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John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive

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NODE 8d78e037John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
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Congrats to Mr. Gilmore, EFF, et. al. for a very impressive DES crack.

It seems that Gilmore and Moore's Law have just turned the
once-respected DES into cryptographic snake-oil. He keeps hurting
snakes like that, he's gonna get himself canonized. ;-).


Seriously. Many thanks to Mr. Gilmore for proving, once again, that
lobbying is pointless, and that physics is not optional.

Outstanding. Marvellous.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

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-----------------
Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@philodox.com>
Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The Philodox Symposium on Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement
  July 23-24, 1998: <http://www.philodox.com/symposiuminfo.html>
NODE d0fae9bdRe: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
Oh please ...

As you point out, physics is not optional.  This is predictable and was
predicted.  Yawn.

I predict that 3DES will fall too - actual time it takes is left to the
student.

More interesting, how about a supposition that DNA computers will be able
to factor
interesting numbers within 5 years ?  Does that make certain other
algorithms into snake-oil ?

At the heart of this is the idea that "strong" cryptography is a fixed and
finite
set over time and that a change in that set will result in a change in the
policy restricting export.  It doesn't necessarily follow.  Lobbying is
necessary.

Perhaps all that happens is that DES now joins the crowd of exportable
algorithms :-)

One lesson I plan to observe - don't encrypt known plaintext unless you
have to !

John Lowry

At 04:20 PM 7/17/98 -0400, Robert Hettinga wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
>Congrats to Mr. Gilmore, EFF, et. al. for a very impressive DES crack.
>
>It seems that Gilmore and Moore's Law have just turned the
>once-respected DES into cryptographic snake-oil. He keeps hurting
>snakes like that, he's gonna get himself canonized. ;-).
>
>
>Seriously. Many thanks to Mr. Gilmore for proving, once again, that
>lobbying is pointless, and that physics is not optional.
>
>Outstanding. Marvellous.
>
>Cheers,
>Bob Hettinga
>
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>-----------------
>Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@philodox.com>
>Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>The Philodox Symposium on Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement
>  July 23-24, 1998: <http://www.philodox.com/symposiuminfo.html>
>
>For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to
>"dcsb-request@ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help".
>
>
NODE 5c2e30faRe: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
On Wed, Jul 22, 1998 at 06:18:30AM -0700, John Gilmore wrote:
> > One lesson I plan to observe - don't encrypt known plaintext unless you
> > have to !
> 
> The EFF DES Cracker cracks more than just known plaintext (though it's
> the easy case).

It occurs to me that an interesting use for the eff des cracker would
be the following: since the government asserts that DES is safe, then
a DES encrypted archive of crypto code should be exportable.  So the
next time someone feels the need to export something that is currently
not exportable, simply encrypt it, along with some plaintext, with
DES, trash the key, export it, and send the plaintext and the
encrypted plaintext to the EFF...

This is not a practical use, but it would make an interesting test 
case in court.

-- 
Kent Crispin, PAB Chair			"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html
NODE 559762d3Re: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
On Mon, 27 Jul 1998, Kent Crispin wrote:

> It occurs to me that an interesting use for the eff des cracker would
> be the following: since the government asserts that DES is safe, then
> a DES encrypted archive of crypto code should be exportable.

No. Encrypting with DES, or any symmetric cipher
does not destroy the information, which is what is controlled.
Even losing the key does not destroy the information, as we all know:
keys can be recovered it is just a matter of the work involved.

Encrypting with an OTP is interesting at first .. but considering that
distributing a crypto archive or the completed works of Shakespeare
amount to the same thing after an OTP has been used, I am not convinced
it has much meaning.

The _spirit_ of the law is that no crypto device can be exported. Programs
are considered to be devices.. as is evidenced by the recent decision
in the Bernstein case.

We don't need encrypted archives floating around.. we need to show that,
like cars, crypto devices (programs or otherwise!) are useful even if
they can be used by bad people for bad purposes.

Abstract things like exporting a hunk of random crap and arguing about
it don't achieve this, and will never do so in the minds of laymen
with no real interest in crypto.

As for me, I prefer the position of my countryman, Henry David Thoreau ..
civil disobedience:

Michael J. Graffam (mgraffam@mhv.net)
http://www.mhv.net/~mgraffam -- Philosophy, Religion, Computers, Crypto, etc
Be a munitions trafficker: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/rsa-keygen.html

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NODE b05d6c06Re: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
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In <Pine.LNX.3.96.980727211127.13539A-100000@albert>, on 07/27/98 
   at 09:20 PM, mgraffam@mhv.net said:

>The _spirit_ of the law is that no crypto device can be exported.
>Programs are considered to be devices.. as is evidenced by the recent
>decision in the Bernstein case.

That was the Junger case. In the Bernstein case the principles of Free
Speach and the 1st Amendment were upheld by the 9th District court
(Patel).

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Geiger Consulting    Cooking With Warp 4.0

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NODE c50852adRe: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
On Mon, 27 Jul 1998, William H. Geiger III wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> In <Pine.LNX.3.96.980727211127.13539A-100000@albert>, on 07/27/98 
>    at 09:20 PM, mgraffam@mhv.net said:
> 
> >The _spirit_ of the law is that no crypto device can be exported.
> >Programs are considered to be devices.. as is evidenced by the recent
> >decision in the Bernstein case.
> 
> That was the Junger case. In the Bernstein case the principles of Free
> Speach and the 1st Amendment were upheld by the 9th District court
> (Patel).

You're absolutably right. My bad.. I don't know what I was thinking.
I guess this shows my pessimissim and lack of trust in our establishment,
doesn't it :)

Michael J. Graffam (mgraffam@mhv.net)
http://www.mhv.net/~mgraffam -- Philosophy, Religion, Computers, Crypto, etc
Be a munitions trafficker: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/rsa-keygen.html

#!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj
$/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1
lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)
NODE ae2ef311Re: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
On Mon, Jul 27, 1998 at 09:20:10PM -0400, mgraffam@mhv.net wrote:
> On Mon, 27 Jul 1998, Kent Crispin wrote:
> 
> > It occurs to me that an interesting use for the eff des cracker would
> > be the following: since the government asserts that DES is safe, then
> > a DES encrypted archive of crypto code should be exportable.
> 
> No. Encrypting with DES, or any symmetric cipher
> does not destroy the information, which is what is controlled.
> Even losing the key does not destroy the information, as we all know:
> keys can be recovered it is just a matter of the work involved.

Apparently we are talking at cross purposes.

Currently, there are rather large ftp crypto archives that are
"protected" by a scheme using randomly generated directory names. 
This is considered acceptable by the export authorities.  The export
authorities would have a hard time, therefore, arguing that an archive
protected by encrypting the files with DES would not be sufficiently
protected.

It would be a stunt, of course.  Merely another stunt to illustrate 
the inconsistencies in the export laws.

[...]
> We don't need encrypted archives floating around.. we need to show that,
> like cars, crypto devices (programs or otherwise!) are useful even if
> they can be used by bad people for bad purposes.
> 
> Abstract things like exporting a hunk of random crap and arguing about
> it don't achieve this, and will never do so in the minds of laymen
> with no real interest in crypto.

I quite disagree.  Frequently a clever stunt does engage the layman 
-- at least the intelligent laymen.

-- 
Kent Crispin, PAB Chair			"No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com			the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint:   B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44  61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html
NODE f1070523Re: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
> One lesson I plan to observe - don't encrypt known plaintext unless you
> have to !

The EFF DES Cracker cracks more than just known plaintext (though it's
the easy case).  It also cracks plaintexts whose likely byte values
are known (e.g. all alphanumeric), winnowing the keyspace down to a
size that software or humans can search.  Such a search runs in very
close to the time required for an ordinary known-plaintext search.
See the book for details (www.oreilly.com).

We successfully cracked a DES-encrypted Eudora saved-mail file
provided by Bruce Schneier during our debugging period.  He gave us
the top byte of the key so we could focus on debugging rather than on
waiting to get to the right block of keyspace.  The machine located
the key within that 49-bit keyspace after we fixed a few software
bugs.

	John
NODE 081a793fRE: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
John,
Do you plan on renting out the use of the cracker on a per-key basis and if
so, how much do you anticipate charging for cracking a message?

Thanks,
--Lucky

> -----Original Message-----
> From: e$@vmeng.com [mailto:e$@vmeng.com]On Behalf Of John Gilmore
> Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 1998 6:19 AM
> To: John Lowry
> Cc: Robert Hettinga; gnu@toad.com; cryptography@c2.net;
> coderpunks@toad.com; cypherpunks@toad.com; e$@vmeng.com;
> dcsb@ai.mit.edu; gnu@cygnus.com
> Subject: Re: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
>
>
> > One lesson I plan to observe - don't encrypt known plaintext unless you
> > have to !
>
> The EFF DES Cracker cracks more than just known plaintext (though it's
> the easy case).  It also cracks plaintexts whose likely byte values
> are known (e.g. all alphanumeric), winnowing the keyspace down to a
> size that software or humans can search.  Such a search runs in very
> close to the time required for an ordinary known-plaintext search.
> See the book for details (www.oreilly.com).
>
> We successfully cracked a DES-encrypted Eudora saved-mail file
> provided by Bruce Schneier during our debugging period.  He gave us
> the top byte of the key so we could focus on debugging rather than on
> waiting to get to the right block of keyspace.  The machine located
> the key within that 49-bit keyspace after we fixed a few software
> bugs.
>
> 	John
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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>
NODE b2a60dd6Re: John Gilmore and the Great Internet Snake Drive
At 11:48 AM -0400 on 7/20/98, John Lowry wrote:


> Oh please ...

Okay, I'll say it again: Yes, Virginia, DES is now officially Snake Oil.

As much snake oil as if someone tried to sell a Ceasar cipher -- a
perfectly good prechristian military messaging technology, mind you :-) --
for use in modern internet financial cryptography.

So, Virginia, DES is DED. Game over. Kaput.

Get used to it.

> As you point out, physics is not optional.  This is predictable and was
> predicted.  Yawn.

Actually my point. It may have been predicted, but it has now happend. DES
is now Snake Oil.

BTW, try getting your gingivitis fixed before you go yawning in someone's
face. ;-).

> I predict that 3DES will fall too - actual time it takes is left to the
> student.

I see. In *your* lifetime? Splendid. I'd love to see *that* happen. And, of
course, *you're* going to do it, Mr. Lowry? Yawn, yourself.

> More interesting, how about a supposition that DNA computers will be able
> to factor
> interesting numbers within 5 years ?

Probably not in your lifetime, bunky, no matter how many 5-gallon buckets
of slime you can grow. Burden of proof's on you, here. My claim that DES is
snakeoil is based on proven fact. Your claim that DNA can economically
factor numbers fast has yet to be demonstrated, and I challenge you to
prove otherwise with a straight face.

> Does that make certain other
> algorithms into snake-oil ?

Anything that is broken, like DES now is, and is still claimed by others to
be safe, and sold by them as such, is, in my book, snake-oil.


> At the heart of this is the idea that "strong" cryptography is a fixed and
> finite
> set over time and that a change in that set will result in a change in the
> policy restricting export.  It doesn't necessarily follow.

No, it doesn't follow, because that's not what I said. I said that because
it is now demonstrably trivial to break DES messages, especially DES
financial messages (the kind with *money* in them, for those in Loma
Linda), DES is now Snake Oil. Just like the Ceasar cipher.

>   Lobbying is
> necessary.

Lobbying is only necessary for those who want to use force to maintain
market share -- geographic, or otherwise. :-). Lobbying itself is the
profession of con men who use the threat of government force to extort
money from people who work, and give it to those who don't, in particular
said con men.

The only way to avoid government's propensity to dynasticize :-) is to
innovate faster than they can regulate. In Loma Linda, they call it
"progress", bunky. And, crypto has just progressed to such a point that
formerly presumed peekware like DES has just been proven to be such, and is
now, quite fairly, snake oil. Moore's law is not optional, At least in
DES's case.

Lobbying is not necessary if you change the world faster than they can
control it. Gilmore, et. al., just proved that.

Lobbying to change the "legal" keysize is a waste of time. Physics causes
economics, which causes law, which causes "policy". It's never the other
way around, regardless of the beltway's daydreams to the contrary.

> Perhaps all that happens is that DES now joins the crowd of exportable
> algorithms :-)

I would claim that, your disengenous ":-)" aside (yeah, I know, pot,
kettle, black), that any "exportable" algorithm is in fact snake oil. And
Gilmore just proved it.

> One lesson I plan to observe - don't encrypt known plaintext unless you
> have to !

Wha? Security through obscurity? How exactly can you encrypt a message you
don't know the contents of?

Oh. I get it. Statist humor. (Yeah, I know about blinding, I just hate
sophistry...)

Feh.

Cheers,
Bob Hettinga

-----------------
Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@philodox.com>
Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
The Philodox Symposium on Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement
  July 23-24, 1998: <http://www.philodox.com/symposiuminfo.html>