NODE 3ba4eadcFrom: dac@zurich.ibm.com (Marc Dacier)
bill payne <billp@nmol.com>Fri, 31 Jul 1998 11:13:25 -0700 (PDT)
Friday 7/31/98 11:40 AM
John Young
I am looking at http://www.jya.com/raid98.htm
Dacier asked me why NSA/Sandia was concerned about what
each bit in an executable image did when I was in his office in
Zurich in April 1997.
Spiking, of course. A SECRET OTHER FUNCTION to a device.
http://caq.com/cryptogate http://www.aci.net/kalliste/speccoll.htm
NSA/Sandia doesn't trust its own employees!
On the other hand, NSA/Sandia employees don't trust NSA/Sandia either.
The REAL WORLD again.
IBM Zurich was BIG into Java.
Network World, July 20, 1998 page 6
The incredible shrinking Java alliance
By Chris Nerney and Andy Eddy
A year ago there were four of them, members of a new alliance
touting a potent new weapon designed to end Microsoft Corp.'s
growing dominance in the computing industry.
Now the Java Gang of Four is the Gang of Two and a Half.
Java creator Sun Microsystems, Inc., of course, is still fully
committed to the programming language, as is IBM. ...
Not looking good for Java future.
Java is similar to FORTH. FORTH executes super-slow on high-level
in most machines. About 10% of the speed of a compiled-language
program - such as Visual Basic.
Specialized Forth and Java machine can be made to run fast.
http://groucho.gsfc.nasa.gov/forth/ and http://www.ptsc.com/
But I am not confident Java or Forth machines are going anywhere.
May be hard to get parts in the future.
But I'm confident about the 80C32 supply!
http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2
Let's hope this UNFORTUNATE matter http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm gets
settled soon so that we can move on to constructive projects.
Later
bill
/\/\/\
Marc
Since I was working the OTHER SIDE of
Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
for the FBI, I might be able to give a nice talk about what the US
government is REALLY UP TO on defeating intrusion detection!
I am not reading e-mail.
best
bill
Hi Matthias!
Counterfeiting Wiegand Wire Access Credentials
Bill Payne
October 16,1996
Abstract
Wiegand wire access credentials are easy and
inexpensive to counterfeit.
Access Control & Security Systems Integration magazine, October
1996 [http://www/securitysolutions.com] published the article,
Wiegand technology stands the test of time
by PAUL J. BODELL, page 12
Many card and reader manufacturers offer Wiegand (pronounced
wee-gand) output. However, only three companies in the
world make Wiegand readers. Sensor Engineering of Hamden
Conn., holds the patent for Wiegand, and Sensor has licensed
Cardkey of Simi Valley, Calif., and Doduco of Pforzheim,
Germany, to manufacture Wiegand cards and readers. ... A
Wiegand output reader is not the same thing as a Wiegand
reader, and it is important to understand the differences.
In brief, Wiegand reader use the Wiegand effect to
translate card information around the patented Wiegand
effect in which a segment of a specially treated wire
generates an electronic pulse when subjected to a specific
magnetic field. If the pulse is generated when the wire is
near a pick-up coil, the pulse can be detected by a circuit.
Lining up several rows of wires and passing them by a cold
would generate a series of pulses. Lining up two rows of
wires - calling on row "zero bits" and the other "one bits"
- and passing them by two different coils would generate two
series of pulses, or data bits. These data bits can then be
interpreted as binary data and used to control other
devices. If you seal the coils in a rugged housing with
properly placed magnets, and LED and some simple circuitry,
you have a Wiegand reader. Carefully laminate the special
wires in vinyl, and artwork, and hot-stamp a number on the
vinyl, and you have a Wiegand card.
IN THE BEGINNING
Wiegand was first to introduce to the access control
market in the late 1970s. It was immediately successful
because it filled the need for durable, secure card and
reader technology.
Embedded in the cards, Wiegand wires cannot be altered or
duplicated. ...
Bodell's Last statement is incorrect.
Tasks for EASILY counterfeiting Wiegand wire cards are
1 Locate the wires inside the card to read the 0s and 1s.
2 Build an ACCEPTABLE copy of the card.
Bodell's clear explanation of the working of a Wiegand card can
be visualized
zero row | | |
one row | |
binary 0 1 0 0 1
representation
Solutions to Task 1
A X-ray the card
B MAGNI VIEW FILM, Mylar film reads magnetic fields ...
Edmunds Scientific Company, catalog 16N1, page
205, C33,447 $11.75
is placed over the top of the Wiegand card.
COW MAGNET, Cow magnetics allow farmers to trap metal in the
stomachs of their cows. Edmunds, page 204, C31,101 $10.75
is placed under the card.
Location of the wires is easily seen on the green film.
Mark the position of the wires with a pen.
Next chop the card vertically using a shear into about 80/1000s
paper-match-sized strips.
Don't worry about cutting a wire or two.
Note that a 0 has the pen mark to the top. A 1 has the pen mark
at the bottom.
Take a business card and layout the "paper match"-like strips to
counterfeit the card number desired.
Don't worry about spacing. Wiegand output is self-clocking!
Tape the "paper-match - like" strips to the business card.
Only the FUNCTION of the card needs to be reproduced!
History
Breaking electronic locks was done as "work for others" at Sandia
National Laboratories beginning in 1992 funded by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation/Engineering Research Facility, Quantico,
VA.
The FBI opined that this work was SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION.
Details of the consequences of this work are covered in
Fired Worker File Lawsuit Against Sandia
Specialist Says He Balked When Lab Sought Electronic
Picklock Software, Albuquer Journal, Sunday April 25, 1993
State-sanctioned paranoia, EE Times, January 22, 1996
One man's battle, EE Times, March 22, 1994
Damn the torpedoes, EE Times, June 6, 1994
Protecting properly classified info, EE Times, April 11,
1994
DOE to scrutinize fairness in old whistle-blower cases,
Albuquerque Tribune, Nov 7 1995
DOE boss accelerates whistle-blower protection, Albuquerque
Tribune, March 27, 1996
DOE doesn't plan to compensate 'old' whistle-blowers with
money, Albuquerque Tribune September 27, 199
NODE 19403afbRe: From: dac@zurich.ibm.com (Marc Dacier)
Anooshiravan Merat <merata@sums.ac.ir>Fri, 31 Jul 1998 14:00:31 -0700 (PDT)
STOP SENDING ME EMAILS MR PAYNE
STOOOPPPP IITTTT!!!!!!
bill payne wrote:
> Friday 7/31/98 11:40 AM
>
> John Young
>
> I am looking at http://www.jya.com/raid98.htm
>
> Dacier asked me why NSA/Sandia was concerned about what
> each bit in an executable image did when I was in his office in
> Zurich in April 1997.
>
> Spiking, of course. A SECRET OTHER FUNCTION to a device.
>
> http://caq.com/cryptogate http://www.aci.net/kalliste/speccoll.htm
>
> NSA/Sandia doesn't trust its own employees!
>
> On the other hand, NSA/Sandia employees don't trust NSA/Sandia either.
>
> The REAL WORLD again.
>
> IBM Zurich was BIG into Java.
>
> Network World, July 20, 1998 page 6
>
> The incredible shrinking Java alliance
>
> By Chris Nerney and Andy Eddy
>
> A year ago there were four of them, members of a new alliance
> touting a potent new weapon designed to end Microsoft Corp.'s
> growing dominance in the computing industry.
> Now the Java Gang of Four is the Gang of Two and a Half.
> Java creator Sun Microsystems, Inc., of course, is still fully
> committed to the programming language, as is IBM. ...
>
> Not looking good for Java future.
>
> Java is similar to FORTH. FORTH executes super-slow on high-level
> in most machines. About 10% of the speed of a compiled-language
> program - such as Visual Basic.
>
> Specialized Forth and Java machine can be made to run fast.
> http://groucho.gsfc.nasa.gov/forth/ and http://www.ptsc.com/
>
> But I am not confident Java or Forth machines are going anywhere.
> May be hard to get parts in the future.
>
> But I'm confident about the 80C32 supply!
> http://www.apcatalog.com/cgi-bin/AP?ISBN=0125475705&LOCATION=US&FORM=FORM2
>
> Let's hope this UNFORTUNATE matter http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm gets
> settled soon so that we can move on to constructive projects.
>
> Later
> bill
>
> /\/\/\
>
> Marc
>
> Since I was working the OTHER SIDE of
>
> Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
>
> for the FBI, I might be able to give a nice talk about what the US
> government is REALLY UP TO on defeating intrusion detection!
>
> I am not reading e-mail.
>
> best
> bill
>
> Hi Matthias!
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Counterfeiting Wiegand Wire Access Credentials
>
> Bill Payne
>
> October 16,1996
>
> Abstract
>
> Wiegand wire access credentials are easy and
> inexpensive to counterfeit.
>
> Access Control & Security Systems Integration magazine, October
> 1996 [http://www/securitysolutions.com] published the article,
>
> Wiegand technology stands the test of time
>
> by PAUL J. BODELL, page 12
>
> Many card and reader manufacturers offer Wiegand (pronounced
> wee-gand) output. However, only three companies in the
> world make Wiegand readers. Sensor Engineering of Hamden
> Conn., holds the patent for Wiegand, and Sensor has licensed
> Cardkey of Simi Valley, Calif., and Doduco of Pforzheim,
> Germany, to manufacture Wiegand cards and readers. ... A
> Wiegand output reader is not the same thing as a Wiegand
> reader, and it is important to understand the differences.
>
> In brief, Wiegand reader use the Wiegand effect to
> translate card information around the patented Wiegand
> effect in which a segment of a specially treated wire
> generates an electronic pulse when subjected to a specific
> magnetic field. If the pulse is generated when the wire is
> near a pick-up coil, the pulse can be detected by a circuit.
> Lining up several rows of wires and passing them by a cold
> would generate a series of pulses. Lining up two rows of
> wires - calling on row "zero bits" and the other "one bits"
> - and passing them by two different coils would generate two
> series of pulses, or data bits. These data bits can then be
> interpreted as binary data and used to control other
> devices. If you seal the coils in a rugged housing with
> properly placed magnets, and LED and some simple circuitry,
> you have a Wiegand reader. Carefully laminate the special
> wires in vinyl, and artwork, and hot-stamp a number on the
> vinyl, and you have a Wiegand card.
>
> IN THE BEGINNING
>
> Wiegand was first to introduce to the access control
> market in the late 1970s. It was immediately successful
> because it filled the need for durable, secure card and
> reader technology.
> Embedded in the cards, Wiegand wires cannot be altered or
> duplicated. ...
>
> Bodell's Last statement is incorrect.
>
> Tasks for EASILY counterfeiting Wiegand wire cards are
>
> 1 Locate the wires inside the card to read the 0s and 1s.
>
> 2 Build an ACCEPTABLE copy of the card.
>
> Bodell's clear explanation of the working of a Wiegand card can
> be visualized
>
> zero row | | |
>
> one row | |
>
> binary 0 1 0 0 1
> representation
>
> Solutions to Task 1
>
> A X-ray the card
>
> B MAGNI VIEW FILM, Mylar film reads magnetic fields ...
> Edmunds Scientific Company, catalog 16N1, page
> 205, C33,447 $11.75
>
> is placed over the top of the Wiegand card.
>
> COW MAGNET, Cow magnetics allow farmers to trap metal in the
> stomachs of their cows. Edmunds, page 204, C31,101 $10.75
> is placed under the card.
>
> Location of the wires is easily seen on the green film.
>
> Mark the position of the wires with a pen.
>
> Next chop the card vertically using a shear into about 80/1000s
> paper-match-sized strips.
>
> Don't worry about cutting a wire or two.
>
> Note that a 0 has the pen mark to the top. A 1 has the pen mark
> at the bottom.
>
> Take a business card and layout the "paper match"-like strips to
> counterfeit the card number desired.
>
> Don't worry about spacing. Wiegand output is self-clocking!
>
> Tape the "paper-match - like" strips to the business card.
>
> Only the FUNCTION of the card needs to be reproduced!
>
> History
>
> Breaking electronic locks was done as "work for others" at Sandia
>
> National Laboratories beginning in 1992 funded by the Federal
> Bureau of Investigation/Engineering Research Facility, Quantico,
> VA.
>
> The FBI opined that this work was SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY
> INFORMATION.
>
> Details of the consequences of this work are covered in
>
> Fired Worker File Lawsuit Against Sandia
> Specialist Says He Balked When Lab Sought Electronic
> Picklock Software, Albuquer Journal, Sunday April 25, 1993
>
> State-sanctioned paranoia, EE Times, January 22, 1996
>
> One man's battle, EE Times, March 22, 1994
>
> Damn the torpedoes, EE Times, June 6, 1994
>
> Protecting properly classified info, EE Times, April 11,
> 1994
>
> DOE to scrutinize fairness in old whistle-blower cases,
> Albuquerque Tribune, Nov 7 1995
>
> DOE boss accelerates whistle-blower protection, Albuquerque
> Tribune, March 27, 1996
>
> DOE doesn't plan to compensate 'old' whistle-blowers with
> money, Albuquerque Tribune September 27, 199
NODE f44b08a3Re: From: dac@zurich.ibm.com (Marc Dacier)
"William H. Geiger III" <whgiii@openpgp.net>Fri, 31 Jul 1998 17:17:30 -0700 (PDT)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
In <35C20839.43A1@nmol.com>, on 07/31/98
at 12:08 PM, bill payne <billp@nmol.com> said:
>Java is similar to FORTH. FORTH executes super-slow on high-level in
>most machines. About 10% of the speed of a compiled-language program -
>such as Visual Basic.
FORTH 10% of VB!! ROTHLMAO!!!! Obviously whoever wrote that doesn't have a
clue when it comes to FORTH. I have old FORTH code I wrote years ago and
even running interpreted (and yes FORTH can be compiled) it is faster than
anything the brain-dead Micky$loth crowd could ever dream of writting in
VB. Add to the fact that your average FORTH programmer has a much higher
skill set than your typical VB programmer and is capable of writting fast,
tight code (when have you ever heard fast, tight code used to describe a
VB program?)
<sigh> why am I not surprised to see yet another "journalist"
clue-impaired.
- --
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net
Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0
Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice
PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail.
OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html
- ---------------------------------------------------------------
Tag-O-Matic: Windows? Homey don't play that!
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NODE 051ec934Re: From: dac@zurich.ibm.com (Marc Dacier)
Xcott Craver <caj@math.niu.edu>Fri, 31 Jul 1998 18:49:38 -0700 (PDT)
> >Java is similar to FORTH. FORTH executes super-slow on high-level in
> >most machines. About 10% of the speed of a compiled-language program -
> >such as Visual Basic.
> FORTH 10% of VB!! ROTHLMAO!!!!
Rolling on the hearth? Rolling off the house? Ripping
out tiny hairs?
Running over the hamster?
You sadistic F@#%.
> Obviously whoever wrote that doesn't have a clue when it comes to FORTH.
It reads especially weirdly to anyone who remembers that BASIC
was traditionally interpreted, too. What crazy times we live in.
And anyone who wants to claim VB superior to FORTH has to
earn the right by transferring first a FORTH-made binary, then
a VB-made binary, from one computer to another via floppy
disks.
> VB. Add to the fact that your average FORTH programmer has a much higher
> skill set than your typical VB programmer and is capable of writting fast,
> tight code
That's because writing in FORTH is like spending the day
solving brain-teasers.
Not that that's a bad thing; I figure programmers would get
paid a lot more for much higher quality work if they were required
to be in extreme brain-on mode 24/7. But at least we have C++,
huh?
-Caj