// COMPLETE THREAD

ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale

8 expanded posts ยท every known parent and child

NODE 335bfc2eATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale
Dear BlackNet,

TOTO Enterprises, Bienfait, Saskatchewan hereby offers
for sale sog's key under the BlackNet anonymous
information market.

Payments must be in anonymous ecash delivered to a
digital dead drop to be arranged later.

Or alternatively, we are willing to take bids in
bottles of Scotch delivered to TOTO Key Escrow
Services, Box 281, Bienfait, Saskatchewan SOC OMO.

Please find enclosed Son of Gomez's key.

Sincerely,

Toto

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.6.2
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=MILa
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
                          *** The Fire House Inn ***
                                 Come visit us
                               Telnet: fhouse.org
                                WWW:  fhouse.org
                                  ***********
NODE de4577a0Re: ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale
At 6:41 PM -0700 10/13/98, Anonymous wrote:
>Dear BlackNet,
>
>TOTO Enterprises, Bienfait, Saskatchewan hereby offers
>for sale sog's key under the BlackNet anonymous
>information market.
>
>Payments must be in anonymous ecash delivered to a
>digital dead drop to be arranged later.
>
>Or alternatively, we are willing to take bids in
>bottles of Scotch delivered to TOTO Key Escrow
>Services, Box 281, Bienfait, Saskatchewan SOC OMO.

Hey, I could tell you all that BlackNet was used a while back to distribute
some of the keys used by The Performance Artist Sometimes Known as Toto.

But that then might earn _me_ a subpoena, so I won't.

There are more things in cyberspace than are dreamt of in our religions,
Horatio Alger (hiss).

--Tim May

Y2K: A good chance to reformat America's hard drive and empty the trash.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   831-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist         | black markets, collapse of governments.
NODE bc93f314Re: ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale
Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> notes that the "Toto death thread"
posting was signed using the "son of Gomer" Blacknet key that
was broken by Paul Leyland (read through the past few days of the
archives to get the context).

Adam notes: "Implications?  Others had CJs keys?  Toto is someone
other than CJ?"

One other implication to consider: you might be able to attain
semi-deniability by siging a message with a key that is breakable
by an adversity with govermental resources (to use an euphamism)
but not by an ordinary, presumably less motivated, cracker.

I.e., when "they" arrest you for "speaking truth to kings," your
lawyer claims that, because the signing key was weak, the
government had forged the message and key in order to attack
you for your otherwise legal political views.

Of course, I'm probably just being paranoid.

Martin Minow
minow@pobox.com
NODE 70423198Re: ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale
Martin Minow <minow@pobox.com> writes:
> Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> notes that the "Toto death thread"
> posting was signed using the "son of Gomer" Blacknet key that
> was broken by Paul Leyland (read through the past few days of the
> archives to get the context).

Note the `son of gomez' key was _encrypted with_ the Blacknet key.
Toto/anonymous was submitting his information for sale to Blacknet, so
he used a `digital dead drop' -- encrypted with Blacknet's key and
posted in a public place (cypherpunks), however he (it appears
intentionally) used the weak 384 bit Blacknet key which Paul Leyland's
announce claims was created by Larry Detweiler.

Also note that Paul Leyland (and Alec Muffett, Arjen Lenstra, Jim
Gillogly) factored that key a _long_ time ago, Jun 1995 (see the Date
on the attachment of the announce to one of my earlier posts.)

Perhaps you understood that, but what you wrote (son of Gomer Blacknet
key?) was confusing.

> Adam notes: "Implications?  Others had CJs keys?  Toto is someone
> other than CJ?"
> 
> One other implication to consider: you might be able to attain
> semi-deniability by siging a message with a key that is breakable
> by an adversity with govermental resources (to use an euphamism)
> but not by an ordinary, presumably less motivated, cracker.

This is similar to the time-delay crypto proposals made by Tim May and
more lately David Wagner, (and some other authors who I forget, I
think Schneier).  One of the time-delay crypto protocols is to encrypt
the information one wants to a time-delayed release of with weak
encryption requiring the approximate amount of time you wish to delay
to break.

'Course it doesn't work in general because it depends entirely on the
resources of the attacker.  Really you need a third party to publish
private keys at delayed intervals.

But for your suggested applicatoin -- plausible deniability for
`speaking truth to kings' -- it works fine, because that's the point,
plausible deniability against well resourced attackers (you are in
trouble if well resourced attackers are interested in you anyway), but
some value to the signature for low resourced attackers.

Other ways to provide plausible deniability is to not sign public
posts, and to use non-transferable signatures for private email.

Adam
NODE d3f545d5plausible deniability (Re: ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale)
I wrote discussing plausible deniability for public postings:
> But for your suggested applicatoin -- plausible deniability for
> `speaking truth to kings' -- it works fine, because that's the point,
> plausible deniability against well resourced attackers (you are in
> trouble if well resourced attackers are interested in you anyway), but
> some value to the signature for low resourced attackers.
> 
> Other ways to provide plausible deniability is to not sign public
> posts, and to use non-transferable signatures for private email.

I missed from this list of approaches for plausible deniability the
canonical cypherpunks approach: post anonymously :-)

The other way is perhaps to have shared identities, such as Monty
Cantsin claimed to be, and such as perhaps Toto has been on occasion.

Adam
-- 
print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`
NODE 7752cd03Re: ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale
Tim May comments on:
> At 6:41 PM -0700 10/13/98, Anonymous wrote:
> >Dear BlackNet,
> >
> >TOTO Enterprises, Bienfait, Saskatchewan hereby offers
> >for sale sog's key under the BlackNet anonymous
> >information market.
> >
> >Payments must be in anonymous ecash delivered to a
> >digital dead drop to be arranged later.
> >
> >Or alternatively, we are willing to take bids in
> >bottles of Scotch delivered to TOTO Key Escrow
> >Services, Box 281, Bienfait, Saskatchewan SOC OMO.

I looked up the key this message was encrypted to on one of the
keyservers by it's keyid -- 0x5A5AD16B.

Look at this:

Type Bits/KeyID    Date       User ID
pub   384/5A5AD16B 1994/02/11 *** KEY REVOKED ***
                              BlackNet<nowhere@cyberspace.nil>

A revoked key, and a rather small key size, this rings a bell, some of
you may recall that some time ago Paul Leyland factored that key.  In
fact I have the hex version of it on my own web pages somewhere as an
example to use with rsa-perl.

A quick altavista on "Leyland BlackNet" turns up the goods [1] below.
(http://www.irdg.com/mep/nni/384broke.txt)

> Hey, I could tell you all that BlackNet was used a while back to
> distribute some of the keys used by The Performance Artist Sometimes
> Known as Toto.

Well this message does indeed seem to contain a key for:

Type Bits/KeyID    Date       User ID
sec  1024/2541C535 1997/11/07 son of gomez <InfoWar@dev.null>

and some claimed passwords for a "carljohn" sympatico account.

Curiouser and curiouser.  Intentional or not?  Intentional I think
from the contents, [2].

Adam


[1]
======================================================================
------- Forwarded Message

From: pcl@sable.ox.ac.uk (Paul Leyland)
Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,sci.crypt,alt.privacy
Subject: The BlackNet 384-bit PGP key has been BROKEN
Date: 26 Jun 1995 10:09:15 GMT
Organization: Oxford University, England
Lines: 165
Message-ID: <PCL.95Jun26110915@sable.ox.ac.uk>
NNTP-Posting-Host: sable.ox.ac.uk
Xref: mozo.cc.purdue.edu alt.security.pgp:21006 sci.crypt:40008 alt.privacy:225
76

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


We announce the first known hostile attack on a PGP public key.

In 1993, Tim May created BlackNet as a proof-of-concept implementation
of an information trading business with cryptographically protected
anonymity of the traders.  He created a 1024-bit key, and invited
potential traders to encrypt their sales pitch and a public key for a
reply with the BlackNet key, posting the result in one or more Usenet
newsgroups.  BlackNet would then reply in the same manner.  The original
proposal went only to a few people and May acknowledged his authorship
shortly afterwards, when his pedagogical point had been made. It was
soon posted to the Cypherpunks list, and from there to Usenet.  Six
months afterwards in February 1994, a 384-bit key was created in the
BlackNet name, and the BlackNet message was spammed to hundreds of
newsgroups by the new key owner, L. Detweiler.

At least one message was posted encrypted in the 384-bit key.  The
encryptor, either by design or by unwitting use of PGP's encrypttoself
option, also encrypted the message to his own key, exposing his identity
to anyone who cared to look him up on the key servers and use finger.

Factoring 384-bit integers is not too difficult these days.  We wanted
to see whether it could be done surreptitiously.  Jim Gillogly picked
the 384-bit BlackNet key as a suitable target, partly because of its
apparent interest and partly because he had saved a copy of the reply.
Paul Leyland took the key to pieces.  The public exponent was found to
be 17 and the public modulus:

3193508200533105601431099148202479609827976414818808019973596061739243\
9454375249389462927646908605384634672078311787

To factor this 116-digit integer, we used the same technology as the
RSA-129 project which completed last year.  That computation was so
large that it was necessary for it to be done in a blaze of publicity in
order to attract enough resources.  Ours, we estimated, would take about
400 mips-years, less than a tenth of the earlier one.  Arjen Lenstra and
Paul Leyland have been factoring integers for years, Lenstra with a
MasPar at Bellcore and Leyland with a dozen or so workstations at Oxford
University.  Alec Muffett has been contributing to factorizations for
almost a year, using forty or so machines outside working hours at Sun
Microsystems UK.  Jim Gillogly threw a couple of machines into the pot,
for a total peak power of around 1300 mips, plus the MasPar.  The
computation began on March 21st on the workstations and continued until
June 23rd.  Lenstra slipped in three weeks runtime on the MasPar between
other factorizations; he also performed the matrix elimination and
emailed the factors (PGP-encrypted) to Leyland. About 50% of the
computation was done by the MasPar.

The factors, as can easily be checked, are:
5339087830436043471661182603767776462059952694953696338283
and
5981374163444491764200506406323036446616491946408786956289

Over in Oxford, a doctored PGP was created.  It could generate only
one secret key, that from two primes hard-coded into it.  The key was
generated and tested on the following message:

> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
> Version: 2.6
> 
> hDwDqeLyyFpa0WsBAYCumTBz0ZUBL7wC8pMXS4mBS0m3Cf6PrPer+2A0EQXJZM46
> OvPnqNWz5QK3Lwyg9DeEqAPF5jH/anmgXQEE3RNhybQUcqnOSVGMO2f5hjltI73L
> 8CRXhFzMCgjdCwTRf0Oq61j4RAptUviqhDq/r7J2FpY7GwpL5DxuJ+YrWNep69LK
> Q/CkKxtwvv2f0taly4HCLCcqw59GQ5m++WnOwDQWKG7yUaXJuUG/mJdr/o+ia3y+
> QKyqOesHdSjWoXDpK7F2Cvxf2KpV3+vzbv+TriRyDV+zR/8womdJl6YAAAKtmWO2
> fy0sp/cqr/1ZGQKmfZWz5L0bh1e/sJXJq9PjvPc05ePxZ35XEoRTCqxbq2GPynkH
> YSynfXZY//814TKmdQxPBvkc8Nbi0rc/GYyoAmItDui4mQISYskGkmLieoWDDlpP
> E9tZlb/7Xa22QS53Or6DwU/y226WXQvrWq5OJ+8OhQyEnLWsEdfgFoe1l9aeweX5
> 0ao5lcp098Q4JFfQWoaU9D7kmKvg+AVT44Pv16/nPvihAoC2O14xg7t1U8032ybs
> 4FLpvxyqoF7+oDV/QNw4Evk1ZnxE5+PH2sOf1qCJdljVSd3wGSfUQaDPRx5RH0XC
> SAgYMsIRaytpdoq521tHUZt2BIg7Ii89TfUBrnkenBFAqdZAf+JR1PSB4yaV3YtG
> PCS4lNQkmWx+ItjP0zsHVcAR0TiBcpV0gMY+tx0h40CTkDi2vHiVyswSJr4halsW
> SIixrdi6B0i3f7v7xlOpFI2khza1c/dH8nrF1uPLECeAZ8TQq53ZlyN472KYuTVZ
> 8y5NqyXd672dYEtzsOlUa9YwFKKyGisyDhZmE5wSOg2Pjopvl0WkuZSR/kdxrX/N
> hFdfXRy1Kgkr+vz9abumhcWS5lYCCfVLk/CIgRqHO09nlEJCTb1T/U788Gptr3/d
> 3dj8C/LECdY7fIdkmTgYhXmfv7fQxLWln29Yux0cEpRq2ud8rjYVSuEaTUO9dF4n
> 9oFRsPdbb0TOxaMVFm2hnELzeKAk/poInfEZkN2ZnusxJ4aM1HkBRva+CAMhQHdT
> XMisoNawWEDPwiwu91owIrBevPJNvX155jUTwKNj0UPBwS6TfS5gXl9g+LoBnMWQ
> nbMMMYVXbJVsAeVOlzTSBftpbglx1k7ocDaAJTZ3OCjf0FcKJsa+4Hybc713611c
> WSHV5esfY9k/yw==
> =nLfz
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

A successful decryption resulted in:

>   Although I realize blacknet was a hoax of some sort, I'm curious as
> to the reasons behind it and I would like to know the motives of the 
> person who did it, malicious to make fun of cypher punks or simply
> poking fun at cyberspace in general.
>    I'm interested in forming a similar net, not for the buying and 
> selling of information, but for the fun of doing it, who knows what might 
> come about in a network somewhat limited and away from the internet, but
> based on pgp without people flaming, and without the netloons like
> dwetler and sternlight, (I have my doubts about dwetler's actual motives
> in spamming the mailers)
>   SO, hopefully they key I encrypt it to is the actual one, and if not
> hopefully whoever is intercepting this is as interested in creating 
> what I am, why else be eaves dropping??
>   Looking forward to hearing from whoever out there, and
> I hope you're competent enough with unix to extract my pgp key
> from my .plan
> 
> 
> --
> Finger yusuf921@raven.csrv.uidaho.edu for PGP public key 2.6ui
> GJ/GP -d+ H+ g? au0 a- w+++ v+(?)(*) C++++ U++1/2 N++++ M-- -po+ Y+++
> -         t++ 5-- j++ R b+++ D+ B--- e+(*) u** h* r+++ y?  
> 
> 
>

The next step was to create a revocation certificate and send that off
to the PGP key servers.  After all, the key has undoubtedly been
compromised.

The moral of this story is that 384-bit keys can be broken by a small
team of people working in secret and with modest resources.  Lest anyone
object that a MasPar is not a modest resource, we'd re-iterate that it
did only 50% of the work; that we took only three months and that we
used only 50 or so quite ordinary workstations.  We believe that we
could have used at least twice as many machines for at least twice as
long without anyone noticing. The currently minimum recommended key
size, 512 bits, is safe from the likes of us for the time being, but we
should be able to break them within five years or so.  Organizations
with more than "modest resources" can almost certainly break 512-bit
keys in secret right now.

Alec Muffett    alec.muffett@uk.sun.com
Paul Leyland    pcl@oucs.ox.ac.uk
Arjen Lenstra   lenstra@bellcore.com
Jim Gillogly    jim@acm.org

and, of course, BlackNet<nowhere@cyberspace.nil>     8-)

P.S.   The 384-bit BlackNet secret key is:

> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
> Version: 2.6.2i
> 
> lQDAAy/ty1QAAAEBgM98haqmu+pqkoqkr95iMmBTNgb+iL54kUJCoBSOrT0Rqsmz
> KHcVaQ+p4vLIWlrRawAFEQABfAw0gFVVGhzZF63Nc8HJin4jAy2WgIOsvST5ne1Y
> CbfyDIZ6siTHUAos8wMBQZ6Q8QDA2b6tiYqrGu6E1+F0DGPSk9MGif5/LKFrAMDz
> 8HXIK1zrEFEDq9/5dUXO2rk1tH+mkAEAv0EE9e5EJn+quL3/YvAg6bKOlM7HgVKq
> JEDDtCBCbGFja05ldDxub3doZXJlQGN5YmVyc3BhY2UubmlsPg==
> =/BEI
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----


- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6

iQCVAwUBL+6HEzt/x7zOdmsfAQGRpQP9FZluArrT5+zsG/R6y/MF7O3d7ArEkVe2
rUQgP7W2NxudAFHTNaL9mqLBDVNW/3PqWIhvHMtrSgG+ZAFBH5bP03tizfOFr+SL
eO1JQgYFey7Wh5J/YCuE0VTlYMZ7bhnoiGIvTYZgxIzVWAYyGmlWKRDjfKz/Pks8
qavbPg6qbPo=
=s12J
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
- --
Paul Leyland <pcl@sable.ox.ac.uk>        | Hanging on in quiet desperation is
Oxford University Computing Services     |     the English way.
13 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6NN, UK     | The time is gone, the song is over.
Tel: +44-1865-273200  Fax: 273275        | Thought I'd something more to say.
Finger pcl@sable.ox.ac.uk for PGP key    |

------- End of forwarded message -------

[2]
======================================================================
ATTN: Jeff Gordon

As a bonus PRIZE for people figuring this out, here's
Toto's sympatico username and password:

username: carljohn
password: 574kxy
SMTP: smtp.sk.sympatico.ca
POP3: mailhost.sk.sympatico.ca
POP3 username: carljohn

  I sent much of my outgoing mail through CJ's system
because he had so many hackers and system intruders
that he was a one-man 'Crowds' unit.

Toto

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2

mQCNAzRiaHcAAAEEAPdnnUJRJoktl6tMtRcrV330FvNPok4FvTMOT82V0lIRA7ZQ
jiAcv4Egm8nx6M6dc75eWIIPo4gZOWf5xjZzN8XjD2ytwMNqQnis0RMN9OI8ysk2
I7frJO0FNLikupHf+tUMhDc52qQbOcsVC53GZ8FdwY1zzaX7Dc5WpAclQcU1AAUR
tB9zb24gb2YgZ29tZXogPEluZm9XYXJAZGV2Lm51bGw+iQCVAwUQNGJph85WpAcl
QcU1AQFXPQQA8adaDwM3DnttrJPTjUd9I/fQ6q73Zvp6oLPP3MSon4uEbIVJryPB
wZYfcjXb6Co84XFpaL8shtgP0cHYRZDfQraCwsaJWOm1Lh+ZhZyqHh2oF4QrpOhm
A5YzxYI7SX3GIu/X1XO5vcb+BnJqbl2+RUaHnGqcwwrwxjSc1stGwJ4=
=Yx4A
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

-----BEGIN PGP SECRET KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
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=yYBi
-----END PGP SECRET KEY BLOCK-----
NODE dddbd448Re: ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

I realised that the private key for son of gomez is passworded, but it
turns out that the password is one of the set John Young forwarded to
the list from an anonymous source a few weeks back: sog709cejCJP

yeah :-)

AdamMonger

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NODE d56458b0Re: ATTN: BlackNet, sog's keys 4 sale
Wew.  The Son Of Gomez key I just decrypted and posted... it's not
just _any_ Toto key, it's _the_ key.  The 0x2541C535 one, the one that
signed the message in question.

Try it out.  [1] the message, [2] the keys.
(http://www.well.com/user/declan/toto/toto.pgp.120997.txt)

(Subject line in archives was "Encrypted InterNet DEATH THREAT!!!").

Implications?  Others had CJs keys?  Toto is someone other than CJ?

Adam

[1]
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"Contrary to one famous philosopher,
you're saying the medium is not the
message," Judge Thomas Nelson said,
alluding to the media theorist Marshall
McLuhan. 
http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/120997encrypt-bernstein.html

  Bullshit!
  The bits and bytes of email encryption are a clear message
that I wish to exercise my right to speak freely, without those
who wish to do me harm invading my privacy.
  The death of strong encryption on the InterNet will be the
global death of free speech on the InterNet. Accordingly, I 
feel it is necessary to make a stand and declare that I stand
ready and willing to fight to the death against anyone who
takes it upon themselves to try to imprison me behind an
ElectroMagnetic Curtain.

  This includes the Ninth Distric Court judges, if they come to
the conclusion that the government that they represent needs to
electronically imprison their citizens 'for their own safety.'


The problem: Criminals with a simple
encryption program can scramble their data
beyond even the government's ability to read it. 
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/content/zdnn/1208/261695.html

  Fuck the lame LEA pricks who whine about not being able to
stop someone bringing in a planeload of drugs without being
able to invade the privacy of every person on the face of
the earth.
  Am I supposed to believe that I have knowledge of when and
where major drug shipments are taking place, simply by virtue
of hanging out as a musician, yet the LEA's are incapable of
finding out the same information by being competent in their
profession? Barf City...
 [I will shortly provide information for any LEA which wishes
  to prosecute me for my coming 'physical' death threat, on
  how to hunt me down like the filthy dog that I am.]

"Why are you saying that the fact that [encryption]
is functional takes it out of the First Amendment
context?" Myron Bright, one of the judges, asked
the Justice Department attorney, who was still in
mid-sentence. He answered that the regulations
were not aimed at suppressing speech, but only at
the physical capacity of encryption to thwart
government intelligence gathering. 

  The Spanish language has the same "physical capacity." So 
does (:>), (;[), and {;-|). Likewise, BTW, FWIW, FYI, and
my own personal favorite, YMMV (You Make Me Vomit? --or--
Your Mileage May Vary?). <-- Ambidextrous encryption.
  An-cay e-way pect-exay ig-pay atin-lay usts-bay of 
ildren-chay?
  Whispering also has the "physical capacity" to "thwart 
government intelligence gathering."

  When does the bullshit stop? When do we stop making the
use of the Spanish language over the InterNet illegal?
When do we stop making whispering, pig-latin, anagrams
and acronyms illegal?
  When do we stop saying that our government is such a
piece of crap that it is a danger to let its citizens
communicate freely, in private, and share their private
thoughts with one another?


At one point Fletcher called the government's case 
"puzzling."
http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,17114,00.html

  Only because her mom taught her that it was unladylike to
say "Bullshit!"


In arguments Monday, a Justice Department
lawyer, Scott McIntosh, said the government's
intent was to preserve the ability of intelligence
agencies to eavesdrop on foreign governments
and citizens. 
http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/120997encrypt-bernstein.html

  Let's see if I have this right...
  The U.S. government needs to destroy the right to free speech 
and right to privacy of its own citizens in order to infringe
upon the human rights of the governments and citizens of other
countries? Countries which already have strong encryption?
Countries like Red China, which is currently engaged in 
encryption research with an American company who got permission
to export much more diverse encryption material (after making
a huge campaign donation to the Whitehouse) than Professor
Bernstein will ever likely share with others?
  Apologies to Judge Fletcher, but that's not "puzzling." That's
the same-old-same-old Bullshit!


OFFICIAL 'PHYSICAL' DEATH THREAT!!!
  The pen is mightier than the sword. Thus, I prefer to wage my
'war to the death' against those who would stomp on my basic
human rights *"in the interests of National Security"* with my
electronic pen, on the InterNet, using encryption when I have
reason to fear persecution by Facist, Nazi motherfuckers.
[* ~~ TruthMonger Vernacular Translation ~~ "so that the 
 government can maintain its authority over the citizens
 by use of force and violation of human rights, rather than
 going to all of the trouble of acting in a manner that will
 garner the citizens' respect."]

  I will continue to express my thoughts through the words
I send electronically over the InterNet, both publically
and privately. I will fight to the bandwidth death against
anyone who wants to deny me my right to express my opinions
and access the opinions of those who also wish to express
their own opinions and share their true thoughts with their
fellow humans.
  If the ElectronicMagnetic Curtain slams down around me, 
then I will have no choice but to continue my current fight
in MeatSpace.
  And I am not alone...

  I will share the same 'DEATH THREAT!!!' with Judges Fletcher,
Nelson and Bright that I have shared with the President and
a host of Congressional and Senatorial representatives:
  "You can fuck some of the people all of the time, and all of
the people some of the time, but you are going to end up in a
body bag or a pine box before you manage to fuck all of the
people all of the time."

  Am *I* going to whack you out? Maybe...
  I would prefer just dumping some tea in Boston Harbor, if that
will get my message across in MeatSpace, but if it won't, then
I guess I will have to take stronger action.
  There are undoubtedly a plethora of LEA's ready and willing to
prosecute and imprison me for agreeing with Patrick Henry, who
said, "Give me liberty, or give me death." The irony, of course,
is that I do not pose a great danger to anyone but myself as
long as I continue to have my human rights and my liberty
unthreatened.

  The chances of me actually getting off of my fat butt and
going out into the real world to whack out the enemies of
freedom are probably pretty small (unless I run out of 
cigarettes and beer, and wouldn't have to make an extra 
trip).
  I fully understand that this does not lessen the potential
of any LEA who gets a wild hair up their butt to throw a
mountain of taxpayer resources into prosecuting me and 
imprisoning me for their own professional/political gain.
  However, if you are performing actions so outrageously against
basic human rights and freedoms as to get me off of my lazy ass,
then I am the least of your problems, because there undoubtedly
are millions of people more functional than myself (who get out
of the house and go further than the liquor store) who are less
willing than myself to put up with increasingly heavy chains
placed around their hands and feet 'in the interests of national
security.'

  Feel free to have the Federales break down my door and
imprison me for pointing out the obvious. After all, I fit
the profile of a domestic terrorist--I quote the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights, and I speak out against increasingly
big government.
  But remember...it's the quiet ones you've got to watch...
If you force everyone to 'be quiet', then you've got a world
of trouble on your hands.

Sincerly,
John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
p.s.
NOTICE TO LEA AGENTS IN NEED OF A CAREER BOOST!
  Yes, I'm just a troublemaking asshole, trying to get John
<spit> Gilmore <fart> in trouble.
  However, if you want to go to the trouble of tracking me 
down, I will give you some hints, since it seems likely that
anyone who has trouble finding a ton of cocaine at an 
airport might not be competent in CyberSpace, either.
  You might want to check with the Webmasters at the sites
quoted above to see who has accessed their web sites this
morning. The anonymous remailer I will be using is an open
secret to CypherPunks around the world as a really bad 
attempt at disguising my true MeatSpace identity. This alone
ought to be enough for some aggressive young LEA and/or
federal prosecutor to earn themself some brownie-points,
since I am a sorry enough son-of-a-bitch that they would not
have much trouble convicting me in front of a jury of 'their'
peers, assuming that they can make certain that I am not 
tried by a jury of my own peers.

Bonus Points:
  I can also be tied into Jim Bell's Worldwide Conspiracy to 
assassinate government authorities, through my implementation
of an Assassination Bot.
 (I am willing to 'rat out' Jim for two bottles of Scotch. If
 he is willing to rat _me_ out for less, then I guess it's
 just my hard luck, eh? <--that's another hint!)

p.p.s.
  You can also charge me with use of 'conventional' encryption
in the commission of a crime.
  Must be your lucky fucking day, eh?

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