Re: 090498_crypto

Ying:

   >   From: Jim Choate <ravage@EINSTEIN.ssz.com>
   >
   >      Tauzin: FBI won't get crypto key and more on high-tech and Capitol Hill 
   >      September 3, 1998 5:55 PM PT
   >      Updated at 6:58 PM PT
   >      
   >      SAN FRANCISCO -- An influential Congressman says Congress is close to
   >      resolving the bitter dispute over encryption software, and it looks as
   >      though it will be decided in favor of the high-tech industry.
   >      
   >      U.S. Rep. Bill Tauzin, R-La., said flatly that "we're not going to
   >      give the FBI the keys to the encryption system." The remark came as
   >      part of a wide-ranging interview with ZDNN.

Yang:

Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT

Statement for the Record
FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
September 3, 1998

Good morning Chairman Hatch and members of the judiciary committee. I
am pleased to be with you this morning as you explore the U.S.
Government's response to international terrorism.

[snip]

THE FUTURE

Would like to close by talking briefly about steps we can take to
further strengthen our abilities to prevent and investigate terrorist
activity.

ENCRYPTION

One of the most important of these steps involves the FBI's encryption
initiative. Communication is central to any collaborative effort --
including criminal conspiracies. Like most criminals, terrorists are
naturally reluctant to put the details of their plots down on paper.
Thus, they generally depend on oral or electronic communication to
formulate the details of their terrorist activities.

For this reason, the law enforcement community is very concerned about
the serious threat posed by the proliferation of encryption
technology. Current standards do not allow for law enforcement access
or the timely decryption of critical evidence obtained through lawful
electronic surveillance or search and seizures.

The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth
amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for
robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national
security needs.

The encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists
today effectively thwart the ability of law enforcement agencies to
implement the court-ordered surveillance techniques that have helped
put some of the nation's most dangerous offenders behind bars. Whether
a state police department is racing the clock to find a kidnapped
child or the FBI is attempting to track and prevent the destructive
ambitions of an international terrorist group, the need for timely
access to legally obtained electronic surveillance cannot be
overstated.

[snip]

EXPANSION OF FBI LEGATS

Likewise, the expansion of the number of FBI LEGATS around the world
has enhanced the ability of the FBI to prevent, respond to, and
investigate terrorist acts committed by international terrorists
against U.S. Interests worldwide. As evidenced by developments in the
embassy bombing cases in East Africa, the ability to bring
investigative resources to bear quickly in the aftermath of a
terrorist act can have significant impact on our ability to identify
those responsible. I encourage Congress to support our efforts to
counter the international terrorist threat by continuing to support
expansion of our LEGAT program.

[snip]

Crypto came up a couple times during Q&A as well. 

-Declan


On Sun, 6 Sep 1998, Information Security wrote:

> Ying:
> 
>    >   From: Jim Choate <ravage@EINSTEIN.ssz.com>
>    >
>    >      Tauzin: FBI won't get crypto key and more on high-tech and Capitol Hill 
>    >      September 3, 1998 5:55 PM PT
>    >      Updated at 6:58 PM PT
>    >      
>    >      SAN FRANCISCO -- An influential Congressman says Congress is close to
>    >      resolving the bitter dispute over encryption software, and it looks as
>    >      though it will be decided in favor of the high-tech industry.
>    >      
>    >      U.S. Rep. Bill Tauzin, R-La., said flatly that "we're not going to
>    >      give the FBI the keys to the encryption system." The remark came as
>    >      part of a wide-ranging interview with ZDNN.
> 
> Yang:
> 
> Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism
> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT
> 
> Statement for the Record
> FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
> September 3, 1998
> 
> Good morning Chairman Hatch and members of the judiciary committee. I
> am pleased to be with you this morning as you explore the U.S.
> Government's response to international terrorism.
> 
> [snip]
> 
> THE FUTURE
> 
> Would like to close by talking briefly about steps we can take to
> further strengthen our abilities to prevent and investigate terrorist
> activity.
> 
> ENCRYPTION
> 
> One of the most important of these steps involves the FBI's encryption
> initiative. Communication is central to any collaborative effort --
> including criminal conspiracies. Like most criminals, terrorists are
> naturally reluctant to put the details of their plots down on paper.
> Thus, they generally depend on oral or electronic communication to
> formulate the details of their terrorist activities.
> 
> For this reason, the law enforcement community is very concerned about
> the serious threat posed by the proliferation of encryption
> technology. Current standards do not allow for law enforcement access
> or the timely decryption of critical evidence obtained through lawful
> electronic surveillance or search and seizures.
> 
> The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth
> amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for
> robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national
> security needs.
> 
> The encryption capabilities available to criminals and terrorists
> today effectively thwart the ability of law enforcement agencies to
> implement the court-ordered surveillance techniques that have helped
> put some of the nation's most dangerous offenders behind bars. Whether
> a state police department is racing the clock to find a kidnapped
> child or the FBI is attempting to track and prevent the destructive
> ambitions of an international terrorist group, the need for timely
> access to legally obtained electronic surveillance cannot be
> overstated.
> 
> [snip]
> 
> EXPANSION OF FBI LEGATS
> 
> Likewise, the expansion of the number of FBI LEGATS around the world
> has enhanced the ability of the FBI to prevent, respond to, and
> investigate terrorist acts committed by international terrorists
> against U.S. Interests worldwide. As evidenced by developments in the
> embassy bombing cases in East Africa, the ability to bring
> investigative resources to bear quickly in the aftermath of a
> terrorist act can have significant impact on our ability to identify
> those responsible. I encourage Congress to support our efforts to
> counter the international terrorist threat by continuing to support
> expansion of our LEGAT program.
> 
> [snip]
> 
>

Tim asks:

>Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting
>the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they 
>be speaking of?
...
>Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions.

Threat of terrorism will be the impetus for applying national security 
restrictions domestically, for relaxing cold war limitations on spying
on Americans, for dissolving barriers between law enforcement
and military/intelligence agencies.

Technical means for access to encrypted data will probably
come first in communications, then to stored material. There
will be an agreement for increased CALEA wiretap funding, which 
is what the two cellular and wired suits against the FBI intend,
(paralleling what the hardware and software industries want from
federal buyers of security products).

This will provide the infrastructural regime for the gov to monitor 
and store domestic traffic as NSA does for the global, using the 
same technology (NSA may provide service to domestic
LEA as it now does for other gov customers for intel).

Other access will come through hardware and software for
computers, paralleling technology developed for telecomm tapping,
tracking and monitoring. 

Most probably through overt/covert features of microprocessors 
and OS's, as reported recently of Wintel and others, but also 
probably with special chips for DSP and software for modular 
design -- why build from scratch when these handy kits are 
available.

As noted here, the features will appear first as optional, in response
to demand from commerce, from parents, from responsible
institutions, to meet public calls for protection, for privacy, for
combating threats to the American people. 

Like wiretap law, use of the features for preventative snooping will 
initially require a court order, as provided in several of the crypto 
legislative proposals.

Like the wiretap orders, gradually there will be no secret court refusals 
for requests to use the technology in the national interest.

A publicity campain will proclaims that citizens with nothing to hide 
will have nothing to fear. Assurance of safety will be transparent, 
no clicks on the line. In a digital world, home-office devices will send
lifestyle data to the device manufacturers over the always monitoring 
transparental Net.

Personal privacy will evaporate almost unnoticeably, as with the tv 
remote control, cp/defcon/bar brag, telephone, fax and forever-lovers 
pillowtalk.

>> Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism
>> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT
>>
>> Statement for the Record
>> FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
>> September 3, 1998

>> The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth
>> amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for
>> robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national
>> security needs.

For the Nth time, let me restate the obvious: all current crypto
restrictions being discussed involve _exports_. There are no domestic
restrctictions whatsoever on domestic use of crypto. Any of us, even
resident aliens, tourists, terrorists, etc. are perfectly free to use PGP,
one time pads, stego, and even Meganet Snake Oil Unbreakable Crypto.

There are, officially, no proposals on the table to limit speech within the
U.S. by limiting the types and forms of language may use. There is the SAFE
bill, which stands zero chance of passing, but this involves relaxing
export requirements (though I expect compromises added, such as the
felonization of crypto use in a crime, are an unwelcome step toward
domestic restrictions).

But it bears constant repeating, especially to the skeptical, that there
are NO DOMESTIC CRYPTO LAWS. Unlike some other countries, the fascists have
not yet managed to get a foothold in the attempt to limit use of crypto by
the citizen-units.

We all know this, but Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting
the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they be speaking of?

And since the Fourth Amendment is an internal U.S. thing (not counting
limited applicability to some foreigners, and of course to U.S. citizens
abroad who encounter U.S. offices, etc.), what can Louis possibly be
referring to when he speaks of the Fourth Amendment? Surely he is not
referring to satisfying the Fourth Amendment concerns for privacy amongst
the Russians, Afghans, and so forth?

Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions.

We all know this, but it sometimes bears repeating what the Constitution
says, what the status quo is, and what they are proposing.

They are planning domestic crypto restrictions, GAK, and all the rest of
what we have long expected.

When that comes, anyone will be full jusfified in taking action by any
means necessary to halt the onset of the total state.

--Tim May

"The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of
tyrants...."
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist              | black markets, collapse of governments.

On Sun, 6 Sep 1998, Tim May wrote:
> 
> There are, officially, no proposals on the table to limit speech within the
> U.S. by limiting the types and forms of language may use. There is the SAFE
> bill, which stands zero chance of passing, but this involves relaxing
> export requirements (though I expect compromises added, such as the
> felonization of crypto use in a crime, are an unwelcome step toward
> domestic restrictions).

Every version of SAFE includes crypto-in-a-crime as a key component. The
thinking of its drafters and backers like Reps. Goodlatte, Eschoo,
Lofgren, CDT, and some corporate lobbyists is that it would be too
politically controversial to pass Congress without it.

There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the
U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd
crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago.

-Declan

PS: Note to DC cypherpunks. There's a meet/party 9-19 in Adams Morgan.

At 8:39 AM -0700 9/7/98, John Young wrote:
>It would be fitting for this list to be distinguished as
>the place where crypto-in-a-crime was first committed.
>
>What might that be? A match of the crime committed
>to prevent widespread strong crypto?
>
>Crypto-criminal anonymity in the national interest (governmental
>secrecy) fighting to prevent crypto-criminal anonymity in the
>public interest (private secrecy).
>
>This is not a troll, but query on what could be done to to tip the
>hand and identify those unnamed who are most fearful of strong
>cryptography, not their public rougers in the 3 divs of gov.

Well, there are just so many things that are now called "crimes" in these
Beknighted States, that it's really a matter of what the Authorities decide
to prosecute.

For example, do they prosecute J. Random Cypherpunk for his support of the
freedom fighters of Hezbollah, which is on the State Department's list of
"terror"-supporting organizations? (Meaning that citizen-unit sheeple are
breaking the law if they provide any financial or technical support to
Hezbollah.) If they prosecute J. Random Cypherpunk, and can show he used
PGP to send messages to the freedom fighters, or even supplied them with a
copy of PGP....

Or how about the religious organization known as Aum Shinretsu. Apparently
I am breaking a U.S. law by tithing to the Aum religion, as it is also on
this list.

And then there are those RICO laws. Arranging cutout organizations to let
foreign nationals consult and write code is probably a violation of various
laws.

I can think of lots of "crimes" in the eyes of the burrowcrats that many of
us are committing constantly.

However, "crypto in a crime" has not become law yet. And if we can keep
those pesky "civil rights" lobbyists in D.C. neutralized, maybe it never
will be. With any luck, these curriers of favor are inside the fallout
pattern from Bin Laden's nuke.

--Tim May




"The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of
tyrants...."
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist              | black markets, collapse of governments.

On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, Tim May wrote:
> 
> However, "crypto in a crime" has not become law yet. And if we can keep
> those pesky "civil rights" lobbyists in D.C. neutralized, maybe it never
> will be. With any luck, these curriers of favor are inside the fallout
> pattern from Bin Laden's nuke.

Taking no position on "public interest" groups for this post, I'd still
note that such lobbyists don't really drive legislation in this area. It's
business groups, especially the Americans For Computer Privacy alliance,
that are drafting the bills and twisting the arms.

And their E-PRIVACY bill has crypto-in-a-crime in it.

-Declan

It would be fitting for this list to be distinguished as
the place where crypto-in-a-crime was first committed.

What might that be? A match of the crime committed
to prevent widespread strong crypto?

Crypto-criminal anonymity in the national interest (governmental
secrecy) fighting to prevent crypto-criminal anonymity in the 
public interest (private secrecy).

This is not a troll, but query on what could be done to to tip the 
hand and identify those unnamed who are most fearful of strong 
cryptography, not their public rougers in the 3 divs of gov.

True that governmental dietary laws are immensely flexible 
when the dogs are hungry.

Given that moral and financial and political betrayal and treachery 
do not qualify for grave natsec threat, and only those acts which 
aim at snatching the very best technology for political control, it's 
the NBC toys that attract most of the serious searchers for terrorists 
under the global bed.

For crypto-in-a-crime that might mean sending here an encrypted
message with an explanatory note that it contains, say:

How to tell the difference between decoys and the real tranporters 
of nuclear components among the national labs and/or to Pantex 
for disassembly.

Or where the recovered Pu and triggers are stored in the TX 
panhandle, helpfully describing what's fake and what's not,
what the security plan is, not disinfo, what tools are needed to 
pick up emanations, how to weed the spoofs.

Or what and where BW or CW armaments are being refreshed,
repaired, deactivated, or invented in top secrecy just in case
some rogue violates a treaty, what tools are needed to sniff 
precursors, how to weed the spoofs, and how to avoid seeded 
soil in your backyard.

Or where key targeters of foreign terrorists live, their childrens' 
school, their favorite places to get away from the terrible
responsibility for USG assassination politics.

Or, could one encrypt a message to oneself claiming to
contain such information, post it here, see who wants
your heart and mind.

Or, create a PK pair, encrypt such a message, then post it,
both keys and PW here. Would the pacesetter be traced?

Would anyone notice, though? Would waiting for the disaster
be better strategy?

Thousands of threats pour in, State says, Secret Service says,
IC says, way too many to fully investigate, until one proves 
blessedly true, ah yes, the likely suspect, then marshal the 
targeters to cruise congress whispering look at this, to OK 
cleansweeping CDR, according to immensely flexible menus
long set.

If anyone does it with an eye to civil disobedience, let me know. But the
bill isn't law yet, and one might reasonably hope that it won't be.

The details vary. First it was crypto in the commission of a felony. Now
it's been narrowed considerably, though not all bills have the "better"
version.

-Declan

On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, John Young wrote:

> It would be fitting for this list to be distinguished as
> the place where crypto-in-a-crime was first committed.
> 
> What might that be? A match of the crime committed
> to prevent widespread strong crypto?
> 
> Crypto-criminal anonymity in the national interest (governmental
> secrecy) fighting to prevent crypto-criminal anonymity in the 
> public interest (private secrecy).
> 
> This is not a troll, but query on what could be done to to tip the 
> hand and identify those unnamed who are most fearful of strong 
> cryptography, not their public rougers in the 3 divs of gov.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>

At 6:53 AM -0700 9/7/98, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the
>U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd
>crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago.
>

I'd forgotten about that little one. Of course, it has not gone anywhere
(no Senate version or committee markup, right?), so I'm not yet ready to
say there's official action on its way. And, fortunately, the session is
over but for the shouting about Clinton and his cigars.

--Tim May

"The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of
tyrants...."
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist              | black markets, collapse of governments.

We even make an illusion to Monica's Cigar in a story in this week's Time.
A Microsoft story I was working on died at the last moment, unfortunately.

As for the crypto bills, there is no comparable Senate bill. Certainly
this is not for lack of sponsors: Kyl and Feinstein would be glad to
introduce it, and Kyl chairs a relevant subcommittee. But they wanted to
see how far they'd get with McCain's bill, and now it's too late to do
much, as Tim said. 

-Declan


On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, Tim May wrote:

> At 6:53 AM -0700 9/7/98, Declan McCullagh wrote:
> 
> >There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the
> >U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd
> >crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago.
> >
> 
> I'd forgotten about that little one. Of course, it has not gone anywhere
> (no Senate version or committee markup, right?), so I'm not yet ready to
> say there's official action on its way. And, fortunately, the session is
> over but for the shouting about Clinton and his cigars.
> 
> --Tim May
> 
> "The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of
> tyrants...."
> ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
> Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
> ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
> W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
> Licensed Ontologist              | black markets, collapse of governments.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>

I've been politely corrected in email. I meant "allusion" of course. I
seem to find myself doing this more often lately... --Declan

On Mon, 7 Sep 1998, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> We even make an illusion to Monica's Cigar in a story in this week's Time.
> A Microsoft story I was working on died at the last moment, unfortunately.

Actually, Tim, the way the Men in Black work is that they keep their bans on
domestic crypto under wraps until the last moment and then get them adopted
with no public hearings in the crisis atmosphere of a heavily lobbied markup
session at some critical point in the legislative calendar.  They know that
the more people actually understand what they are up to, the less they are
likely to get what they want.  But do not underestimate the power of having
useful stooges like Jerry Solomon and the shamefully clueless Jon Kyl in
positions where they can do last-minute switcheroo on bills that are being
moved to the floor.  One of the major reasons why we didn't get the
Goodlatte bill on the floor this year is that moving it to the Floor would
have resulted in putting Oxley Manton or the House Intelligence Committee
bill on the Floor at the same time.

-----Original Message-----
From:	owner-cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
[mailto:owner-cypherpunks@cyberpass.net] On Behalf Of Tim May
Sent:	Monday, September 07, 1998 8:55 AM
To:	Declan McCullagh
Cc:	cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject:	Re: What we are Fighting

At 6:53 AM -0700 9/7/98, Declan McCullagh wrote:

>There is, offically, a proposal on the table to limit speech within the
>U.S. by restricting sale, manufacture, distribution, import of non-GAK'd
>crypto. A House committee approved that one year ago.
>

I'd forgotten about that little one. Of course, it has not gone anywhere
(no Senate version or committee markup, right?), so I'm not yet ready to
say there's official action on its way. And, fortunately, the session is
over but for the shouting about Clinton and his cigars.

--Tim May

"The tree of liberty must be watered periodically with the blood of
tyrants...."
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist              | black markets, collapse of governments.