of "Business PGP" could also mean short shrift to non-KR
versions, including a lag in availability, or even eventual dropping of
development efforts. (I'm sure PGP, Inc. will assure us otherwise, but this
could still be an eventual development, if, for example, "Business PGP"
accounts for 80% of their sales.)

I agree with Phil Zimmermann's point:  ''PGP does not stand for back
doors,'' said Zimmermann. ''I don't mind if they sell a program that has a
back door in it, but they shouldn't call it PGP. If your employer can read
your mail anytime he wants, without your permission, that goes against the
spirit of the PGP trademark."

Let's hope PGP, Inc. comes to their senses and stops doing the work of Big
Brother.

--Tim May

The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221   | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <v03102800b05d58dd0280@[207.167.93.63]>, on 10/05/97 
   at 08, Tim May <tcmay@got.net> said:

>Let's hope PGP, Inc. comes to their senses and stops doing the work of
>Big Brother.

This is really silly Tim,

The ability to encrypt using multiple keys has been a feature of PGP since
day one. All the Business Edition is doing is automating the process.
Despite the flawed news reports on this matter (who would have guessed)
their is nothing covert about it. The user is both informed that this is
being done and there is a way for the user to disable it in the client.

This has been discussed before on this list and others, and few have
disagreed, that a company has a legitimate need to be able to access its
encrypted data. If employees want to send love letters or whatnot then
they should not be doing it on company time using company resources.

If a corporation wishes to establish a company policy that all
correspondence be encrypted with the companies master key it is their
right to do so and IMNSHO it would be foolhardy for them to do otherwise. 

Claiming that they are doing the work of Big Brother is a cheap-shot and
uncalled for.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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At 12:06 PM 10/5/97 -0700, Tim May wrote:

>>Claiming that they are doing the work of Big Brother is a cheap-shot and
>>uncalled for.
>
>(Ironic coming from a frequent issuer of cheap shots.)
>
>
>It is the work of Big Brother, as Garfinkel, Zimmermann, and I agree, when
>it becomes a default that additional recipients are automatically copied on
>encrypted mail. It may be useful to companies, but it's still dangerous.

Look a bit closer at the announcments:  I believe they said that they would 
compile a new version for each key that they used.  So it's not even likely 
that this could become a widespread feature.

For this to be useful for GAK, you'd have to change all copies in existence 
to encrypt for this key.  (And of course, then you'd have a very simple key-
id to search for in the executable and modify, say to encrypt back to 
yourself, and you'd have circumvented this little problem)

If you want PGP to get into widespread use in business, you have to provide 
features that they will require.  Frankly, this is good for encryption, to 
provide features that business needs.  With this, hopefully the business 
lobby will fall in line with the no-regulation-on-crypto lobby, and get all 
of us the results we want.

Phil is never going to release a copy of PGP that has built-in GAK.  We know 
that.  This is MAK (Management Access...) in a secure manner, which is better 
than the other methods of internal escrow.
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Anderson - <Pug Majere>     "Who knows, even the horse might sing" 
Wayne State University - CULMA   "May you live in interesting times.."
randerso@ece.eng.wayne.edu         
PGP Fingerprint - 7E 8E C6 54 96 AC D9 57  E4 F8 AE 9C 10 7E 78 C9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

At 9:46 AM -0700 10/5/97, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>In <v03102800b05d58dd0280@[207.167.93.63]>, on 10/05/97
>   at 08, Tim May <tcmay@got.net> said:
>
>>Let's hope PGP, Inc. comes to their senses and stops doing the work of
>>Big Brother.
>
>This is really silly Tim,
>
>The ability to encrypt using multiple keys has been a feature of PGP since
>day one. All the Business Edition is doing is automating the process.
>Despite the flawed news reports on this matter (who would have guessed)
>their is nothing covert about it. The user is both informed that this is
>being done and there is a way for the user to disable it in the client.

I never claimed it is "covert." (Nor is "Key Recovery" covert, if the
various laws are implemented. Does this make mandatory Key Recovery
acceptable?)

Nor, so far as I have read, can employees disable the "Policy" features.


>
>This has been discussed before on this list and others, and few have
>disagreed, that a company has a legitimate need to be able to access its
>encrypted data. If employees want to send love letters or whatnot then
>they should not be doing it on company time using company resources.

I repeated this point _twice_.

That employers want to read mail is not surprising, or illegal. But PGP
loses its claims to protect personal privacy if it builds in these
capabilities. This is what Phil said, too.

>Claiming that they are doing the work of Big Brother is a cheap-shot and
>uncalled for.

(Ironic coming from a frequent issuer of cheap shots.)


It is the work of Big Brother, as Garfinkel, Zimmermann, and I agree, when
it becomes a default that additional recipients are automatically copied on
encrypted mail. It may be useful to companies, but it's still dangerous.

--Tim May

The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221   | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

At 11:46 AM 10/5/97 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>In <v03102800b05d58dd0280@[207.167.93.63]>, on 10/05/97 
>   at 08, Tim May <tcmay@got.net> said:
>
>>Let's hope PGP, Inc. comes to their senses and stops doing the work of
>>Big Brother.
>
>This is really silly Tim,
>
>The ability to encrypt using multiple keys has been a feature of PGP since
>day one. All the Business Edition is doing is automating the process.
>Despite the flawed news reports on this matter (who would have guessed)
>their is nothing covert about it. The user is both informed that this is
>being done and there is a way for the user to disable it in the client.

I guess the real question is whether the messages/files generated just add
an extra key or if they leak the key through some harder to identify method.

The current version of PGP no longer shows you the list of recipients, so
it is more difficult to determine if extra keys are added.

Is the method they are using for this new version to "escrow" the keys
obvious to the recipient or not?

---
|              "That'll make it hot for them!" - Guy Grand               |
|"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer:         |
| mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!"  | Ignore the man      |
|`finger -l alano@teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key  | behind the keyboard.|
|         http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/       |alan@ctrl-alt-del.com|

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <3.0.3.32.19971005124929.03dfa15c@ctrl-alt-del.com>, on 10/05/97 
   at 12, Alan <alan@ctrl-alt-del.com> said:

>At 11:46 AM 10/5/97 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
>>
>>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>
>>In <v03102800b05d58dd0280@[207.167.93.63]>, on 10/05/97 
>>   at 08, Tim May <tcmay@got.net> said:
>>
>>>Let's hope PGP, Inc. comes to their senses and stops doing the work of
>>>Big Brother.
>>
>>This is really silly Tim,
>>
>>The ability to encrypt using multiple keys has been a feature of PGP since
>>day one. All the Business Edition is doing is automating the process.
>>Despite the flawed news reports on this matter (who would have guessed)
>>their is nothing covert about it. The user is both informed that this is
>>being done and there is a way for the user to disable it in the client.

>I guess the real question is whether the messages/files generated just
>add an extra key or if they leak the key through some harder to identify
>method.

>The current version of PGP no longer shows you the list of recipients, so
>it is more difficult to determine if extra keys are added.

>Is the method they are using for this new version to "escrow" the keys
>obvious to the recipient or not?

I *highly* doubt that they are doing anything other than adding an extra
recipiant when encrypting. The code for doing so is already there and
achives the objectives desired by their customers. Really no reason to do
anything else from a programming or business prospective.

I have not had a chance to obtain a copy of 5.5 and check it out so I
don't know what info is being presented to the user. I don't run Win95/NT
or MAC so it is unlikly that I will spend the $$$ for a copy. Perhaps
someone running one of these inferior OS's could obtain a copy and
investegate this aspect futher. :)

Looking at the encrypted messages should revial wether or not extra keys
are being added or not.


- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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    attila in --with both feet.

    starting with the premise that a corporation has a fundamental 
    legal right to review all work and communications of any employee,
    and "acknowledging" that the employer is virtually required to
    maintain access to documentation to service the regulations of the
    government, the courts, and the LEAs, the issue is simply HOW?

    1.  I personally include my own public key in every encrypted
        message --if I consider the contents important enough to 
        warrant encrypting, not just signing, I consider it important
        enough not to maintain a plaintext copy.

    2.  If I consider the contents more than just important -eg:
        critical, I use one of my unpublished public keys for the
        file copy. this version, including the encryption software
        and key library, are kept on a separate ZIP disk from the
        standard version ZIP disk.

        as a matter of reference, all temporary space is maintained on 
        the ZIP drive.  

    the major insecurity is the swap space which is maintained on a 
    separate partition which is fully purged at boot time --which is not
    often enough.  I have written secure swappers, or maybe I should say
    secure except for the transitory time the information may have been
    swapped out.  this can be made further secure by preventing swap for
    the encryption engine if the system permits it, or even better, use
    semiconductor memory which leaves no magnetic media residuals to be
    analyzed 500 levels down by the Feds.

    From a mechanical standpoint there is no difference when you
    apply the same methods to the corporate environment. Again, the
    issue is HOW it is implemented.

    1.  if a corporate entity uses a single private-public keypair
        for each and every employee, that is their own stupidity as
        this is insecure, both internal and external. Too many hands on
        the private key.

    2.  ideally, each employee should be given a separate corporate
        public key. at the very least the key can represent a department     
        or work group.

    3.  using the scenario in 2, specific projects can use a second
        corporate key which permits group leader management control.

    Therefore:

    Is this GAK?                    unfortunately, yes. 

    By tolerating the use of        unfortunately, yes.
    corporate GAK are we setting 
    ourselves up to accept 
    personal GAK?  

    why?                            individuals will be desensitized 
                                    to defending the absolute
                                    importance of maintaining our                     
                                    Constitutional rights, what few
                                    the Supreme Court has not yet                                
                                    denigrated.

    can we avoid this result?       YES! 

    GAK for businesses is a slam dunk, eg: if business has it, LEA,     
    etc. can get it. desensitization can be minimized by pressuring
    professional associations to keep the issue of _personal_ privacy
    on the hot burner; this is the only issue. 

    our mission must be to keep the fire out front so Americans will 
    not stand for the total loss of privacy, etc. that F[reeh,uck] is
    hawking to our government; F[reeh,uck] sings the siren song of
    anti-terrorism, anti-anarchy, and all that good stuff government
    wants to suppress in violation of the Constitution.

    if the general public is fully aware of the implication, there 
    is a chance to lead the rabble with the the chant:

        hell no, we wont dump our crypto!

    Now that the NYTimes has seen the light and is joining the battle
    against the forces of encryption denial, the mainstream press may 
    make some effort in the cause, but we must keep the pressure on
    high.

    CDT, EPIC, and the rest of them are funded by business, big
    business, all of whom have a vested interest in selling product. 
    they are the employers of the inside-the-beltway whores ...pardon 
    me: lobbycritters; and they will compromise our individual rights in 
    the corporate interests of the almighty dollar; in fact, corporate 
    managers and beancounters will violate the privacy of their
    employees faster than the US spooks, both on and off the job --they 
    have little if any concept of personal Constitutional privacy rights
    
        corporate officers are clueless on personal privacy.

    we face a two edged sword. 

    if we encourage the expanded use of encryption in business, it will
    spread much more readily to the private sector --knowing full well
    the corporate users will be subjected to GAK.  

    If business units are smart, they will implement the multi-target
    encryption and fight like hell against what F[reeh,uck] really
    wants: on-the-fly, real-time trapdoor cleartext --just like clipper. 
    If F[reeh,uck] gets what he wants, why should he ask a court for
    approval to decrypt when he can already glean the information in
    the same way POTS taps are real time.

    if we rant and rave against the multi-public key encryption system, 
    we risk facing the far more Draconian demands of F[reeh,uck].  The
    multi-public key system has been in use since the first time the
    ability to use multi-keys for multi-recipients was included.

    there is nothing we can do in the courts to prevent corporations
    processing encrypted mail through servers for verification, or even
    content scanning.  business has this right --unfortunately, the
    government can compel the business to exercise this "right" and 
    therefore government potentially does have real-time access.

    THE FOCUS:

    All efforts need to be directed to prevent the inclusion of
    master keys in hardware and/or software and the mandating of
    universal usage of the government system.  there is little
    difference in what F[reeh,uck] is proposing and Clipper --and 
    the same arguments can challenge F[reeh,uck] and friends.

    Let's not waste time hashing and rehashing business practices we 
    have long since been forced to accept; and stay away from politics:

        FOCUS on our Constitutional rights.

    death is inevitable --an action we all face; some things are worth
    dying early defending  --my personal privacy rights and the sanctity 
    of my intellectual processes or whatever I wish to cogitate or 
    regurgitate is one of them. For the masses:

        '54-40 OR FIGHT' 

    or any number of us will die martyrs;

    STAND UP AND BE COUNTED; 

    dont be government wimps, snitches, and shills like Hallam-Baker.

        attila on the way out

 ______________________________________________________________________
 "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 


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>An article in today's (Fri, Oct 3) New York Times (CyberTimes) ...
>describes the new release of "PGP for Business Security 5.5," which
>contains mechanisms that incorporate key recovery mechanism that can
>either be volontary or be enforced by using PGP's software for controlling
 >a company's SMTP server -- the server can verify that all encrypted
>messages include the corporate public key (or conform to other corporate
>policies):

	Alex Le Heux <alexlh@xs4all.nl> noted:

|>	Keep in mind that this is the 'PGP for Business'. Companies often
|>operate on the principle that email that's sent and received from
|>their machines is the company's, not the employee's. This is actually
|>reasonable business practice. Specially when encryption enters the
|>picture. The employee could walk under a bus, and leave some vital
|>but encrypted emails in his mailbox. This could be a real problem for
|>corporations.

	William H. Geiger III <whgiii@invweb.net> brushed aside PGP Inc's
critics to complain:

>>This has been discussed before on this list and others, and few have
>>disagreed, that a company has a legitimate need to be able to access its
>>encrypted data. If employees want to send love letters or whatnot then
>>they should not be doing it on company time using company resources.
>>
>>If a corporation wishes to establish a company policy that all
>>correspondence be encrypted with the companies master key it is their
>>right to do so and IMNSHO it would be foolhardy for them to do otherwise.
>>
>>Claiming that they are doing the work of Big Brother is a cheap-shot and
>>uncalled for.

	With respect, Gentlemen, I think you are missing the point.

	There is no corporate demand for a key-recovery mechanism which
allows Management immediate real-time access to all encrypted electronic
communications.  This new PGP facility is analogous to key-escrow or
key-recovery for session keys; in essence, it's a backdoor to the session.

	Here in the US, FBI Director Louis Freeh has been pointed in his
comments about the distinction between key-recovery for stored data and
key-recovery for transient electronic communications.  Key-recovery for
encrypted stored data, Freeh noted, serves a sensible and pragmatic
business need.  Corporations will do it because it's a necessary part of
their Disaster Planning.

	But, as Freeh noted several times in Congressional testimony, there
are few if any business requirements for surreptitious, real-time, access
to online communications, so businesses (unless forced by legislation,
argued Freeh) simply won't do it.  It is police agencies, not Management,
which seek real-time access to all encrypted e-mail.  No one but the Govt
wants it.

	Management, at least in the US, doesn't need this sort of
evidentiary data. Management has an employee who can be required to keep a
copy of all business e-mail for Management review; or required to cc his or
her boss on all e-mail to a customer -- or even forbidden to use e-mail for
anything other than business mail cced to the boss. And, of course, the
employee can be fired if he/she doesn't comply.

	But the truth is: Managment doesn't need the aggravation and --
while the standard of managment oversight is more lenient, at least for
professional staff -- no company can keep talented employees if it treats
them this way.  Surreptitious universal access to an employee's encrypted
e-mail _is_ like sound and video pickups in the bathrooms.  Vastly
intrustive; humilating; diminishing. Far more intrustive than is useful or
necessary for conventional management needs.

	It is the work of Big Brother, sadly.

	GAK-enabled PGP, plain and simple!

	As Director Freeh noted, it's only LEAs who need and want this.

	The likely early victims of such a draconian oversight will
probably be the long-suffering US government employees.  With no evidence
to support my supposition, I'll bet the GAKed-crypto strategists are once
again offering the federal workforce as the sacrificial lambs, as they did
with Fortezza.  Trying (again!) to use the bulk federal purchasing power to
establish a defacto product standard.  Watch over the next six months. I
think they used the new -- "post-Fortezza," pre-PKI -- prospect of huge
'98-'99 federal purchases of COTS crypto for non-classified DoD and
civilian agency e-mail to lure Mr. Zimmerman, major stockholder, into
swallowing the words of Feckless Phil, the wild and wooly free-crypto
rebel.

	Anyone wanna wager that this "design option" evolved concurrent
with a quiet MOU-structured review of the New Improved PGP by the X
Organization at Ft. Meade?   Nor, I fear, will this be the last enhanced
cryptographic communications app to come out of vendors active in the NSA's
new Commercial Liaison initiative.  Big federal market. Big lure. Hard not
to give the Customer what he wants.

	Still, it's sad.

	(I, btw, am moderating a panel on the "Prospects for Government
Control of the Internet" at the NSA/NIST-sponsored NISSC in Baltimore this
week.  Among my panelists are David Herson, the top pro-GAK policy maven
for the European Commission; Tom Black of Smith System Engineering, the
network specialists commissioned by the European Parlament to figure out
how to enforce content regulation; Patricia Edfors, the Chair of the
federal PKI Steering Committee and the Security Champion on GITS;  Dave
Farber of UPenn, the Internet Society, and EFF; and Danny Weitzner of CDT.
Powerful and articulate voices from all sides of the Question.

	Thoughtful and non-obvious suggestions for questions to the Panel
would be welcome -- to the List or in private e-mail. TIA.)

		_Vin

      Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin@shore.net>
  53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548
                                  -- <@><@> --

Tim May <tcmay@got.net> writes:
> I agree that an employer has a "right" to read employee mail, sent on
> company time with company resources.
> 
> However, a program which facillitates this has no business being called
> "Pretty Good Privacy." As Phil notes, it goes against the whole spirit of
> PGP. It's surveillance, pure and simple.
> 
> Further, while businesses have every right to monitor their workers (Hey,
> I'm not saying I _like_ this, just that the alternative of banning such
> monitoring would be abusive to a property owner's rights), we should not be
> _encouraging_ the spread of such technologies. Especially given the very
> real risk that wide deployment of "Business PGP" could present.

I agree with Tim's point that we should not be encouraging businesses
to use GAK technologies for Corporate access to keys.

Your "choice" not to work for a company which uses software like
pgp5.5 is likely to become ever more limited if corporates adopt this
type of policy.  They will be conditioned to expect this.  Governments
will of course encourage corporates to use such software.

I'd prefer to see an "off-the-record" option: a personal comment
option, with non-transferable signatures, and no GAK; this would give
the user the option to have the mail as an official company statement,
by clicking "official company business" button, and an option for
unofficial, or "not an official statement" button, which are more akin
to phone conversations which are typically not recorded.

Personal comments are in any case probably in the companies interests
not to have transferable proof of authorship attached to.  Many email
comments are sent with a few seconds thought, a sort of too and fro
banter between employees, some of whom have business company contacts
who are also personal friends, etc.  Actually for maximal
non-transferability all "not an official statement" email should be
sent via mixmaster remailers, otherwise mail logs etc, may give some
material which could be used as proof of authorship.

This set up seems less troublesome than pgp's offering with pgp5.5.  I
reckon it's more sensible to archive "official company business"
communications in the normal way.  Compose the message in a word
processor, archive that, or build in an archive mechanism into the
MUA/mail encryption system which encrypts to a storage system.

Communications encryption keys should be transient, otherwise you are
opening your self up to the less often considered form of key escrow:
your company or you are presented with a court order for your keys.
Or the Feds burgle your offices and install keyboard sniffer.  If
they're interested in you they will already have hoovered up your past
email with cooperation of your leased line providor.

I really think people are asking for trouble not using forward secrecy
for secured email.  The attacker can archive all your encrypted email,
and then decrypt at his leisure if he is able to compromise your key
at a later date.


Also I seem to remember that Tim, or perhaps someone else, reported
that PRZ stated at a recent cpunks meeting that he would quit PGP Inc
if they went for a GAK option.

Well Phill?  Getting pretty close ain't it?

Adam
-- 
Now officially an EAR violation...
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

Adam Back wrote:
> Tim May <tcmay@got.net> writes:
> > I agree that an employer has a "right" to read employee mail, sent on
> > company time with company resources.
...
> > Further, while businesses have every right to monitor their workers (Hey,
> > I'm not saying I _like_ this, just that the alternative of banning such
> > monitoring would be abusive to a property owner's rights)...

I hate to inject too strong a note of reality into arguments that I
would like to agree wholeheartedly with, but I believe that there has
been so much thievery of both property and rights (individual and
corporate) that it is extremely difficult to make a strong case for
any pure argument any more.
First, the federal government gives a business confiscated land to
support a failing industry, the state gives them huge tax breaks
to move from elsewhere, the city does the same, while taxing you
even more to support the grand growth schemes that the mayor and
council members are getting rich on, and then the company announces
that you can 'choose' not to work there if you don't like their
rules.

> Your "choice" not to work for a company which uses software like
> pgp5.5 is likely to become ever more limited if corporates adopt this
> type of policy.  They will be conditioned to expect this.  Governments
> will of course encourage corporates to use such software.

In Canada, one could 'choose' not to work for Safeway Stores, but the
chain would come into a community and undersell everyone until the
locals were run out of business, then raise prices dramatically.
In theory, you could choose to *not* work for Safeway, but in reality,
there was no one else left *to* choose to work for in the grocery 
business.

TruthMonger

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

In <3438F7E2.7BAE@dev.null>, on 10/06/97 
   at 08, TruthMonger <tm@dev.null> said:

>In Canada, one could 'choose' not to work for Safeway Stores, but the
>chain would come into a community and undersell everyone until the locals
>were run out of business, then raise prices dramatically. In theory, you
>could choose to *not* work for Safeway, but in reality, there was no one
>else left *to* choose to work for in the grocery  business.

I have these same complaints about WalMart and KMart here in the US. It
should be noted that it is the community that *chooses* to shop at the
discount store rather than at the local shops. If they didn't buy products
from the Safeway or WalMart then you wouldn't have the "problem" above.
Economics 101; the people are voting with their wallets.

This is a prime example of the basis of socialism; envy. The socialist are
envious of the rich as they are a constant reminder of "what could have
been". "If I had only worked a little harder" ... "If I only had spent
more time in school" ... ect. After a period of time this envy turns to
jelousy and rage. "It's not fair" ... "There should be a law" ... ect.

The socialist never thinks of the hard work and personl sacrfise that goes
into creating a "Safeway" or "KMart" or "Walmart". Such companies are not
created by an act of GOD but through hard work and long hours by their
founders. While the socialist is pissing his life away on the road to
medocracy the founders of such companies, and 1000's like them, are
working 80+ hours a week building their company sometimes at the expence
of health, home and family.

After years of hard work, when the founders are finaly able to reap the
fruits of their toil, the socialist will step up and say: "I want what you
have, you can't have that because I don't" even though the socialist has
done nothing to earn it. 

This is the true evil of socialism: "Equiality of Outcome". While the
socialist will make a big show of his desire for "equal opertunity" it is
really "equal outcomes" that he desires. It is like the story of the
grashopper and the ant. Both have the "equal opertunity" durring the
summertime to store up for the winter. The ant choses the path of the
capitalist and works hard all sumer long while the grasshopper choses the
path of the socialist and wastes the days away in play and folly. When
wintertime comes along the ant is well prepaired while the grasshopper is
without. While the capitalist will see the grasshopper getting his just
rewards for his foolhardy behavior the socialist will cry foul, seeing
this as unjust that the ant should have so much and the grasshopper so
little and demaniding that the ant give a portion of his "wealth" (a large
portion no doubt) to the grasshopper thus achiving his desired "equality
of outcome" even the grasshopper has done nothing to deserve such an
outcome.

- -- 
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html                        
- ---------------------------------------------------------------

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William H. Geiger III wrote:
> TruthMonger <tm@dev.null> said:
> 
> >In Canada, one could 'choose' not to work for Safeway Stores, but the
> >chain would come into a community and undersell everyone until the locals
> >were run out of business, then raise prices dramatically. In theory, you
> >could choose to *not* work for Safeway, but in reality, there was no one
> >else left *to* choose to work for in the grocery  business.
> 
> If they didn't buy products
> from the Safeway or WalMart then you wouldn't have the "problem" above.
> Economics 101; the people are voting with their wallets.
> 
> This is a prime example of the basis of socialism; envy. The socialist are
> envious of the rich as they are a constant reminder of "what could have
> been".
>
> The socialist never thinks of the hard work and personl sacrfise that goes
> into creating a "Safeway" or "KMart" or "Walmart". Such companies are not
> created by an act of GOD but through hard work and long hours by their
> founders.

  Nothing personal, shit-for-brains, but this sounds like the 'standard
speech' you have prepared, waiting only for a 'trigger' before you fire
it off...

  I was making reference to the simple fact that 'Caveat Hemptor' still
rules, but does so with the backing of men who can afford to hire thugs
called policemen to back their action.
  My point is that Safeway has every right to bring their competition
to financial ruin, just as Nestle's has every right to give away their
baby formulae for free in impoverished countries, just long enough for
the mother's milk to dry up, at which time their babies die if they
can't afford to buy Nestle's product.
  I reserve the right, however, to whack their sorry asses out if 
I decide that my world will be a better place without their scheming
for their own profit at the expense of those who believe the fairy
tales they tell while planning to buttfuck the people all along.

  The rest of your post is proof that one should not read Ayn Rand
while high on acid, but I'm glad you could get all of that off your
chest, just the same.

  The point I was making, if you care to respond to it once the buzz
wears off, is that the 'playing field' has been twisted so far out of
askew that it is difficult to make any judgements about capitalism
versus socialism, etc., since the world is standing on its head.
  I sincerely doubt that 'capitalists' getting paid 'not to grow' 
cotton/corn/whatever, are a far cry different from the socialists
getting paid 'not to go to work.'

  There are no longer any capitalists or socialists, there are only
people projecting images with political rhetoric and ten-second
sound-bytes.
  I am beginning to think that the *only* way to level the playing
field is with a nuclear grader. (If only I could figure out where 
this damn yellow wire goes...)

TruthMangler

> After years of hard work, when the founders are finaly able to reap the
> fruits of their toil, the socialist will step up and say: "I want what you
> have, you can't have that because I don't" even though the socialist has
> done nothing to earn it.
> 
> This is the true evil of socialism: "Equiality of Outcome". While the
> socialist will make a big show of his desire for "equal opertunity" it is
> really "equal outcomes" that he desires. It is like the story of the
> grashopper and the ant. Both have the "equal opertunity" durring the
> summertime to store up for the winter. The ant choses the path of the
> capitalist and works hard all sumer long while the grasshopper choses the
> path of the socialist and wastes the days away in play and folly. When
> wintertime comes along the ant is well prepaired while the grasshopper is
> without. While the capitalist will see the grasshopper getting his just
> rewards for his foolhardy behavior the socialist will cry foul, seeing
> this as unjust that the ant should have so much and the grasshopper so
> little and demaniding that the ant give a portion of his "wealth" (a large
> portion no doubt) to the grasshopper thus achiving his desired "equality
> of outcome" even the grasshopper has done nothing to deserve such an
> outcome.
> 
> - --
> - ---------------------------------------------------------------
> William H. Geiger III  http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii
> Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0
> 
> Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
> PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
> OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html
> - ---------------------------------------------------------------
> 
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